We are aware of recent reports regarding targeted phishing attacks that have resulted in account takeovers of some Signal users, including government officials and journalists. We take this very seriously.

To be clear: Signal’s encryption and infrastructure have not been compromised and remain robust. These attacks were executed via sophisticated phishing campaigns, designed to trick users into sharing information – SMS codes and/or Signal PIN – to gain access to users’ accounts.

These attacks, like all phishing, rely on social engineering. Attackers impersonate trusted contacts or services (such as the non-existent “Signal Support Bot”) to trick victims into handing over their login credentials or other information. To help prevent this, remember that your Signal SMS verification code is only ever needed when you are first signing up for the Signal app.

To protect people from such phishing, Signal actively warns users against sharing their SMS code and PIN.

We also want to emphasize that Signal Support will *never* initiate contact via in-app messages, SMS, or social media to ask for your verification code or PIN. If anyone asks for any Signal related code, it is a scam. We make this clear when users receive their SMS code during initial signup.

While we build robust technical safeguards, user vigilance is ultimately the best defense against phishing. We will continue to work on mitigating these risks via interface design and signposting throughout the app. In the meantime, please stay alert, and never share your SMS verification code or Signal PIN with anyone.

https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/9932566320410-Staying-Safe-from-Phishing-Scams-and-Impersonation

Staying Safe from Phishing, Scams, and Impersonation

We provide a privacy-first, end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messaging and calling platform designed so only you and your intended recipients can communicate securely. Even with strong encryption, attac...

Signal Support
@signalapp recipients who are not native English speakers may not notice the giveaways in this and similar scams.
@ExcelAnalytics @signalapp not only that, the entire concept of demaning a #PhoneNumber to use #Signal is inherently and irredeemably wrong to begin with!
Kevin Karhan :verified: (@kkarhan@infosec.space)

@signalapp@mastodon.world THERE IS *NO LEGITIMATE REASON* FOR #Signal TO DEMAND A #PhoneNumber (= #PII by circumstances if not mandatory doxxing to the governments aka. *"#KYC"*)… - so yes I [do blame Signal](https://infosec.space/@kkarhan/116200585213177913) because this attack vector is unique to #Signal's shittyness and would not exist with @monocles@monocles.social / #monoclesChat or even [`cock.li`](https://cock.li) of all places…

Infosec.Space

@kkarhan
This has always struck me as the strangest complaint about Signal.

You don't need to distribute your phone number to actually communicate with other signal users.

Presumably you want some form of 2fa, because losing your account would be bad.

And you don't want to be tied to some cloud based email provider.

And it's literally a phone app so every single user has the dependency.

@lackthereof it's not a "strange complaint", but a massive problem, because it creates dependency on a proven insecure network that is more often than not controlled if not run by hostile actors

  • Also #eMail, like #XMPP+#OMEMO, is based around #OpenStandards so you ain't forced to use any provider that is subject to #CloudAct nor known to snitch on customers without a valid domestic warrant
    • And if you trust noone, you can just host your eMail Server on a Rasberry Pi at home. It'll certainly be less convenient and more expensive but the you also get all the benefits of it being not possible to seize it without breaking into your home.

@signalapp mandating #PhoneNumners is a huge red flag because at best any #PhoneNumber is pseudonymous like a #Shitcoin-Wallet and that any #privacy is broken the moment it has any (even remotely circumstantial) connection to someone.

  • Because even if you ain't forced into #SelfDoxxing to obtain a #Prepaid - #SIM (aka. "#KYC") and/or Phone Number it is still a bad design.
    • Not to mention that this conpletely twarts their "#Metadata - #FUD" completely.

Not to mention #Signal's #App is a huge shitshow

The Lack Thereof :v_bi: (@lackthereof@beige.party)

@kkarhan@infosec.space This has always struck me as the strangest complaint about Signal. You don't need to distribute your phone number to actually communicate with other signal users. Presumably you want some form of 2fa, because losing your account would be bad. And you don't want to be tied to some cloud based email provider. And it's literally a phone app so every single user has the dependency.

beige.party

@kkarhan
Email is, in practice, a privacy shit show equal to or greater than phone numbers. Either you self-host, which means you have an isp and a DNS provider at minimum who can reveal your identity on their whims, even if you lie on a whois record. Or you use one of the mega free providers with all their conflicts of interest and data mining. Or you use a paid provider which opens up all the payment chain to trace back to you on top of everything else

To get a phone number I can walk to the corner convenience store and, with cash payment and no ID, purchase a prepaid SIM card. I can pay cash to refill it every month.

@lackthereof no, it's not because unlike #Phones and #PhoneNumbers, #eMail is not necessarily traceable by circumstances.

  • Because a Phone "Line" (regardless of whether it's POTS, ISDN, VoIP, GSM, VoLTE, …) and #telephony in general are designed for realtime communication, they inherently necessitate an active, ongoing connection.
    • Even if it's just some App/PBX/… to connect to the provider and constantly state "I am on the network and able to recieve calls!" (with PSTN networks, there a physical line that gets assumed to have a phone connected)…

Whereas with eMail (and any #asynchronous #communication) you don't have that requirement.

  • So unless the provider is being taken over or otherwise "cooperative" there's no means for a sender to know where, when and how a message was retrieved unless the recipient wants the sender to know of it!

Or to put it simple:

  • You can ring up someone and thus circumstantially verify the chain of #PhoneNumber -> #IMSI -> #ICCID -> #SIM -> #IMEI -> Device -> Location -> Owner quite quickly.
    • Whereas you can't positively verify whether an eMail address and/or #XMPP+#OMEMO account belongs to me unless I want you to know that it does!

So either way a phone number is just a horrible means of doing that.

  • And don't even get me started on the fact that legally speaking noone truly owns their number.
    • Because even if you got some spechal case number (like UPT was) you still depend on neither regulators nor telcos to not block or otherwise interfere with it. Which is in contrast to say an OnionService which can only be shutdown effectively by sabotage aka. (more or less figurately) "unplugging" it.

I mean, it's not as if I didn't gave @signalapp a fair chance.

  • I wanted #Signal to be good - honestly...
    • But I'm old enough that things rarely are that simple as #TechPopulism & #Propaganda claim it to be.
    • Just like 5th grade #SexEd is not a substitute for Endocrinology, Gynecology and Andrology and actually licensed, medical professionals.

So any #Messenger service that requires a #Phone Number for signup and/or useage is truly not a real replacement and inherently makes PROVEN WRONG assumptions [i.e. that it is legal and possible to obtain a phone number anonymously at someone's juristiction] about it's customers' ability to shield their privacy

THIS is why I am going fucking ballistic on #TechPopulism aiming at #TechIlliterates because it's spreading a "false sense of #security" whilst completely disregarding absolute fundamentals when it comes to the underlying systems.

ProtonMail Sends User IP and Device Info to Swiss Authorities.

YouTube

@kkarhan

Your threat model is totally incoherent here and you talk like a cheap LLM

@lackthereof no it's not (because things are in fact intertwined) and I expect you to apologize for that!

  • Go outside, #TouchGrass and in a week you can come back…

#thxbye #next #EOD #muted

The Lack Thereof :v_bi: (@lackthereof@beige.party)

@kkarhan@infosec.space Your threat model is totally incoherent here and you talk like a cheap LLM

beige.party