Once again Proton hand over data on an activist to authorities, this time to the FBI via the Swiss High Court.
Proton is unsafe for use by frontliners.
https://www.404media.co/proton-mail-helped-fbi-unmask-anonymous-stop-cop-city-protestor/
Once again Proton hand over data on an activist to authorities, this time to the FBI via the Swiss High Court.
Proton is unsafe for use by frontliners.
https://www.404media.co/proton-mail-helped-fbi-unmask-anonymous-stop-cop-city-protestor/
Group-wide selfhosted mail is so often the solution here, but it needs to be done right, and with strong operational security posture. This includes the jurisdictional layer relative to operating context.
And yet #selfhosted mail is famously hard. We dedicate much time to this, deploying a full blown high-reputation MTA with webmail frontend, in the Fortress sessions https://courses.nikau.io/fortress/
@mihamarkic @JulianOliver use public key encryption, a server can encrypt all your non-encrypted incoming email with your public key, and only your client with your private key can decrypt it. Without your private key, nothing stored on the server can be decrypted.
This is pretty easy to implement yourself, using pgp, if you already run your own mail server.
@mihamarkic @JulianOliver ah. Yes, a good question, with, IMO, no good answers. On a laptop you can just prompt for a key or password on boot. On a server that must be able to reboot without human intervention, there is nowhere to store the key that's safe from snooping.
I've daydreamed about building a USB flash drive that only stays active for N seconds after a bus reset, then shuts itself off. Thus you could store a key on it that can be read at boot time, but not long after.
@mihamarkic @JulianOliver if they're not physically present then they can only attempt to read it during a short time window at bootup, when nothing but the kernel has started.
If they're physically present, all bets are off.
@ronnylam those turnkey solutions are good for very simple setups but can be awfully inflexible and easily outgrown. I believe also people invite risk running complex infra they don't understand. Mail is complex. The way it is.
For the longhaul, esp so far as adding new mailing domains and forwarding, aliasing and even hardening, it is hard to beat native Postfix/Dovecot/OpenDKIM for MTA with webmail frontend on separate host. No containerisation, all legible, fast, tunable and readily secured.
@JulianOliver
https://riseup.net/ offers something like this.
Including onion/tor access.
I'm slightly surprised that they don't state what data they store
@realn2s Riseup have been around for ages and are an activist favourite, but still bound to local laws (California).
I agree, they remain too skinny on details, esp given how vulnerable they will be in the US right now.
It would be good to see them move out, say, to an Icelandic DC.
@DonChacale When they sold out the French anti-gentrification and climate activist it was to trace the originating IP of emails sent and received. So an onion layer would also be required in that case that sends a fake user-agent string. The Tor browser, for instance.
Regardless, even with such provisions in place, I would not consider Proton safe
journalism is an entirely different conversation. being half Mexican I'm horrified by the routine murders of journalists in that country. for me, again, as an ablsoiture layperson with no computer skills, a group whcih did arson and vandalism paid for their email with a credit card with their name on it. smfh stupid. good people with mad computer skills may have a solution.