US Urged to Put Boots on Moon to Counter China's Space Ambitions
The US is at a critical juncture in space security, with China's rapidly advancing space program threatening to leave America in the dust. To stay ahead, the US must urgently develop a military presence on the moon to safeguard its interests and prevent China from gaining a strategic advantage in lunar resources and territory.
#UsSpaceSuperiority #SpaceSecurity #NationalSecurity #LunarAccess #China
New preprint: UAV-Space Framework đ°ïž
SPARTA/MITRE ATT&CK cover intentional threats to space
infrastructure. Physical environment vectors â geomagnetic
storms, SAA transits, SEP events â have no framework.
UAV-Space fills that gap.
Empirical basis:
â 43,848h NASA OMNI2 real data
â 18.3Ă anomaly rate during major storms (Kpâ„7)
â Fisher exact p=0.005, ÏÂČ=23.66 p<0.0001
â 8.2Ă during Solar Energetic Particle events
Each physical phenomenon modeled as threat actor:
TTPs, IoCs, advance warning, NIS2 Art.21 playbooks
Key finding: NOAA SWPC gives 24h CME advance warning.
No operator today has a procedure to use that window.
UAV-Space pre-defines the procedures.
#infosec #spacesecurity #threatintel #NIS2 #satellite
#spaceweather #criticalinfrastructure #CRA
New research shows compromised satellite parts from vendors could feed fake telemetry that looks legit to operators. This hits cyberwarfare + space systems hard. Everyone focuses on GPS spoofing, not supply chain attacks. Not happening in orbit (yet), just a warning shot.
Spoofing attacks are among the most destructive cyber threats to terrestrial systems, and they become even more dangerous in space, where satellites cannot be easily serviced, and operators depend on accurate telemetry to ensure mission success. When telemetry is compromised, entire spaceborne missions are placed at risk. Prior work on spoofing has largely focused on attacks from Earth, such as injecting falsified uplinks or overpowering downlinks with stronger radios. In contrast, onboard spoofing originating from within the satellite itself remains an underexplored and underanalyzed threat. This vector is particularly concerning given that modern satellites, especially small satellites, rely on modular architectures and globalized supply chains that reduce cost and accelerate development but also introduce hidden risks. This paper presents an end-to-end demonstration of an internal satellite spoofing attack delivered through a compromised vendor-supplied component implemented in NASA's NOS3 simulation environment. Our rogue Core Flight Software application passed integration and generated packets in the correct format and cadence that the COSMOS ground station accepted as legitimate. By undermining both onboard estimators and ground operator views, the attack directly threatens mission integrity and availability, as corrupted telemetry can bias navigation, conceal subsystem failures, and mislead operators into executing harmful maneuvers. These results expose component-level telemetry spoofing as an overlooked supply-chain vector distinct from jamming or external signal injection. We conclude by discussing practical countermeasures-including authenticated telemetry, component attestation, provenance tracking, and lightweight runtime monitoring-and highlight the trade-offs required to secure resource-constrained small satellites.
US, Allies Forge Joint Orbital Warfare Plan
The US and its allies are joining forces to develop a game-changing orbital warfare plan, with a collective concept of operations set to be finalized by the end of the year. This strategic blueprint will enable them to protect and defend their space assets like never before.
#OrbitalWarfare #UsSpaceCommand #NationState #EmergingThreats #SpaceSecurity
đ° ESA Hosts Industry Workshop to Develop Standardized Cybersecurity for Space Systems
đ°ïž The European Space Agency is hosting a workshop to build standardized, off-the-shelf cybersecurity products for space systems. The goal is to defend critical infrastructure against growing threats and comply with new regulations. #SpaceSecurity #ESA #Cyber
DĂ©battue Ă lâAssemblĂ©e nationale, avant un passage au SĂ©nat, lâactualisation de la Loi de programmation militaire prĂ©voit dâimportants changements pour les capacitĂ©s spatiales militaires françaises. Lâurgence prĂ©vaut dans les choix stratĂ©giques et budgĂ©taires, quitte Ă recourir aux capacitĂ©s commerciales et Ă transformer des dĂ©monstrateurs en atout opĂ©rationnel.
Analyst207
Caria Giovanni - Harpocrates
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