- Meanwhile #Iran continues to make headway, not only in the #Sahel, but in #Sudan (where it supports the #SAF in the current civil #war) and #SouthAfrica. #Somaliland s neighbour #Djibouti had reestablished relations with Iran in 2023, days before the #Hamas raid.

- Despite #US threats of #war, massive uprising at home and #Israel taking a keener interest in the continent, #Africa is set to remain a major strategic priority for Iran.

Both the #RSF and the #SAF are weak, indisciplined, corrupt and structurally inclined to a spectrum of grave human rights violations. Neither has had any incentive whatever to seek either a truce, a ceasefire or peace.

#Sudan #war

Meanwhile, Hemedti’s #Uganda visit was meant to promote an #AU #IGAD mediation that the #SAF are all the while undermining. While the AU is currently resisting #Egypt s push for Sudanese reinstatement, #Sudan has reintegrated IGAD 10 days after the regional organization had condemned #RSF crimes.

#Sudan #war

Both the #RSF and the #SAF will have indeed to cater to heightened foreign interest in bringing an end to the #war, especially on the part of the #US. While the SAF are keen to criminalize not only the RSF but also Hamdok’s civilian bloc, to reject any #UAE involvement and to retaliate against any foreign involvement with the RSF, they claim to seek a truce within the US-Saudi Jeddah process, stillborn in 2023 and further delegitimized by Saudi support to the SAF.

#SaudiArabia #Sudan

On paper, the #RSF s international support seems bound to deteriorate, as exemplified by recent weak signals from #Chad. Chadian internal unrest as to the extent of N’Djaména’s support to the RSF, acting as a #UAE proxy, has been fueled by spillover in Tiné and the deaths of Chadian soldiers. Hemedti has nevertheless managed to visit #Uganda, while on an apparent search for an African mediator, an occurrence swiftly and predictably condemned by the #SAF.

#Sudan #SouthSudan #war

Diplomatically, the #SAF is continuing and will very probably continue to enjoy the benefits of having captured the Sudanese state and of its recent alignment on #SaudiArabia. This is the context of Burhan’s recent visit to #Qatar, as well as post-war reconstruction talks with #India.

#Sudan #war

#RSF and allies have meanwhile launched a diversionary offensive into Blue Nile state from #SouthSudan. A RSF training camp in Benishangul-Gumuz (Northwestern #Ethiopia) are also very close to that second front. The major risk this diversion poses is a wider regionalization of the conflict, with both RSF and #SAF more heavily involved in the civil #war currently unfolding in South Sudan, as well as in any renewed hostilities in #Tigray and in the looming war between Ethiopia and #Eritrea

#Sudan

Nevertheless, ground operations are largely concentrated in #Kordofan s “triangle of death”, meaning El Obeid (capital of North Kordofan), Dilling and Kadugli (capital of South Kordofan). #RSF s alliance with SPLM-N Al-Hilu and control of West Kordofan makes the #SAF positions there precarious, and any relief brough by the recent siege breaking of those last two towns temporary.

#Sudan #war

It does not mean either that any corner of the country is “safe”. The #SAF are rebuilding their airforce with #Pakistan s aid and are eliminating #RSF Chinese, #UAE provided air defence. Meanwhile drone warfare has generalized and intensified, a consequence of massive external supplies to both sides. Strikes commonly involve non-military targets.

#Sudan #war