Here’s How Karabakh Became The Catalyst Of Russia’s Southern Peripheral Setbacks

Here’s How Karabakh Became The Catalyst Of Russia’s Southern Peripheral Setbacks

By Andrew Korybko

The previously unresolved Karabakh Conflict might in retrospect be seen as a several-decades-delayed grand strategic game-changer that revolutionized regional geopolitics.

Vance’s recent trip to the South Caucasus, which saw him visit Armenia and Azerbaijan to accelerate implementation of the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) that’ll expand US influence into Central Asia, drew attention the US’ recent strategic gains at Russia’s expense. Everything’s now moving so fast that few remember how it all started with 2020’s Continuation War in Karabakh, the internationally recognized part of Azerbaijan that was then controlled by Armenia for three decades.

To over-simplify the sequence of events, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan rose to power in 2018 through a Colour Revolution on the back of Western diaspora-driven anti-Russian sentiment, but Moscow tried to work with him anyhow since his country is a CSTO member. Around that time, it became obvious that Azerbaijan would soon militarily outmatch Armenia, hence why Russia proposed that Armenia compromise with Azerbaijan over Karabakh. Pashinyan, who was already pivoting to the West, refused.

Armenia’s loss in 2020’s Continuation War saw it and Azerbaijan agree to a Moscow-mediated ceasefire for deploying peacekeepers to Karabakh. That deal also obligated Armenia to unblock regional transport routes for connecting “mainland” Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan. This new regional corridor would then be guarded by Russia. As with Russia’s pre-war proposal that Armenia compromise with Azerbaijan over Karabakh, Pashinyan also refused to comply with this too due him pivoting to the West.

Azerbaijan predictably lost patience and exploited Russia’s focus on the special operation to launch a one-day military operation in Karabakh in September 2023 for expelling the rest of Armenia’s forces. Even then, Pashinyan still refused to unblock regional transport routes, emboldened as he was by support from the Biden Administration. They were in turn operating under the influence of California’s powerful Armenia diaspora lobby and ties with Azerbaijan were also greatly worsened at this time.

Had Kamala won, the US would probably have continued supporting Armenia over Azerbaijan and thus attempted to transform it into their bastion of influence for dividing-and-ruling the region, possibly by one day emboldening Armenia to launch a doomed-to-fail revanchist war. Trump 2.0 reversed his predecessor’s policy by repairing ties with Azerbaijan, perhaps after being convinced of the wisdom in doing so by Qatar, which wields lots of influence with them and is close with Azerbaijan’s Turkish ally.

They then saw the chance to replace Russia’s role in the Armenian-Azerbaijan peace process and also in the corridor that it proposed, thus enabling what came to be known as TRIPP to obtain a dual military-logistics function for expanding NATO influence along Russia’s entire southern periphery. To review, this was set into motion by Pashinyan’s successful Colour Revolution, his repeated US-backed refusals to comply with Russia’s advice to compromise with Baku, and then Trump 2.0’s regional policy reversal.

It remains a subject of debate whether Russia could have decisively intervened, even if only diplomatically, at each of these three stages to preemptively avert this major regional setback that might expose its entire southern periphery to radical Ukrainian-like NATO influence in the worst-case scenario. In any case, this all stems from the previously unresolved Karabakh Conflict, which might in retrospect be seen as a several-decades-delayed grand strategic game-changer that revolutionized regional geopolitics.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#Armenia #Azerbaijan #CentralAsia #Geopolitics #KarabakhConflict #NATO #Russia #SouthCaucasus #Turkey #Turkiye #USA

At least 64 reported dead during mass Karabakh exodus

• At least 64 people died on the road during last month’s mass exodus from Nagorno-Karabakh, according to Armenia’s Investigative Committee.
  • Armenia plans to demolish and completely rebuild its checkpoint on the border with Iran.
  • Nagorno-Karabakh President Samvel Shahramanyan gave his first interview since the region’s fall to Azerbaijan last month.

Credits: Ruptly

The post At least 64 reported dead during mass Karabakh exodus appeared first on CIVILNET.

#armenia #artsakh #azerbaijan #dailyarmenia #politics #reportsinenglish #64 #armeniairanborder #armeniairanrelations #armeniangenocide #artsakhwar #bordercheckpoint #dailynewsdigest #economiccooperation #ethniccleansing #fueldepotblast #gasforelectricityswap #interview #investigativecommittee #karabakhconflict #massexodus #missingpeople #offensive #rafaelvardanyan #roadtolls #samvelshahramanyan #seniornagornokarabakhofficials #trade #trucktaxes

Stabbed In The Front: Russia’s Betrayal of Armenia

CivilNet host and commentator Patrick Elliott sits down with political analyst and former parliamentarian Mikayel Zolyan to discuss Armenian- Russian relations.

They cover prime minister Pashinyan’s consequential speech at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, in which he openly declares Armenia’s desire to partner with the EU as closely as possible.

They also touch on possible scenarios for retaliation that Russia might concoct to punish Armenia, and what decoupling could look like.

The post Stabbed In The Front: Russia’s Betrayal of Armenia appeared first on CIVILNET.

#armenia #politics #region #reportsinenglish #allies #azerbaijan #baku #csto #europeanunion #karabakhconflict #nato #nikolpashinyan #russia #russianarmenianrelations

Tasnim News’ Latest Reports Prove That Iran-Azerbaijan Ties Are Actually Improving

Tasnim News’ Latest Reports Prove That Iran-Azerbaijan Ties Are Actually Improving

By Andrew Korybko

There’s an indisputable disconnect between popular perceptions and objective reality.

Azerbaijan’s decisive victory in the Karabakh Conflict last month provoked very strong reactions from many Iranian commentators and those foreigners who support the Islamic Republic’s worldview. Most of them started smearing that country as an Israeli and/or Turkish puppet whose restoration of constitutional order over that formerly separatist region supposedly poses a security threat to Iran. Unaware observers were then left with the impression that bilateral ties had dramatically deteriorated.

Iranian-Azeri ties actually improved since then, however, as proven by Tasnim News’ latest reports:

* “Iranian Delegation to Observe Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan Joint Caspian Drill”

* “Iran Eyes Stronger Regional Cooperation As Azerbaijan Reclaims Karabakh”

* “Iran-Azerbaijan Exchanges of Goods via Rail Grow by 44%”

* “Constructing Aghband Bridge on Aras River Begins at Iran-Azerbaijan Border”

This indisputable disconnect between popular perceptions and objective reality will now be analysed.

Like all societies, a plurality of opinions on foreign policy also exists within Iran and among its supporters abroad, which in this context concerns those who view Azerbaijan either as a friend or a foe. About that country, it occupies a very special place in the Iranian national consciousness for historical reasons. Accordingly, there are very strong views about its leadership’s decision to formally ally with Turkiye, informally do the same with Israel, and partner with NATO.

Critics accuse Azerbaijan of conspiring with those three to contain Iran, while others interpret these moves through the Neo-Realist paradigm of International Relations and thus regard them as a predictable response to their security dilemma. The first are therefore convinced that Azerbaijan is an intractable foe with whom no pragmatic cooperation is possible while the second believe that such cooperation should still be pursued in an attempt to reduce mutual suspicions through these means.

Both perspectives have their merits and respective supporters within Iran’s policymaking community, and the complex interplay between the latter’s factions accounts for why the Islamic Republic sometimes sends mixed signals about its approach towards Azerbaijan. These competitive dynamics are natural and not exclusive to Iran since all countries’ corresponding communities have various groups within them that vie to influence the formulation of policy towards others.

In this particular case, the geo-economically focused faction that favours the expansion of trade ties as a means for managing regional security dilemmas arguably appears to be the one calling the shots in Iran nowadays, not the security-centric one that precludes such cooperation out of principle. This assessment is based on spring’s Chinese-brokered Iranian-Saudi rapprochement, which was made possible by the People’s Republic convincing both countries to finally put aside their differences for the greater good.

Upon burying the hatchet, they were able to unlock the broader region’s full geo-economic potential, which is mutually beneficial since it’ll bring more prosperity to their people in parallel with accelerating Eurasia’s multipolar integration through the subsequent creation of new connectivity corridors. Something similar appears to be in the process with Azerbaijan as proven by Friday’s inaugural ceremony celebrating the construction of the Aghand Bridge over the Aras River dividing those two.

Upon completion, this project will connect Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan and thus also Turkiye via Iran, which advances all stakeholders’ shared geo-economic interests. Importantly, it also serves as a viable alternative to the Zangezur Corridor through Armenia that’s been held up for nearly three years already by Yerevan’s obstinance despite its premier agreeing to this initiative in the Moscow-mediated November 2020 ceasefire. This insight debunks speculation that Iran fears Azeri-Turkish connectivity.

To the contrary, the geo-economically focused policymaking faction that’s nowadays arguably predominant in the Islamic Republic wants their country to profit from this trade after seeing how beneficial it’s been for nearby Georgia, through which it’s hitherto been conducted. Their security-centric rivals object to these plans since they consider all Azeri-Turkish corridors to be “Trojan Horses” for NATO, Pan-Turkism, and/or Zionism, but they failed to convince policymakers of these concerns.

Seeing as how Iran patched up its problems with Saudi Arabia, which had up until that point been considered a much greater threat to their country’s security than Azerbaijan ever was, it makes sense that Tehran would promulgate a similar policy towards Baku too. Whatever concerns the security-centric faction has about Azerbaijan pale in comparison to those that they previously had about Saudi Arabia, so it was a fait accompli that improving ties with the latter would lead to improving ties with the former.

That said, both rapprochements could still be derailed by unforeseen developments, including the scenario that the security-centric policymaking faction regains its prior influence and then convinces decisionmakers to distance their country from those two. Neither geo-economically driven rapprochement nor that respective faction’s leading role in policy formulation should therefore be taken for granted, but nevertheless, everything explained thus far reflects reality as it presently exists.

These observations add crucial context to the fact that Iranian-Azeri relations actually improved in spite of popular social media speculation that they supposedly deteriorated since the end of the Karabakh Conflict. The indisputable disconnect between these two is now revealed to be the result of the interplay between these competing factions after the security-centric one encouraged the aforesaid information warfare campaign in an attempt to pressure their geo-economically focused rivals.

Whether intended or not, this ultimately had the effect of discrediting the government’s policy of proactively engaging Azerbaijan in a well-intentioned attempt to reduce mutual suspicions stemming from their security dilemma, thus confusing some of Iran’s supporters at home and abroad. After all, those whose views were swayed by the security-centric faction into thinking that all Azeri-Turkish corridors constitute a “Trojan Horse” don’t understand why Iran is now facilitating this via its territory.

If this same faction doesn’t soon scale back its information warfare campaign, then there’s a risk that some folks might be misled into thinking that the Iranian government either “sold out” or has been “infiltrated” by NATO/Pan-Turks/Zionists. Both perceptions are detrimental to its national interests, which is why the security-centric faction is advised to reconsider the wisdom of propagating fearmongering narratives about Azerbaijan, at least at this particular point in time.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#azerbaijan #geopolitics #iran #karabakhConflict

Բրյուսելի ու Մոսկվայի գործընթացները Ղարաբաղի հարցով մի օր առճակատվելու են. Արեգ Քոչինյան

Ղարաբաղյան հակամարտության կարգավորման հարցով Բրյուսելի և Մոսկվայի միջնորդությամբ ընթացող գործընթացները մի օր առճակատվելու են: Այս մասին ասում է պատմաբան, քաղաքագետ Արեգ Քոչինյանը ՍիվիլՆեթի Արշալույս Մղդեսյանի հետ զրույցում: Նրա խոսքով՝ Արևմուտքը և Ռուսաստանը տարածաշրջանում հետապնդում են հակադիր շահեր, և Ղարաբաղյան հակամարտության շուրջ նրանց միջնորդական ջանքերը մրցակցային են:

The post Բրյուսելի ու Մոսկվայի գործընթացները Ղարաբաղի հարցով մի օր առճակատվելու են. Արեգ Քոչինյան appeared first on CIVILNET.

#թոփ #լրահոս #հայաստան #տարածաշրջան #քաղաքական #քաղաքականություն #aregkochinyan #armenianazerbaijanitalks #brusselstalks #karabakhconflict #nikolpashinyanilhamaliyev #russianpeacekeepers #арегкочинян #армяноазербайджанскиепереговоры #карабахскийконфликт #николпашинянильхамалиев #переговорывбрюсселе #российскиемиротворцы #արեգքոչինյան #հայադրբեջանականբանակցություններ #նիկոլփաշինյանիլհամալիև #ռուսականխաղաղապահներ

Հայաստանը կարո՛ղ է ստանալ ամերիկյան միջուկային տեխնոլոգիաներ. Արմեն Խարազյան

Միջուկային ոլորտում ԱՄՆ-ի հետ քաղաքացիական ռազմավարական համագործակցության փոխըմբռնման հուշագիր ստորագրելուց հետո Հայաստանը հնարավորություն ունի ստանալ ամերիկյան միջուկային տեխնոլոգիաներ` նոր ատոմակայան կառուցելու համար: Այդ մասին ասում է ԱՄՆ-ում ՀՀ նախկին փոխդեսպան, Վաշինգտոնում բնակվող իրավաբան Ամեն Խարազյանը ՍիվիլՆեթի Արշալույս Մղդեսյանի հետ զրույցում:

Խարազյանը խոսում է նաև Հայաստան-Թուրքիա հարաբերությունների և Արցախ խնդրի մասին։

The post Հայաստանը կարո՛ղ է ստանալ ամերիկյան միջուկային տեխնոլոգիաներ. Արմեն Խարազյան appeared first on CIVILNET.

#թոփ #լրահոս #հայաստան #տնտեսություն #քաղաքական #քաղաքականություն #araratmirzoyan039svisittotheusa #armenkharazyan #armeniannews #armeniannewsհայկականլուրեր #armenianamericanrelations #civilnetonlinetelevision #independentmedia #karabakhconflict #newsfromarmenia #nucleartechnologies #арменхаразян #армяноамериканскиеотношения #армянотурецкиеотношения #визитараратамирзоянавсша #карабахскийконфликт #лурерайастаниц #ядерныетехнологии #արարատմիրզոյանիայցնամն #արմենխարազյան #հայամերիկյանհարաբերություններ #հայթուրքականհարաբերություններ #ղարաբաղյանհակամարտություն #միջուկայինտեխնոլոգիաներ #սիվիլնեթ #սիվիլնեթհեռուստատեսություն

Karabakh says all regions lost to Azerbaijan are defined as “occupied”

On February 15, the Parliament of Nagorno-Karabakh unanimously adopted a draft law on the occupied territories of Karabakh. The draft law considers all regions which were lost due to Azerbaijani aggression in the 1990s, 2016 and 2020, as “occupied territories.” What could this mean for the negotiating position of the Armenian side?

Credits: Ruptly

The post Karabakh says all regions lost to Azerbaijan are defined as “occupied” appeared first on CIVILNET.

#armenia #artsakh #dailyarmenia #reportsinenglish #armenianregion #civilnetkarabakh #karabakharmenian #karabakhconflict #karabakhexplained #karabakhoblast #nkao #occupationkarabakh #occupiedarmenia #occupiedazerbaijan #pashinyankarabakh #tigrangrigoryan

The issues with Pashinyan’s Karabakh negotiation style

CivilNet analyst Tigran Grigoryan in a conversation with Emilio Luciano Cricchio, discusses some of the issues with the Armenian government’s approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process. Tigran also discusses the change in wording in the latest resolution regarding Armenia’s democratic progress out of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the latest findings by the new IRI poll.

The post The issues with Pashinyan’s Karabakh negotiation style appeared first on CIVILNET.

#armenia #politics #reportsinenglish #euarmenia #iriarmenia #karabakhconflict #osceminskgroup #pacearmenia #pashinyanartsakh #pashinyankarabakh #pashinyantalks #peacetalksarmenia #peacetalkskarabakh #tigrangrigoryan

Sultanov as governor-general of Shushi, Zangezur, Jebrail, and Jevanshir – 15 January 1919

[15 January 1919]

In January 1919, Colonel D. I. Shuttleworth of the British Command issued the following circular, which drew violent protest from the people of Karabagh and the government of Armenia.

The English Command declares to the entire population of the counties of Shushi, Zangezur, Jebrail, and Jevanshir that:

the government of Azerbaijan, by its decision of January 15, 1919, has appointed Dr. Sultanov as governor-general. He enjoys the cooperation of the English command;

in conformity with existing laws, a six man council of capable Armenians and Muslims is to be found in the governor-generalship to minister to the needs of the entire population;

an officer of the English Mission may join the council as the representative of the English Command;

the Azerbaijani treasury will be responsible for the salaries of officials and for all other expenses in the governor-generalship;

the final solution to all disputed questions will emanate from the [Paris] Peace Conference;

the English Mission will be informed in advance about all military movements within the boundaries of the governor-generalship;

with the communiqué the English Command wishes to emphasize that in order for the Governor-General to fulfill the obligations placed on him, including preservation of law and order in the governor-generalship, all regulations and directives issued by the Governor-General and his bureaus must be enacted without opposition, and the English Command lends its full support to all legally adopted measures.

[Republic of Armenia Archives, File No. 9]

The Karabagh File, Documents and Facts, 1918-1988, First Edition, Cambridge Toronto 1988, by the ZORYAN INSTITUTE, edited by: Gerard J. LIBARIDIAN, p. 10

Image - Armenian Seminary in Shushi

The post Sultanov as governor-general of Shushi, Zangezur, Jebrail, and Jevanshir - 15 January 1919 appeared first on Aniarc.

#inenglish #news #featured #karabakhconflict

“Armenians Ask Moscow for Help, Charging Azerbaijan With Bias” -The New York Times, December, 1977

A territorial and ethnic conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in a mountainous region of the Soviet Caucasus had led–according to reports filtering across the Soviet border–to tension, clashes, protest demonstrations at public events and pleas by Armenians to Moscow for help, including a recent letter to Leonid I. Brezhnev. The disputed area is the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, a pocket of only 1,699 square miles and 153,000 people engaged primarily in livestock raising, food-processing, light industry and such old crafts as rug making and silk spinning.

Although 80 percent of the area’s inhabitants are Armenians, it was assigned in 1923 to Azerbaijan, whose people are of Turkic-Islamic background.

The Armenians in Karabakh charge that they are victims of cultural oppression, economic discrimination and other ethnic disadvantages. They demand, with increasing insistence, that Karabakh be put under the Armenian Republic.

Moscow’s decision to turn over the Karabakh region to Azerbaijan was in conflict with earlier promises to the Armenians. The promises were reflected in a declaration on Dec. 1, 1920, in the Communist Party newspaper Pravda by Stalin, then Lenin’s Commissar for Nationalities.

Stalin, in a commentary on the Communist victory in Armenia, said Azerbaijan had relinquished claims to Karabakh and other territories historically Armenian. He went on to proclaim: “The age-old enmity between Armenia and the surrounding Moslem peoples has been dispelled at one stroke by the establishment of fraternal solidarity between the working people of Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan.”

The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians have been trying to have their region transferred to the Republic of Armenia, which is adjacent but across a mountain range.

The recent letter to the Soviet leader was sent by Sero Khanzadian, Communist Party member since 1943 and at one time a member of the Central Committee of the Party in the Armenian Republic. Mr. Khanzadyan complained of various disorders, which included “casualties,” and urged Mr. Brezhnev to intervene on behalf of the Armenians, according to a copy of his letter taken out of the Soviet Union by travels.

Mr. Khanzadyan’s letter was made available to The New York Times, in English translation, by Dr. Vahakn N. Dadrian, an authority on Armenia and a professor of sociology at the State Universe of New York at Geneseo.

Dr. Dadrian visited Armenia recently and met Mr. Khanzadian in Yerevan, the capital city.

In the letter to Mr. Brezhnev, Mr. Khanzadyan charged that a “national injustice” existed in Karabakh and accused the local authorities of insulting Armenians and calling them “backward” and “ignorant” for their nationalist sentiments.

Mr. Khanzadyan, an author of historical novels, denied that the Armenians in Karabakh had “voluntarily” accepted their status as part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

“The purely Armenian region of Karabakh, which is part of the frontiers of our mighty country - -with its 80 percent Armenian schools, with its claim for Armenian as the national language - - must be incorporated into Soviet Socialist Armenia.”

The complaint to Mr. Brezhnev by Mr. Khanzadyan seemed a bolt step with uncertain consequences. In 1975, Armenians in Karabakh were sharply rebuked, and some were ousted from the party or imprisoned on charges of nationalist agitation contrary to “the principle of Leninist friendship of peoples and proletarian internationalism.”

[Raymond H. Anderson in The New York Times, December, 1977]

The Karabagh File, Documents and Facts, 1918-1988, First Edition, Cambridge Toronto 1988, by the ZORYAN INSTITUTE, edited by: Gerard J. LIBARIDIAN, pp. 51-52.

Image – Shushi

The post “Armenians Ask Moscow for Help, Charging Azerbaijan With Bias” -The New York Times, December, 1977 appeared first on Aniarc.

#inenglish #news #արցախյանօրագիր #featured #karabakhconflict