Operazione globale "Alice" contro piattaforma fraudolenta del dark web. Partecipa anche la Polizia italiana

Il 9 marzo 2026 è stata avviata un'operazione globale guidata dalle autorità tedesche e sostenuta da #Europol, contro una delle più grandi reti di piattaforme fraudolente del dark web.
L'indagine è iniziata a metà del 2021 contro la piattaforma dark web “Alice with Violence CP”.
Nel corso delle indagini, le autorità hanno scoperto che la piattaforma gestiva più di 373.000 siti web fraudolenti che pubblicizzavano materiale pedopornografico (#CSAM) e offerte di criminalità informatica come servizio (#CaaS).

Dal 9 al 19 marzo 2026, 23 paesi hanno unito le forze nell' "Operazione Alice", che inizialmente aveva come obiettivo solo l'operatore della piattaforma. Tuttavia, grazie alla #cooperazioneinternazionale, l'indagine ha portato alla luce l'identità di 440 clienti che avevano usufruito dei servizi dell'operatore. Data la natura degli acquisti, sono state avviate ulteriori indagini nei loro confronti. L'operazione contro più di un centinaio di queste persone è ancora in corso.

Finora, l'Operazione Alice ha portato ai seguenti risultati:

  • Identificato 1 autore che gestisce la piattaforma dark web;
  • Identificati 440 clienti in tutto il mondo;
  • Oltre 373.000 siti web del dark web sono stati chiusi;
  • 105 server sequestrati;
  • Dispositivi elettronici sequestrati, tra cui computer, telefoni cellulari e supporti di dati elettronici.

Caterina De Bolle, Direttore esecutivo di Europol, ha dichiarato: " L'operazione Alice invia un messaggio chiaro: non c'è nessun posto dove nascondersi per i criminali quando la comunità internazionale delle forze dell'ordine lavora fianco a fianco. Li troveremo e li riterremo responsabili. Europol continuerà a proteggere i bambini, a sostenere le vittime e a rintracciare i responsabili".

Nel corso di quasi cinque anni di indagini, le autorità tedesche hanno scoperto che un singolo individuo gestiva più di 373.000 domini onion (siti web) sul dark web. Un dominio onion è un tipo speciale di indirizzo di sito web progettato per nascondere l'identità e la posizione del sito web e delle persone che lo visitano. Da febbraio 2020 a luglio 2025, il sospettato ha pubblicizzato il CSAM su diverse piattaforme, accessibili tramite oltre 90.000 di questi domini onion. Su queste piattaforme, l'autore del reato ha offerto CSAM che avrebbe potuto essere acquistato come “pacchetti” dopo aver fornito un indirizzo email ed effettuato un pagamento in Bitcoin.

Ogni pacchetto aveva un costo stimato compreso tra 17 e 215 euro e prometteva volumi di dati che andavano da pochi gigabyte a diversi terabyte di CSAM. Tuttavia, si trattava di siti puramente fraudolenti in cui il CSAM veniva pubblicizzato e presentato in anteprima ma mai consegnato.

Oltre al CSAM, sono state promosse diverse offerte di cybercrime-as-a-service (CaaS), tra cui i dati delle carte di credito e l'accesso a sistemi esteri. L'obiettivo è sempre stato quello di convincere i clienti a effettuare pagamenti senza ricevere alcun servizio in cambio.

Sono state condotte indagini anche contro l'operatore della piattaforma, un uomo di 35 anni con sede nella Repubblica popolare cinese. Le autorità stimano che l'individuo abbia realizzato profitti per oltre 345.000 euro da circa 10.000 clienti in tutto il mondo che, secondo le autorità, hanno tentato di acquistare il materiale da lui pubblicizzato.

Da novembre 2019 fino a poco tempo fa, al suo apice gestiva una rete composta da circa 287 server, 105 dei quali situati in Germania. Le autorità tedesche hanno emesso un mandato d'arresto internazionale.

Pagando per il CSAM, gli stessi clienti sono diventati sospettati, anche se non hanno mai ricevuto il materiale. Gli investigatori hanno valutato che gli individui che cercano di accedere a materiale esclusivo –e, quindi, grave– sugli abusi sessuali su minori potrebbero rappresentare obiettivi di alto valore e fornire informazioni importanti alle forze dell’ordine di tutto il mondo.

Nel corso degli anni di indagini, le autorità sono intervenute immediatamente ogni volta che hanno individuato bambini in pericolo, adottando misure appropriate per proteggere il loro benessere. Ad esempio, nell'agosto 2023, gli investigatori della Polizia criminale dello Stato bavarese hanno perquisito l'abitazione di un padre di 31 anni che aveva trasferito 20 euro per acquistare un pacco contenente 70 GB di CSAM. L'uomo è stato successivamente condannato.

Nel corso dell'indagine, gli specialisti dell'Europol hanno facilitato lo scambio di informazioni tra le autorità nazionali, fornito supporto analitico e coordinato la risposta internazionale. Inoltre, hanno svolto un ruolo fondamentale nel tracciare i pagamenti in criptovaluta e nel fornire informazioni ai paesi coinvolti nell'operazione. Ancora più importante, la stretta collaborazione tra le autorità tedesche ed Europol ha consentito l'identificazione dell'autore del reato.

La lotta contro lo sfruttamento sessuale dei minori è una priorità per Europol. Oltre al sostegno fornito dal Centro europeo per la criminalità informatica (EC3) agli Stati membri nella prevenzione e nell’individuazione dei crimini legati allo sfruttamento sessuale dei bambini, Europol sta attualmente portando avanti due importanti progetti in questo settore.

Questa settimana, Europol ha pubblicato nuove foto sulla piattaforma "Stop Child Abuse – Trace an Object"(https://www.europol.europa.eu/stopchildabuse), che invita tutti i cittadini a esaminare gli oggetti provenienti da casi irrisolti di abusi sessuali su minori e vedere se ne riconoscono qualcuno. Nessun indizio è troppo piccolo: anche il più piccolo dettaglio potrebbe aiutare a identificare e salvaguardare un bambino abusato sessualmente.

Inoltre, nel novembre 2025 è stata lanciata una nuova piattaforma digitale, Help4U (https://www.help4u-project.eu), per supportare bambini e adolescenti che subiscono abusi sessuali o danni online. Progettato per essere semplice, privato e accessibile, Help4U aiuta i giovani a trovare consigli affidabili, comprendere i propri diritti e connettersi con persone che possono aiutarli.

Tra i Paesi partecipanti all'Operazione Alice anche il Servizio di Polizia Postale e per la Sicurezza Cibernetica della Polizia di Stato.

Operazione globale "Alice" contro piattaforma fraudolenta del dark web.

Operazione globale “Alice” contro piattaforma fraudolenta del dark web. Partecipa anche la Polizia italiana [...]

https://noblogo.org/cooperazione-internazionale-di-polizia/operazione-globale-alice-contro-piattaforma-fraudolenta-del-dark-web

Operazione globale "Alice" contro piattaforma fraudolenta del dark web.

Il 9 marzo 2026 è stata avviata un'operazione globale guidata dalle autorità tedesche e sostenuta da #Europol, contro una delle più grandi reti di piattaforme fraudolente del dark web. L'indagine è iniziata a metà del 2021 contro la piattafo...

Geocriminalità e Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia

#Pedocriminel #SSI #CaaS
Europol démantèle un vaste réseau frauduleux (373 000 sites dans plusieurs pays, dont 1/3 en Allemagne) qui se présentait comme une plateforme de vente de "matériels" destinés aux pédocriminels et à la cybercriminalité en tant que service (CaaS), mais c'était en fait du phishing (arnaques).

Ils ont identifié l'opérateur derrière ce réseau (un chinois de 35 ans), et 440 "clients" (sur près de 10 000) qui font l'objets d'enquêtes :
https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/global-cybercrime-crackdown-over-373-000-dark-web-sites-shut-down

Global cybercrime crackdown: over 373 000 dark web sites shut down – Authorities from 23 countries participate in the operation | Europol

On 9 March 2026, a global operation led by German authorities and supported by Europol was launched against one of the largest networks of fraudulent platforms in the dark web. The investigation began in mid-2021 against the dark web platform “Alice with Violence CP”. During the investigation, authorities discovered that the platform’s operator was running more than 373 000 fraudulent websites advertising child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and cybercrime-as-a-service (CaaS) offerings.

Europol

The Dark Web Exposed: Cybercrime’s Hidden Marketplace

1,918 words, 10 minutes read time.

When people hear “dark web,” they often imagine a digital underworld where hackers trade stolen identities, malware, and secrets under layers of unbreakable encryption. While that image contains kernels of truth, it’s heavily distorted by media dramatization and technical misunderstanding. In reality, the dark web is neither a monolithic criminal empire nor an impenetrable fortress—it’s a technically specific segment of the internet designed for anonymity, used by journalists, activists, and privacy advocates as much as by cybercriminals. Yet its role in enabling large-scale cybercrime is undeniable. Stolen credentials, ransomware tools, and corporate data routinely surface in hidden marketplaces long before breaches make headlines. For defenders, ignoring this space means missing early warnings of compromise. The goal isn’t to chase every rumor in obscure forums but to understand how adversaries operate so we can build more resilient systems. This isn’t about fear—it’s about foresight.

Demystifying the Dark Web: Separating Fact from Fiction

To engage with the dark web intelligently, we must first clarify what it actually is. The internet consists of three conceptual layers: the surface web, the deep web, and the dark web. The surface web includes everything indexed by search engines—news sites, public blogs, e-commerce stores. The deep web encompasses all non-indexed content: private databases, medical records, internal company portals, and subscription-based academic journals. Neither of these is inherently illicit; in fact, the deep web constitutes the vast majority of online data. The dark web, by contrast, refers specifically to websites hosted on anonymizing networks like Tor or I2P, accessible only through specialized software and identifiable by unique domains such as .onion. These sites prioritize user and host anonymity through multi-layered encryption and randomized routing, making traffic analysis extremely difficult.

This technical foundation has been wildly misrepresented in popular culture. Movies and TV shows depict the dark web as a neon-lit bazaar where anyone can instantly buy passports or hire assassins with a few clicks. In truth, navigation is cumbersome, services are unstable, and trust is scarce. There’s no Google for the dark web; users rely on curated link directories, forum posts, or word-of-mouth referrals to find active sites. Many marketplaces vanish overnight due to law enforcement action or exit scams, forcing users to constantly rebuild their networks. Moreover, while anonymity tools like Tor provide strong protections, they’re not foolproof. Operational security failures—such as reusing usernames across platforms, leaking metadata, or connecting without proper firewall rules—have repeatedly led to arrests. The myth of invincibility serves cybercriminals by discouraging scrutiny, but the reality is far more fragile. Recognizing this helps shift focus from sensationalism to signal: instead of fixating on the “mystery” of the dark web, defenders should monitor for concrete indicators, like employee email addresses appearing in credential dumps or proprietary documents listed for sale.

How Cybercrime Actually Works Underground

Beneath the myths lies a highly structured, almost bureaucratic ecosystem of cybercrime. Modern dark web operations function less like chaotic black markets and more like legitimate SaaS businesses—complete with customer support, service-level agreements, and reputation systems. The infrastructure relies on three pillars: anonymizing networks, cryptocurrency, and modular marketplace design. Tor remains the dominant access layer, though some actors are migrating to alternatives like I2P or private Telegram channels to evade increasing scrutiny. On top of this, cybercriminal marketplaces replicate the user experience of Amazon or eBay: vendors list products with descriptions, pricing, and reviews; buyers rate sellers; and disputes are mediated by platform administrators. This mimicry isn’t accidental—it builds trust in an environment where betrayal is common.

Cryptocurrency is the lifeblood of these transactions. While Bitcoin was once the default, its traceability has pushed many toward privacy-focused coins like Monero, which obfuscate sender, receiver, and transaction amounts. Payments typically flow through escrow systems: the buyer sends funds to a wallet controlled by the marketplace, and the seller receives payment only after delivery is confirmed or a dispute window closes. This reduces fraud and encourages repeat business—a critical factor in sustaining underground economies. Beyond marketplaces, private forums serve as collaboration hubs where threat actors share tactics, dissect new defensive technologies, and even auction access to compromised corporate networks. Some of these forums operate on subscription models, charging monthly fees for real-time breach data or custom exploit development. This professionalization reflects a broader shift: cybercrime is now industrialized. Roles are specialized—coders develop ransomware, affiliates conduct phishing campaigns, money mules launder proceeds—and profits are shared via affiliate programs. The result is a scalable, resilient threat model that doesn’t rely on lone geniuses but on distributed, redundant networks. Understanding this reveals why perimeter defenses alone fail: the adversary isn’t just bypassing firewalls—they’re leveraging economic incentives and user behavior at scale.

Real Breaches, Real Consequences: Case Studies from the Front Lines

The abstract mechanics of dark web markets become starkly real when examined through actual breaches that originated or escalated within these hidden channels. Take the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack in May 2021—a single compromised password, allegedly purchased on a dark web marketplace, enabled the REvil-affiliated group to cripple fuel distribution across the U.S. East Coast. Investigators later confirmed that the initial access credential belonged to a legacy VPN account with no multi-factor authentication, and that the password had been circulating in underground forums for months after earlier data breaches. Colonial’s systems weren’t breached by a zero-day exploit or a nation-state actor; they were unlocked with a reused credential sold for less than $50 in Monero. This incident underscores a brutal truth: many catastrophic breaches begin not with sophisticated intrusion techniques, but with the commodification of negligence—poor password hygiene, unpatched remote access tools, and lack of identity monitoring.

Similarly, the 2023 MGM Resorts cyberattack, which disrupted hotel operations, casino floors, and booking systems for over ten days, traces back to social engineering tactics refined in dark web communities. The attackers, linked to the Scattered Spider group, impersonated an employee to trick an IT help desk into resetting credentials—a technique openly discussed and even scripted in underground forums. Once inside, they moved laterally using legitimate administrative tools, exfiltrated data, and deployed destructive ransomware. Within hours of the breach, internal documents and customer records began appearing on dark web leak sites, used as leverage to pressure the company into paying a ransom. Notably, threat intelligence firms had already flagged Scattered Spider’s growing activity in private Telegram channels and invite-only forums weeks before the attack, yet without proactive monitoring, MGM had no early warning. These cases demonstrate that the dark web isn’t just a passive repository of stolen data—it’s an active planning ground where tactics are stress-tested, tools are refined, and targets are selected based on perceived weaknesses. The lag between intelligence availability and organizational response remains one of the most exploitable gaps in modern cybersecurity.

What Organizations Can Do: Practical Defense Strategies

Given this reality, what can defenders actually do? The answer lies not in attempting to “shut down” the dark web—that’s a law enforcement mission—but in integrating dark web awareness into existing security programs in a pragmatic, risk-based way. First and foremost, organizations should implement continuous dark web monitoring for their digital footprint. This doesn’t mean scanning every .onion site; rather, it involves subscribing to reputable threat intelligence feeds that track known marketplaces, paste sites, and forums for mentions of corporate domains, executive names, or employee email addresses. Services like those offered by Recorded Future, Flashpoint, or even CISA’s Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) program can provide timely alerts when credentials associated with your organization surface. When such data appears, it’s not just evidence of a past breach—it’s a flashing red indicator that those credentials may still be active and usable.

Second, credential hygiene must be elevated from a best practice to a core security control. Enforce strict password policies, eliminate shared accounts, and mandate multi-factor authentication (MFA) everywhere—especially on remote access systems like VPNs, RDP, and cloud admin portals. More importantly, integrate identity threat detection and response (ITDR) capabilities that can flag anomalous login behavior, such as logins from unusual geolocations or at odd hours, even if valid credentials are used. Assume that some credentials are already compromised; your goal is to render them useless through layered verification and rapid rotation. Third, treat employee awareness as a technical control, not just a compliance checkbox. Train staff to recognize social engineering attempts—particularly vishing (voice phishing) and help desk impersonation—which are increasingly orchestrated using scripts and playbooks traded on the dark web. Simulated attacks based on real-world TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures) observed in underground forums can harden human defenses more effectively than generic phishing quizzes.

Finally, avoid overpromising on dark web monitoring ROI. It won’t prevent all breaches, nor should it replace foundational hygiene like patching and network segmentation. But when integrated thoughtfully, it provides context that transforms reactive incident response into proactive risk mitigation. Seeing your company’s name in a ransomware leak post isn’t just alarming—it’s actionable intelligence that can trigger immediate credential resets, enhanced logging, and executive briefings. In an era where adversaries operate with the efficiency of startups and the patience of predators, visibility into their planning grounds isn’t optional. It’s part of the new baseline for resilience.

Conclusion: Seeing Clearly in the Shadows

The dark web will never be fully eradicated. As long as there is demand for anonymity—whether for whistleblowing or weaponized data theft—the infrastructure will adapt, migrate, and reemerge under new protocols. Law enforcement takedowns, while symbolically powerful, often produce only temporary disruption; markets fragment, actors regroup, and new platforms rise within weeks. This isn’t a reason for despair, but for recalibration. Instead of viewing the dark web as an unknowable abyss, we should treat it as another layer of the threat landscape—one that reveals adversary intent, capability, and timing with remarkable clarity if we know where to look. The criminals don’t want you to understand this. They rely on mystique to obscure their methods and on organizational inertia to delay defensive action. By demystifying the dark web, grounding our understanding in verified incidents, and embedding practical monitoring into our security posture, we strip away that advantage. In cybersecurity, visibility is power. And in the shadows, even a little light goes a long way.

Call to Action

If this breakdown helped you think a little clearer about the threats out there, don’t just click away. Subscribe for more no-nonsense security insights, drop a comment with your thoughts or questions, or reach out if there’s a topic you want me to tackle next. Stay sharp out there.

D. Bryan King

Sources

Disclaimer:

The views and opinions expressed in this post are solely those of the author. The information provided is based on personal research, experience, and understanding of the subject matter at the time of writing. Readers should consult relevant experts or authorities for specific guidance related to their unique situations.

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New by me: Cybersecurity Implications of Cloud Service Models: IaaS, PaaS, CaaS, and SaaS

Cloud isn’t just “someone else’s computer” anymore. The service model you pick changes who owns what security controls, where misconfigurations happen, and how fast a mistake turns into an incident.

https://www.kylereddoch.me/blog/cybersecurity-implications-of-cloud-service-models-iaas-paas-caas-and-saas/

#CyberSecurity #CloudSecurity #CloudComputing #IaaS #PaaS #CaaS #SaaS #Kubernetes #DevSecOps #InfoSec

Cybersecurity Implications of Cloud Service Models (IaaS, PaaS, CaaS, and SaaS)

Cloud changes your attack surface and your responsibilities. Here’s what security really looks like across IaaS, PaaS, CaaS, and SaaS.

CybersecKyle

Modele LLM bez ograniczeń, czyli rozwój Cybercrime as a Service

Generatywne modele językowe przebojem wdarły się do naszej codzienności. Dziś już wielu nie wyobraża sobie codziennej pracy czy nauki bez ich udziału. Rozwój dużych modeli językowych wpłynął także na obraz zagrożeń w cyberprzestrzeni. Z jednej strony LLM-y mogą pomagać w obronie, z drugiej strony stwarzają zupełnie nowe możliwości dla podmiotów...

#Aktualności #Caas #Jailbreaking #Kawaiigpt #Llm #Phishing #Wormgpt

https://sekurak.pl/modele-llm-bez-ograniczen-czyli-rozwoj-cybercrime-as-a-service/

Modele LLM bez ograniczeń, czyli rozwój Cybercrime as a Service

Generatywne modele językowe przebojem wdarły się do naszej codzienności. Dziś już wielu nie wyobraża sobie codziennej pracy czy nauki bez ich udziału. Rozwój dużych modeli językowych wpłynął także na obraz zagrożeń w cyberprzestrzeni. Z jednej strony LLM-y mogą pomagać w obronie, z drugiej strony stwarzają zupełnie nowe możliwości dla podmiotów...

Sekurak
Cybercrime goes full SaaS: Phishing kits w/ AI, Telegram OTP bots on weekly plans, infostealer data feeds, access brokers selling logins, RATs for $200/mo. Attackers just subscribe—no skills needed. 🔗 https://zurl.co/az4Hk #CyberSecurity #InfoSec #CaaS #ThreatIntel
Operação Chargeback: Europol e Eurojust travam fraude de 300M€ que afetou 4.3 milhões de pessoas

 Uma operação internacional em larga escala, apelidada de "Operação Chargeback", conseguiu desmantelar três redes massivas de fraude com cartões de crédito e la

TugaTech

Europol Dismantles SIM Farm Network Powering 49 Million Fake Accounts Worldwide

Europol announced the disruption of a sophisticated cybercrime-as-a-service (CaaS) platform that operated a SIM farm and enabled its customers to carry out a broad spectrum of crimes ranging from phishing to investment fraud.

#SIMfarm #Europol #CaaS #cybercrime #security #cybersecurity #hackers #hacking

https://thehackernews.com/2025/10/europol-dismantles-sim-farm-network.html

Europol Dismantles SIM Farm Network Powering 49 Million Fake Accounts Worldwide

Europol’s Operation SIMCARTEL dismantled a SIM farm used for 49M fake accounts and €5M in fraud.

The Hacker News