Five questions for the western left on Ukraine and imperialism – by Simon Pirani

Five questions for the western left on Ukraine and imperialism

Russia’s war: stop trying to delegitimise resistance

Link :

https://europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article78328

British writer, historian and energy researcher Simon Pirani confronts what he terms “campism” — the tendency in parts of the western left to treat Ukrainian resistance as a NATO proxy rather than genuine anti-colonial struggle. Structured as five questions addressed to a sceptical comrade, the article contests the claim that the Ukraine war is simply inter-imperialist, argues for the colonial character of Russian domination over Ukraine, and defends arms supplies on historically grounded socialist principles, drawing on Bangladesh, the Malvinas and the French Resistance as precedents. Written as the US-Israeli assault on Iran reopens campist divisions, Pirani calls for principled internationalism over geopolitical simplicity. [AN]

he second of two linked articles. The first is here: European socialism, imperial militarism and the defence of Ukraine

In the labour movement and civil society organisations in the UK, support for Ukrainian resistance to Russian imperialism is countered by those who argued that Ukraine is only a proxy of western powers.

The underlying idea, that the only “real” imperialism is western – and that resistance to Russian or Chinese imperialism, or their puppets in e.g. Syria or Iran, is therefore illegitimate – has its roots in twentieth-century Stalinism. But it retains its hold, in part, because the western empire’s crimes are so horrific. It is Gaza, and climate change, that angers young people in the UK above all.

This “campism” (division of the world into a US-centred “camp” and other, not-so-bad camps) transmits itself, in part, through activists who seek simple principles on which to build social movements. [1]

It has reared its ugly head again during the US-Israeli war on Iran this month, treating the theocratic, authoritarian regime as the victim rather than the Iranian people caught between that regime and the murderous US-Israeli onslaught.

This article is a plea to avoid such simplicity. It has grown out of an email, written last year to one such activist, who told me I was wrong to support the provision of arms to Ukrainians resisting Russian aggression. I asked him these five questions, and I still hope he will reply.

 1. What is the character of Russian imperialism, and what is its relationship to Ukraine?

We often hear, or read, on the “left” that the war in Ukraine is an “inter-imperialist war”. I don’t agree. There’s certainly an inter-imperialist conflict that forms the context, but the actual war is between Russia (an essentially imperialist country) and Ukraine (clearly not an imperialist country). I’ll come back to the character of the war below (question 2). But I think we agree that Russia is essentially imperialist. What sort of imperialism?

For all socialists in the 19th and early 20th centuries, Russia was the most fearsome empire and Ukraine was its oldest, and largest, colony. Throughout the Soviet period, as far as I know, none of the versions of socialism or communism, however exotic, argued that Ukraine and the other 13 non-Russian republics had somehow disappeared or lost their right to self-determination.

As far as extreme Stalinists were concerned, that right was guaranteed by the Soviet constitution and all was fine. There were plenty of arguments about the extent to which the speaking of Ukrainian in Ukraine, Kazakh in Kazakhstan, Azeri in Azerbaijan etc should be implemented. But as far as I’m aware, not even when Stalinist nationalities policy zig-zagged into extreme insanities, did anyone suggest that these were not nations with their own language and culture.

Russia emerged from the Soviet period as a severely weakened empire, or a would-be empire, but still an empire. The large stock of nukes and gigantic army made up for what Russia lacked in terms of its economy.

A large part of Putin’s project is to strengthen the Russian empire. That was what the incredibly brutal wars in Chechnya in the 1990s and early 2000s were about, and a large part of what the Russian intervention in Syria was about. In my view, this is essentially what the war in Ukraine is about too.

What about Ukraine? The friend I was arguing with wrote to me: “we’re not talking about an ’oppressed people’ in the sense we may talk of resistance in Palestine, we’re talking about an advanced capitalist state’s army, which is supported by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) powers and in a war with another state’s army, with all the consequences that brings”.

Let’s unpack this. Of course there’s no comparison, in Ukraine or anywhere else, to the long-running history of violent ethnic cleansing in Palestine, let alone the genocide now being carried out. It would be analytically meaningless, and I’d say morally dubious, to try to make a comparison. So let’s not try.

I would not compare Ireland’s situation to Palestine either, but I would say that Ireland – which also has an “advanced capitalist state”, right? – and Ukraine are both examples of countries that have historically been subject, by Britain and Russia respectively, to long-term forms of imperial domination.

Some people think that in the post-Soviet period, Russian domination of Ukraine has been fading away. I myself thought that in the early 2000s, and how wrong I turned out to be.

Certainly the Ukrainian bourgeoisie tried to carve out for itself an independent economic path (or rather, a path towards closer economic integration with Europe), with some success. Other republics took distance, economically, from Russia: Azerbaijan towards Turkey, some of the central Asian states towards China. But Ukraine’s aspirations took a crushing blow from the 2008-09 financial crisis. Russia attempted to reassert control through local politicians, but found itself in a cul-de-sac in 2014. The Kremlin then opted for military subversion.

 2. What caused the war (which is relevant to how it might be stopped)?

The standard explanation of the 2014 invasion by campists and “realists” is that Putin’s hand was forced by NATO. To my mind (i) that’s a heap of happy horse manure, and (ii) while there was a strand of thinking (albeit not consistent or dominant) in the NATO powers that Putin should be more tightly controlled, it is just deceptive to present this as the cause of the invasion. Actually, Yanukovich was forced out by a popular movement – extremely politically heterogenous, but a movement all the same – and Putin felt forced to act.

I remember going to Kyiv literally the day after Yanukovich left. I met a friend. She said: “the Russians are going to invade”. I said: “no they won’t. That would be madness, it would ruin all they have been trying to do with the economy for years”. It was madness, it did ruin Russia’s economic strategy, but they did it anyway.

Why? I was then working at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, in which context I had to interact with Russian business people and researchers. I spent several years asking them: why did they think the Kremlin did it? The best answer I got was: “Because they could, given the confusion in Ukraine at that moment. And because if they had not taken the opportunity, they would have had to answer to the military, and to the nationalists, as to why they had not done it.” (A forthcoming book by Alexandra Prokopenko answers a slightly different question, i.e. why didn’t the Russian elite, most of whom saw the war as a disaster, do more in 2022 to stop it.) [2]

What was the social reality of the initial invasion in 2014? What were Russian troops and the Russian-supported forces in Donetsk and Luhansk up to in 2014-21? The “campists” and “realists” have little or nothing to say about this. The answer is that they were terrorising people who disputed their right to set up tinpot dictatorships, jailing trade unionists, putting in place an arbitrary, dictatorial legal system, attempting to stop people speaking or teaching kids the Ukrainian language, and so on.

It’s estimated that as well as wrecking the economy, these bastards managed to reduce the population by half between 2014 and 2018 or so. Many people who were young and able to leave, left.

Surely this was not an inter-imperialist war? And without understanding this, it’s impossible to claim seriously that the conflict post-2022 is an inter-imperialist war. Militarily, it’s a war between Russia and Ukraine, and grew out of the 2014-21 war. No matter how much support is being given to Ukraine by the western powers – and it’s actually pretty small scale by historical standards – this is not a conflict between two imperialist armies.

 3. Are there circumstances in which, against a background of inter-imperialist conflict, socialists would take the side of one state against another?

Of course there are – which is another hole, or a crater, more like – in “campist” and “realist” arguments.

Sure, there’s an inter-imperialist conflict going on. But I would say socialists are justified in supporting Ukraine because we stand for nations’ right to self-determination, free of imperialist bullying.

An example of this is Iran, which is surely as much an “advanced capitalist state” as Ukraine, and also surely close geopolitically to Russia and China. Does that mean that as socialists we are indifferent to the attack on Iran by the US and Israel? Of course not. Neither were we indifferent to the attack on Iraq in 2003.

In fact I can think of examples of socialists actually supporting a capitalist, perhaps would-be imperialist, power invading another country. One such is the Indian invasion of Bangladesh in 1971, when Pakistan was threatening to crush the Bangladeshi independence movement militarily. [3] I wrote to an Indian socialist friend to ask about this, and she replied:

I am not sure if it’s correct to refer to India at that time as a “would-be imperialist power”, although it certainly was the dominant power in South Asia. But you are right in thinking that Indian socialists, including the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist), with the exception of the Maoists, supported the Indian intervention to halt what I would subsequently call a genocidal assault on East Bengal, with an especially horrifying number of rapes. No doubt [the Indian prime minister] Indira Gandhi was being opportunistic, and, as I found later when I visited Bangladesh, workers there had no illusions in her or in India. But the rapes and killings had to be stopped, and she did it.

If we go back to the 1930s and 40s there are numerous examples of socialists supporting the supply of weapons to states, and quasi-state formations, by imperialist countries. Socialists in the UK and across Europe supported the supply of weapons by British and American imperialism to the French resistance, which was led by a bunch of reactionary bourgeois politicians, who after the war led reactionary bourgeois governments. I do not know what Irish socialists thought of the supply of weapons to the IRA (Irish Republican Army) by Nazi Germany, but certainly they made no vocal demands that the arms be sent back.

Of course there are political reasons to be cautious about focusing on the supply of weapons, to do with our larger attitude to militarism and our attitude to the state. (I have mentioned these in this related article.) [4]

But let’s again consider Ukraine specifically. In his email, my friend contrasted Palestinians (an “oppressed people”) to Ukrainians (who have “an advanced capitalist state’s army”). What difference does this make?

In my view, the absence of a Palestinian capitalist state with weapons is a key factor that has allowed the genocide to proceed in Gaza. It’s no accident that the Israeli right has spent the last quarter of a century making sure that no steps are taken in the direction of the formation of such a state (the “two state solution”).

If only Palestinians had had that advanced state with an army, that Ukrainians have!

To see what happens to people attacked by Russia without a fully-fledged state and army to protect them, we have only to look to Chechnya, which was subject to a war of mass extermination as a result.

 4. Is there a difference between the manner of social control in Russia on one side, and Ukraine, Poland and other eastern European countries on the other? And does this make any difference?

Last year, I picked a polemical argument with people who talk about the war in Ukraine being a confrontation between authoritarianism and democracy, because I think that that folds too easily into the western imperialist powers’ narratives. But the issue of bourgeois democracy is not irrelevant.

In Ukraine, however dire the situation, it is still possible – as we saw, dramatically, with the “anti-corruption” demonstrations last summer – for people to demonstrate, to criticise the government in the media, etc, in other words to exercise the rights of free speech and assembly – with a risk of repression that I suppose is comparable to the UK, i.e. low.

In Russia, this is obviously not the case. We have seen no movements involving street demos since 2022, and the standard punishment for criticising the war on social media is seven or eight years in prison. Numerous people have been killed for opposing the government. Our socialist and anarchist friends and comrades are either in jail, or have left the country, or, if they can not do so, have stopped doing any public political activity or organising.

Does this difference matter? Does it mean that some of the considerations that were discussed in the 1940s – that the axis powers, i.e. not only Germany which was fully Nazi but also fascist Italy and fascist Spain – represented a threat to democracy that was qualitatively different from the threat posed by the British, French and American bourgeoisies? I think it matters, and I think that again has implications for whether socialists favour the Ukrainian side in the war.

 5. Can we make clear that we favour the use of weapons by the capitalist state for one thing (defending Ukrainian people) but not another (general rearmament)?

In his email, my friend said he would find it difficult to justifying arms deliveries to working-class Brits who are faced with monstrous spending cuts. We need to discuss this seriously, analytically.

I think it’s obvious that there are some uses of force by the state that we favour, and some we don’t. If we were on a counter-demo against a bunch of fascists outside a hotel being used to house migrants, and were significantly outnumbered, and all that was protecting the hotel was a line of cops, we would not be urging the cops to go away, would we? We would not lambast their defence of the hotel in the same terms that we lambast many other things that police officers do, would we?

Obviously we would hope not to be in that situation, and we would put all the emphasis on mobilising to ensure that the counter-demos were bigger.

But working-class Ukrainians never hoped to be in the situation they are in either.

This argument can easily be extended to examples of military force. I asked some Argentine comrades about the Malvinas war of 1982. [5] Many in the largely-underground labour movement urged the military dictatorship, which had killed, tortured and imprisoned many thousands of their friends and comrades, to divert its resources to fight the armed forces sent by Margaret Thatcher to the islands. One comrade wrote to me that the Argentine Trotskyist organisations

held a critical position, differentiating the Malvinas cause (which they supported) from the military leadership of the military junta, which they considered a genocidal dictatorship that used the war to remain in power.

Sections of the left proposed the nationalisation of British-owned properties, the confiscation of British assets, and the non-payment of the external debt to Great Britain, seeking to make the war “popular” and not directed by the military junta.

The Argentine left maintained a position of national sovereignty over the islands, denouncing the British occupation since 1833. It criticised the dictatorship’s handling of the war, viewing the conflict as a way in which the military junta sought to perpetuate its power. The general approach is sovereigntist and anti-imperialist, differentiating it from the positions of the center-right or liberal sectors.

Were the Argentine socialists right to support the war, and to call for it to be “made popular”, even in the face of a brutal, inhuman dictatorship?

Why, now, should we not put demands on the racist, anti-working-class, genocide-supporting Starmer government to step up UK arms shipments to Ukraine?

My friend said in his email that he “simply could not face [working class people in dire circumstances], or the people I work with around [climate impacts] and defend the absurd amount of money which has gone to continuing this bloody stalemate”.

I would suggest to him that he could say to his comrades: the state can fund this stuff if it has the will to do so. The state can tax the rich, or whatever. It’s not an either/or. It’s a matter of principle.

 Conclusion

The damage done by western “leftists”’ cynical attempts to delegitimise Ukrainian resistance has already been done. At least since 2014, and rising to a crescendo in 2022. Always wrapped up in earnest-sounding, empty words about “anti imperialism”. The damage is not to Ukrainian people – that is done by Russian bombs, and by the gangsters and torturers that the Kremlin has put in charge of Donbas – but rather damage to socialism, damage to its development as a movement. [6]

Simon Pirani, 12 March 2026.

 A linked article: European socialism, imperial militarism and the defence of Ukraine

 There are detailed discussions of UK “left” groups’ attitude to Russia’s war on the Red Mole substack, e.g. here, here, here and here.

Simon Pirani is a British writer, historian and energy researcher, honorary professor in the School of Modern Languages and Cultures at the University of Durham, and former senior research fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (2007–21). He is the author of Burning Up: A Global History of Fossil Fuel Consumption (Pluto Press, 2018) and writes the People & Nature blog at peoplenature.org.

P.S.

https://peopleandnature.wordpress.com/2026/03/12/russias-war-stop-trying-to-delegitimise-resistance/

Notes for ESSF by Adam Novak

Footnotes

[1] On campism and its roots in Stalinist ideology, see Marc Bonhomme, “Ukraine and the Weak Link: Anti-Imperialism in the Age of Neo-Fascism”, Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières, 5 March 2026. Available at: https://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article78229

[2] Alexandra Prokopenko, Russia Elites Transformation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, forthcoming 2026. Preview available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/12/russia-elites-transformation

[3] The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 resulted in the creation of Bangladesh from what had been East Pakistan. Indian military intervention halted the Pakistani army’s campaign of mass killings against the Bengali population. The conflict is estimated to have caused between 300,000 and 3 million deaths.

[4] Simon Pirani, “European socialism, imperial militarism and the defence of Ukraine”, People and Nature, 12 March 2026. Available at: https://peopleandnature.wordpress.com/2026/03/12/european-socialism-imperial-militarism-and-defence-of-ukraine/. Also published on Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières. Available at: https://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article78305

[5] The Malvinas/Falklands War (April–June 1982) was fought between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), which Argentina claims and which have been under British control since 1833. Argentina’s military junta, led by General Leopoldo Galtieri, launched the invasion partly to shore up collapsing domestic support; Britain under Margaret Thatcher dispatched a naval task force and retook the islands after ten weeks of fighting.

[6] On the impact of campism on the European left’s response to the war, see also Simon Pirani, “European socialism, imperial militarism and the defence of Ukraine”, Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières, 12 March 2026. Available at: https://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article78305; and Luisa Martinez, “No concessions to any imperialism! The Zapatistas’ Clear Stand on Ukraine”, Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières, 8 September 2025. Available at: https://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article76176

About the author, Simon Pirani :

Hello. My name is Simon Pirani. I write here about the climate and ecological crisis; energy and energy workers; science, technology and society; history; and other things. The site also has articles by guest authors, interviews, reviews and pamphlets.

From 2011 until February 2021, I was writing here under a pseudonym, Gabriel Levy. I am no longer doing so.

I am an energy researcher and historian. My book, Burning Up: A Global History of Fossil Fuel Consumption (Pluto Press, 2018) is relevant to some themes on this site. You will find other things I have written at simonpirani.com.

People & Nature articles have been republished by the EcologistOpen DemocracyRed PepperLibcomThe Pensive QuillRS21London Green LeftClimate and Capitalism and elsewhere. My writing on Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan has appeared in LeftEastThe Russian Reader and Russian- and Ukrainian-language sites including OpenLeftCommons.ua and Nihilist.

People & Nature is not really a news or campaigning site – but I have featured campaigns such as solidarity with Kazakh oil workersUkrainian trade unionists and victims of political repression in Russia.

For more, see People & Nature greatest hits of the 2010s, and for even more, the (entire) site contents.

Comments, correspondence and guest posts welcome.

#Campism #Crimea #DifferentUsesOfWeapons #EuropeanMilitarism #EuropeanUnion #europeanUnion #FrenchResistanceAgainstTheGermanNazisDuringWorldWar2ArmedByBritishAndUSAImperialism #InternationalistPrinciples #ireland #NATO #politics #putin #Russia #SimonPirani #Ukraine #war

Simon Pirani on European socialism, imperial militarism and defence of Ukraine

Simon Pirani, British energy researcher, historian and author of the People and Nature blog, offers a sharp self-criticism of the European left’s failure to engage seriously with the political and military questions posed by Russia’s war, now in its fourth year. Acknowledging small steps in labour movement solidarity, he argues the deeper failure lies in the absence of genuine discussion about the war’s transformation of European politics. Drawing on Ukrainian socialist voices — Taras Bilous, Hanna Perekhoda, Oleksandr Kyselov — and Nordic left initiatives, Pirani outlines principles for an internationalist socialist response linking Ukraine, Palestine, refugees, and working-class struggle. [AN]

Link :


European socialism, imperial militarism and defence of Ukraine

Russian bombing of Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and blocks of flats has continued uninterrupted this month, while attention has been diverted by the criminal US-Israeli military adventure in Iran. Ukrainian cities are emerging from their hardest winter yet, during which Russia tried its best to freeze them into submission.

How, or whether, socialists in Europe get their heads around the political and practical challenges posed by Russia’s war is surely very, very far down the list of things that most Ukrainian people care about right now.

I am going to write about it here nonetheless, because if “socialism” is to mean anything, then how European socialists are responding to the bloodiest war on this continent for eighty years matters a great deal.

I will argue that, whatever small steps we have taken, to support Ukrainian resistance in the spirit of internationalism, are overshadowed by our collective failure to understand and discuss the profound changes caused by the Russian war and to work out effective responses.

By “we”, I mean socialists who from the start supported Ukrainian resistance to imperialist attack. In this first article I offer a view of what we have done and not done. In a second article, I comment on the enduring influence of those who oppose Ukrainian resistance, in practice, words or both. [1]

The small steps we have taken can be summed up as follows. First, sections of the organised labour movement have given direct, material support to their Ukrainian counterparts in the form of medical and other supplies. While this is probably a relatively small component of the overall flow of support from civil society and from Ukrainians living in Europe, up to and including military equipment and volunteer soldiers, it is significant.

Second, we have sought to unite support for Ukrainian resistance to Russian imperialism, and indeed for the tiny, fiercely suppressed anti-war movement in Russia, with the massive anti-war movement that opposed western governments’ support for Israeli genocide in Gaza. We raised our voices against the hypocrisy of governments who sought forcibly to silence pro-Palestinian voices while permitting Ukrainian ones.

Demands on western governments from within the labour movement to take stronger specific actions in support of Ukraine, by making economic sanctions more effective or freeing up supplies of particular types of weapons, have in my view been less effective, due to the relative weakness of the labour movement politically and the crisis of social-democratic parties across Europe.

Our most serious failure, though, in my view, has been the lack of deep-going discussion about the way that the Russian war has changed Europe, and what that means for the labour movement and social movements.

Too little attention is paid to Ukrainian socialists’ attempts at critique. Meaningful discussion about military issues that stare us in the face is almost completely absent, in the UK at least. Clear thought about what war and its effects means for society, for social movements, for working people as the motive force of change – as distinct from what it means for the state – is rarely articulated.

One consequence of this failure is that our responses to crude “anti-imperialism” that makes Ukrainian resistance invisible – voiced recently, for example, by Zarah Sultana – are insufficiently robust.

Among Ukrainian socialists’ critiques, there is an implicit challenge to us in western countries in the reflections by Taras Bilous on the last four years of war, building on his widely-circulated “letter to the western left” written on the day Russia invaded. [2]

Asked about prospects for a negotiated peace and security guarantees – the lack of which is a key outstanding obstacle to a settlement, according to Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky – Bilous said:

“In the context of the collapse of the international order, no written security guarantees are reliable. For Ukraine, there are two main security guarantees: the army, and the fact that Russia has suffered heavy losses in this war. Now they will think twice before attacking us again.”

Bilous on one hand points up the significance of the direct Russia-Ukraine negotiations that are now taking place, as distinct from the US-Russia “great power” farce. On the other he sees no evidence that Putin has abandoned his plan to destroy the Ukrainian state, and sees calls to surrender the unoccupied part of Donbas to Russia as, potentially, “just a step towards this”.

These stark warnings imply dilemmas for socialists across Europe. If the only real “security guarantees” are the force of arms, what does that mean in Estonia? Lithuania? Poland? What does it mean further west?

Hanna Perekhoda, a Ukrainian socialist who lives in Switzerland, argued last year that any left-wing perspective had to start not from the nation-state or European community, but the “global working class”. It has to “keep in mind that neither human life nor workers’ rights, nor the environment can be protected” in any state trapped in the “zone of influence” of imperial extractivist powers such as Russia, China or the US. [3]

In her view, this requires socialists in Europe, first, to “ensure the structural survival of a democratic space” and, second, to “fight from within that space to redefine its political and social content”. In the Baltic states, Poland and Finland, this means “rebuilding their stocks [of armaments] and reinforcing infrastructure”. She continued:

“When your neighbour is the world’s second military power, bombing cities daily, spending a third of its budget on war and calling your country a ’historical mistake’, the ability to defend yourself is not an arms race. It is survival.”

Eastern European states can only undertake this with the help of western European allies, Perekhoda writes. In western Europe, “the threat is different. Less about invasion, more about the rise of the far right”; and defence means:

“[C]ountering disinformation, protecting infrastructure, blocking foreign money in politics, defending against cyberattacks, sabotage, and energy blackmail. And helping those who need weapons immediately for their survival.”

Perekhoda argues that socialists should not oppose the production of weapons; the real battlefield is who controls it; “the problem is letting the market decide what is produced, for whom, under what rules”.

If we in western Europe are not discussing these issues, what are we playing at? It is not Ukrainian comrades’ job to sort out our problems. They have enough other things to worry about. It is to our collective shame that Oleksandr Kyselov, a Ukrainian socialist based in Sweden, should mark the fourth anniversary of all-out war by protesting that: [4]

“Too many of the European left are busy stretching familiar old frameworks over a changed world. As if continuing to hope that, should they just deny, condemn, and denounce loudly enough, selectively pontificating about internationalism while reinforcing the borders of their national units, they will be spared the new reality of the world.”

There are (at least) two sides to the discussion we need to have: one (“political”) concerning any effect we might have on the situation now, when all decisions about military matters are effectively in the hands of the ruling class, its state and its puppet politicians; and, second (I’ll call it “movement-focused”), about principles around which to build a movement strong enough both to counter the state and to bring about social transformation.

On the political side, socialists in Nordic countries are streets ahead of us in the UK, perhaps because they are geographically closer to Russia.

Bjarke Friborg of the Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten) in Denmark underlined in a recent interview the “very real” threat posed by Putin’s regime, “not necessarily in terms of ’tanks rolling into Paris’, but certainly as a threat to democracy, sovereignty and the principle that borders can not be changed by brute force”. He continued:

“We oppose Russian imperialism just as we have opposed American and NATO imperialism: not by supporting one bloc against another, but by defending the right of peoples to self-determination and supporting democratic and progressive forces in Russia and its client state, Belarus.”

Friborg argued that “opposing militarism” and recognising “the need for people to resist aggression” are entirely compatible, and formulated this in terms of “popular defence – a democratic defence based on citizens and rooted in civil society, not a militarised state apparatus serving the interests of business, the arms industry and imperialist interventions”. The alternative to “popular defence” is to leave the field open to authoritarian powers.

“There is no contradiction between military support for Ukraine and criticism of NATO and the arms industry.”

Where do socialists in the UK stand? In October last year, a group of us held a (small, not publicly advertised) discussion about “How we can effectively support Ukrainian resistance, while opposing general European rearmament”. A friend who opened the discussion – let’s call him Gerald – began by saying that he didn’t think this was possible; that we could not do one without the other (in contrast to Friborg’s view). [5]

As I understood it, Gerald reckons that European nations’ military spending has been relatively low in recent years, and that without multi-billion-euro investment in weapons systems, they would be unable to counter Russian militarism in eastern Europe.

Military technologies (about which I know very little) were also referred to in our discussion. The extent to which the US, European countries, Israel and others rely on each other for these is relevant.

Where could we start, in forming a collective view of this difficult subject? The working-class and socialist movements can and must pick and choose which actions of the capitalist state we support, and which we oppose. We must pick and choose technologies.

We support building schools and employing health workers; we oppose building new airport runways. Why can’t we support the provision of air defence systems to Ukraine, while opposing sinking billions into Trident and aircraft carriers? Why can’t we call on the government to refuse to purchase Israeli-made weapons systems?

In order to develop a socialist approach along these lines, we need, for a start, an honest assessment of the extent and nature of the Russian military threat (i) to Ukraine, (ii) to other eastern and central European states, and (iii) to western Europe (likely in the form of cyber and other sabotage, covert support for right-wing parties etc). [6]

Furthermore, we need an honest assessment of the limits of European “democracy” that claims to be defending Ukraine – the same “democracy” that reinforces the power of corporations against working people, that supported Israel’s genocide to the hilt and that maintains a “fortress” against defenceless refugees. This is the issue raised point-blank by Hanna Perekhoda, as I mentioned above.

It is this “democracy” that controls military technology. Its claims that investment in military systems is justified by support for Ukraine need to be assessed in that context. We know that that support is strictly rationed, and that it goes alongside the continuing arms trade with Israel, the Gulf states and other autocracies.

In my view, political demands that the European “democracies” supply to Ukraine defensive weapons it needs must be integrated into broader opposition to imperialist militarism, as Friborg does. Could the call for a Europe-wide embargo on arms sales anywhere except Ukraine, mentioned by Taras Bilous, be a starting point?

One UK politician has timidly hinted that there are good, and bad, weapons supplies: John Swinney, Scotland’s first minister. In September last year, he lifted restrictions on the use of public support for munitions production “in light of Russia’s invasion of and continued war against Ukraine”, but blocked new awards of public money to defence companies trading with Israel, due to the “plausible evidence of genocide” in Gaza. [7]

A very limited commitment, to be sure. But could it be one stepping-stone to a set of radical political approaches? Could the distinction between arms for Ukraine, and arms for genocidal regimes, be incorporated into such initiatives as the “Plan for an Alternative to Russian occupation”, issued last year by Labour MPs, trade union leaders and others, and supported by the Ukraine Solidarity Campaign?

The Plan urges increasing weapons supply and tighter sanctions on Russia, and calls for Ukraine’s international debt to be cancelled and for frozen Russian financial assets to be transferred to Ukraine.

It also advocates “an emergency ’Save Ukraine’ summit of European and allied nations” be convened, “for necessary military and financial support”. In my view this is a pandora’s box.

How would the labour movement, and/or politicians allied to it, stop such a summit being a vehicle for European governments to compel Ukraine to do their bidding? What can we learn from the experience of the conferences on Ukrainian economic reconstruction in 2022-23, at which European corporations jostled for pride of place in post-war EU-financed programmes?

There is a dearth of frank, serious discussion about the logic of such political demands.

We need discussion, too, about how such political demands about arms supplies, addressed to the UK and other reactionary governments, relate to broader socialist principles on which the development of the labour movement and social movements can be based. (This is what I meant, above, by movement-focused approaches. It is underpinned by the idea that socialism implies the transformation of the whole of society, by society, with the working class at its centre, as distinct from political changes in the state.)

Opposition to imperialist militarism, and support for all those attacked by it, has to be at the centre, in my view. This means, for a start:

 Working to unite European support for Ukrainian resistance to support for Palestinian resistance to Israeli colonialism and genocide – in other words, working to unite movements of human liberation on both sides of the geopolitical divide.

 In the UK and Europe, supporting the human rights of all refugees and asylum-seekers in the face of governments’ racist, divisive manipulation of rules to play off Ukrainian refugees against those from African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries.

 Bringing together such basic internationalist principles with the struggle to reverse the assaults on working-class living standards and public services in the UK and Europe, that is, to direct the fight on these issues against capital, to counter the extreme right-wing attempts to set working-class people in Europe against Ukraine and/or against refugees and migrants.

 Cooperation and coordination with Ukrainian labour movement and civil society organisations, which are allied with the right-wing Zelensky government against Russian aggression, but in conflict with it in their efforts to extend social and civil rights, to resist authoritarianism and corruption in the Ukrainian state, and to resist economic policies designed to suit western corporations.

Such basic principles are not heard loudly enough. Our banner “From Ukraine to Palestine, occupation is a crime” is warmly welcomed on demonstrations, but that remains a minority’s slogan. Voices such as Adeeb Shaheen’s, identifying the commonality of struggles against western and Russian imperialism, need to be amplified. [8]

If support for Ukrainian resistance is not anchored in such principles, there is a danger that it will be turned into an adjunct of Labour’s militarist politics.

That seems to be the current mission of Paul Mason, the left-turned-right journalist, who parades his support for arms supplies to Ukraine, while simultaneously expressing “pride” in Labour’s backing for Israeli genocide, applauding the authoritarian clampdown on pro-Palestine protest and bemoaning Labour’s punishment by left-wing voters.

Mason advises the government that the UK’s general rearmament programme can be to society’s benefit.

Identification of Ukraine’s struggle with imperialist militarism is anathema to genuine solidarity with Ukrainian resistance, and the mirror image of “campist” opposition to that resistance, that I have written about in a second article.

Simon Pirani, 12 March 2026

A linked article: Russia’s war: stop trying to delegitimise resistance

— –

Simon Pirani is a British writer, historian and energy researcher, honorary professor in the School of Modern Languages and Cultures at the University of Durham, and former senior research fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (2007–21). He is the author of Burning Up: A Global History of Fossil Fuel Consumption (Pluto Press, 2018) and writes the People and Nature blog at peoplenature.org.

P.S.

Source : People and Nature, 12 March 2026.

Additional notes for ESSF by Adam Novak.

Footnotes

[1] Simon Pirani, “Russia’s war: stop trying to delegitimise resistance”, People and Nature, 12 March 2026. Available at: https://peopleandnature.wordpress.com/2026/03/12/russias-war-stop-trying-to-delegitimise-resistance/

[2] Taras Bilous is a Ukrainian socialist, historian and member of Sotsialnyi Rukh (Social Movement). His “Letter to the western left from Kyiv”, written on the day of Russia’s full-scale invasion (24 February 2022) and published in openDemocracy, was widely circulated internationally. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/a-letter-to-the-western-left-from-kyiv/

[3] Hanna Perekhoda, “The Military Vulnerability of Europe: A Blind Spot for the Western Left”, ESSF. Available at: https://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article74521 — FLAG: verify article ID, title and date before publication.

[4] Oleksandr Kyselov is a Ukrainian socialist based in Sweden and a member of Sotsialnyi Rukh (Social Movement — Соціальний рух), the Ukrainian democratic socialist organisation.

[5] On the debate within the European left about rearmament and Ukrainian defence, see also: “Against the ’rearmament’ of Europe”, ESSF. Available at: https://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article74464 — FLAG: verify article ID, title, author and date before publication.

[6] On the realities of Russian military pressure, European rearmament dynamics and the left’s response, see: Christian Varquat, “Russia/Ukraine October 2025: drones, fears and rearmament in Europe + what anti-imperialist resistance”, ESSF. Available at: https://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article78172 — FLAG: verify article ID, title and date before publication.

[7] John Swinney has been First Minister of Scotland since May 2024, succeeding Humza Yousaf as leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP).

[8] Adeeb Shaheen is a Palestinian-Ukrainian author. The linked page relates to a memoir project about his experience of double displacement — from Palestine, and from Ukraine following Russia’s full-scale invasion.

#Crimea #europeanUnion #HannaPerekhoda #InternationalistPrinciples #LetterToTheWesternLeft #NATO #NordicLeft #OleksandrKyselov #Palestine #politics #putin #RedGreenAllianceDenmark #Russia #SimonPirani #TarasBilous #Ukraine #war

Russia, resistere alla macchina da guerra di Vladimir Putin

di Simon Pirani, professore onorario alla Durham University e autore di libri su Russia e Ucraina e sui sistemi energetici, da Jacobin In Russia e nell'Ucraina occupata, migliaia di civili sono stati imprigionati o fatti sparire forzatamente per aver denunciato l'invasione. Le cifre riflettono una repressione del dissenso peggiore di qualsiasi altro momento dagli anni '50. […]

https://andream94.wordpress.com/2025/11/04/russia-resistere-alla-macchina-da-guerra-di-vladimir-putin/

Russia, attivisti contro la guerra e repressione putiniana

Simon Pirani ha pronunciato questo intervento durante la conferenza Socialism 2025, tenutasi dal 3 al 6 luglio a Chicago, negli Stati Uniti, nell’ambito della sessione “I prigionieri politici anti-guerra di Putin in Russia”. Nel testo presenta il suo prossimo libro, Voices against Putin’s war: Protesters’ defiant speeches in Russian courts (Voci contro la guerra di Putin: discorsi di sfida dei manifestanti davanti ai tribunali russi), che sarà pubblicato da Waterstones ad agosto. La trascrizione del discorso è stata modificata per maggiore chiarezza.

di Simon Pirani, storico, attivista e ricercatore inglese, curatore del blog peopleandnature.wordpress.com, da links.org.au

[…]

https://andream94.wordpress.com/2025/07/25/russia-attivisti-contro-la-guerra-e-repressione-putiniana/

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