Mastodawn

UNIFIL: Funeral ceremony at Cikutra Heroes Cemetery in Bandung, Reuters Connect

Funeral ceremony at Cikutra Heroes Cemetery in Bandung

Reuters Connect, April 5, 2026

Indonesian military personnel carry a coffin of late of Zulmi Aditya Iskandar, a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeeper killed in Lebanon, during a funeral ceremony at Cikutra Heroes Cemetery in Bandung, West Java province, Indonesia, April 5, 2026. REUTERS/Claudio Pramana

Relatives of Zulmi Aditya Iskandar, a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeeper killed in Lebanon, react during a funeral ceremony at Cikutra Heroes Cemetery in Bandung, West Java province, Indonesia, April 5, 2026. REUTERS/Claudio Pramana

Relatives react near the coffin a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeeper killed in Lebanon, during a military honour ceremony at Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, in Tangerang, on the outskirts of Jakarta, Indonesia, April 4, 2026. REUTERS/Ajeng Dinar Ulfiana

Meanwhile Mass Prayer Meeting Outside US Embassy

Thousands of members of the Islamic Mass Organizations Council hold a demonstration and prayer vigil in front of US Embassy in Jakarta on April 5, 2026. The demonstration and prayer vigil were held to express condolences for the three Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) members killed in South Lebanon while serving with UNIFIL. Tempo/Amston Probel

Thousands of Jakarta residents who are members of the Islamic Mass Organization Council hold a demonstration and mass prayer meeting in front of the United States Embassy for Indonesia, Jakarta, April 5, 2026. Tempo/Amston Probel

What is UNIFIL?

The United Nations’ UNIFIL website says the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is a peacekeeping mission in south Lebanon. It was established by the UN Security Council in 1978 with Resolutions 425 and 426. In 2006, the UN Security Council strengthened UNIFIL’s mandate to monitor the cessation of hostilities, among other tasks.

This post is based on Funeral ceremony at Cikutra Heroes Cemetery in Bandung, Reuters Connect, April 5, 2026 and https://www.tempo.co/foto/arsip/massa-gelar-doa-bersama-untuk-3-prajurit-tni-gugur-di-lebanon-2126744 Featured image credit A relative reacts next to the grave of Zulmi Aditya Iskandar, a UNIFIL peacekeeper killed in Lebanon, after the funeral ceremony at Cikutra Heroes Cemetery in Bandung, West Java province, Indonesia, April 5, 2026. REUTERS/Claudio Pramana

In related news:

Rate this:

#AmerikaSerikat #ArmedForces #Gaza #Lebanon #Palestine #PBB #un #UNIFIL #UnitedNations #UnitedStates

Stories From Indonesia Mar 19

Gaza ISF: Indonesia Outlines Caveats for Involvement, Tempo.co

Indonesia Outlines Four National Caveats for an ISF Mission in Gaza, Tempo.co

Indonesia has been selected as the deputy commander of the ISF in the Gaza Strip.

By Dani Aswara for Tempo.co, February 23, 2026

Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced four national caveats for Indonesia’s involvement in any International Stabilization Force (ISF) in the Gaza Strip. These caveats are conditions for Indonesia’s participation in a mission.

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Yvonne Mewengkang said the government had determined the guidelines for involvement from the outset. Mewengkang claimed Indonesia has established clear national caveats from the outset.

“First, Indonesia’s participation is to be non-combat and non-demilitarization, and it will not participate in disarmament,” Mewengkang told Tempo on Monday, February 23, 2026.

Second, Indonesia will not engage in direct confrontation with any party.

Third, the deployment of Indonesian personnel is limited to the Gaza Strip and must obtain the approval of the Palestinian Authority.

Fourth, the use of force is permitted only for self-defense and to maintain the mandate. This use must be proportional, gradual, a last resort, and in accordance with international law and the Rules of Engagement.

Yvonne explained that the focus of Indonesia’s participation in an ISF is protecting civilians, providing humanitarian and medical assistance, reconstruction, and strengthening the capacity of the Palestinian civil authority through training for the Palestinian civil police.

Hikmahanto Juwana, Professor of International Law at the University of Indonesia, questioned the effectiveness of the national caveats that the government has reportedly issued on Indonesia’s involvement in a mission in Gaza. The issue is whether these national boundaries will truly be considered and used as a basis for mobilizing Indonesian troops, he said. “Will the national caveats be considered and used as a basis for mobilizing our troops or not?” Hikmahanto asked when contacted on Sunday, February 22, 2026.

He believes that after a country contributes troops, operational control can rest with the mission command. In that situation, he said, it is possible that the command will declare the national caveats solely an internal matter for the sending country, while troop movement decisions remain with the command.

Hikmahanto also reminded the government to be cautious regarding the appointment of Indonesia as Deputy Commander. He believes this position could be a strategy to get Indonesia to continue contributing the largest number of troops, considering that Indonesia currently has the largest contribution of the five countries contributing troops.

Dani Aswara, a graduate of the Political Science Study Program at Andalas University in Padang, West Sumatra, began his career in journalism at Tempo in 2024. He writes about political, legal, and crime issues.

This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/politik/ini-empat-batasan-nasional-indonesia-untuk-misi-isf-di-gaza-2117229. Featured image credit: Burnt out car of a Brigadier A W S Mallaby, Surabaya 1945.

In related news:

https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/3/22/why-the-world-should-worry-about-israels-nuclear-doctrine

In related news:

Rate this:

#ArmedForces #Elections #Gaza #Indonesia #News #Palestine #PBB #Politics #Tempo #UnitedNations

Oh! Media Mar 13

Iran Tegaskan Tidak Akan Tutup Selat Hormuz - https://ohmedia.my/ohtidak/iran-tegaskan-tidak-akan-tutup-selat-hormuz/
#amerikasyarikat #Iran #pbb #selathormuz

Iran Tegaskan Tidak Akan Tutup Selat Hormuz

Iran beri jaminan tidak akan menutup Selat Hormuz tetapi tetap pertahankan hak menjaga keselamatan laluan penting itu. - Baca artikel penuh di Oh! Media untuk info lanjut.

Iran Tegaskan Tidak Akan Tutup Selat Hormuz | Oh! Media

Stories From Indonesia Feb 18

Op-Ed: Indonesia’s Gaza Gamble by Ronny P Sasmita for Al-Jazeera

Indonesia’s Gaza Gamble

By Ronny P Sasmita for Al-Jazeera, February 16, 2025

(Excerpt) President Prabowo Subianto’s government said on February 10 that Indonesia is preparing to deploy up to 8,000 troops to a proposed multinational Gaza stabilization force under Donald Trump’s so-called Board of Peace (BoP). The troop proposal forms part of Jakarta’s broader decision to participate in the BoP framework, an initiative conceived and driven by Trump. Together, these steps signal a significant shift in Indonesia’s longstanding foreign policy posture. At a time of intensifying geopolitical volatility, Jakarta appears to be committing itself to a project shaped around a single, deeply polarizing political figure. The decision raises a fundamental question: is Indonesia advancing its national interests and diplomatic credibility, or allowing its foreign policy direction to be shaped by an external agenda?

Geopolitics is not a theater for symbolic proximity to power but a disciplined calculation of national interest and sovereign credibility. Indonesia’s decision to engage with the BoP appears less like a carefully calibrated strategic choice and more like a reactive impulse that risks weakening the philosophical foundations of its diplomacy, built over decades. Indonesia’s international influence has historically rested on strategic equidistance rather than personal alignment with controversial leaders.

There is a growing sense that Jakarta risks acting out of geopolitical urgency. Yet the initiative Indonesia has chosen to support is led by a figure known for transactional diplomacy and disregard for international consensus. The implications extend well beyond Middle East peace initiatives. What is at stake is Indonesia’s reputation as an independent stabilizing actor in global diplomacy.

If Indonesia proceeds with troop deployment under the BoP framework, the risks become even more acute. Gaza is not a conventional peacekeeping theater. It is one of the most volatile and politically contested conflict environments in the world, where humanitarian imperatives and hard security objectives frequently collide. Deploying thousands of troops into such an arena without an inclusive multilateral mandate risks drawing Indonesia into a conflict environment where neutrality would be difficult to sustain.

Erosion of the ‘Free and Active’ doctrine

The most serious concern is the gradual erosion of Indonesia’s “Free and Active” foreign policy doctrine, the intellectual backbone of its diplomacy since the Djuanda Declaration and the Bandung Conference. Indonesia has historically positioned itself as a mediator, rather than a follower of personalized diplomatic agendas.

By participating in an institution closely identified with Donald Trump, Jakarta risks legitimizing unilateral approaches that often conflict with established international norms. “Free” diplomacy implies independence, and “active” diplomacy implies engagement driven by national priorities rather than external pressure.

Indonesia also risks being reduced to a symbolic endorsement of a United States-centered foreign policy outlook. If Jakarta drifts too far into this orbit, its leverage with other major actors, including China, Russia and ASEAN partners, could weaken. Indonesia’s leadership in Southeast Asia has depended on its credibility as a neutral stabilizing force. That credibility may erode if it is seen as participating in great-power security agendas.

Indonesia’s respected record in United Nations peacekeeping has historically rested on internationally recognized neutrality under UN command structures. Participation in a BoP framework, which sits outside established multilateral systems, risks shifting Indonesia from neutral arbiter to participant in a political security architecture shaped beyond globally recognized peacekeeping norms.

More troubling is the precedent this sets. If foreign policy principles become negotiable in exchange for economic or strategic promises, Indonesia risks undermining the coherence of its diplomatic identity. Its constitutional commitment to promoting global peace and social justice depends on preserving policy independence.

The Palestine paradox

Indonesia’s participation in the BoP also creates a visible moral and constitutional tension. The Indonesian constitution explicitly rejects all forms of colonialism and emphasizes international justice. Participation in an initiative led by the architect of policies historically skewed in Israel’s favor creates a contradiction that is difficult to reconcile.

Trump’s record in the region remains controversial. His decision to relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem altered decades of diplomatic consensus and drew widespread criticism across the Muslim world. For Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation and a consistent supporter of Palestinian statehood, association with this framework carries significant political sensitivity….

Read the whole piece at https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/16/indonesias-gaza-gamble. Featured image credit: Protesters outside the US Embassy urge the Indonesian government to revoke its membership from the Board of Peace on March 3, 2026. Photo: REUTERS via The Straits Times. Image Credit: Excerpt – US President Donald Trump gestures towards Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto, during a charter announcement for his Board of Peace in Davos, Switzerland, January 22, 2026. [Denis Balibouse/Reuters via Al-Jazeera] Per Al-Jazeera Ronny P Sasmita is a senior international affairs analyst at the Indonesia Strategic and Economics Action Institution, a Jakarta-based think tank focused on geopolitics and geoeconomics. His commentary has appeared in leading Indonesian outlets and a number of international English-language publications. He regularly contributes analysis on international political economy, China’s economy, and global geoeconomic trends.

In related news:

In earlier news…

The Illusion of Trump’s Board of Peace

By A.D. Agung Sulistyo, for Tempo.co January 30, 2026

Indonesia’s decision to join President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace for Gaza is anything but neutral. It bristles with ethical problems.

This choice, made by Indonesia to participate in the Board of Peace for Gaza established by President Trump, is framed in familiar clichés: active involvement, a commitment to global stability, and a dedication to peace.

However, Indonesia’s membership in this U.S.-controlled peace forum actually presents a dilemma: stand firm in upholding the rules-based international order or participate and risk gradually diminishing the significance of the United Nations Charter.

Since World War II, peace has never stood alone as a goal in international law. It has always been accompanied by procedures, mandates, and limitations on power. Pursuing peace without a legal framework is akin to establishing a new, subtler form of domination. Consequently, the responsibility for maintaining peace is entrusted to the Security Council. This is not because the institution is perfect, but because its authority is anchored in collective representation and legitimacy.

Photo by Ahsanul Haque Z on Pexels.com

When the White House describes the Trump Board of Peace for Gaza as an initiative aligned with UN Security Council Resolution 2803, a more fundamental question arises: Is world peace still governed by law, or is it beginning to be determined by those in power who are merely using legal language as a diplomatic facade?

A policy may appear to align with the UN’s objectives, but that does not automatically confer legal validity. A UN Security Council resolution is not a blank check. If a resolution does not explicitly establish a body—including its structure, mandate, and accountability—then legally that body does not exist.

Herein lies the tenuous nature of the White House’s claim. UN Security Council resolutions—under Chapter VII of the UN Charter—has never created new bodies through vague interpretations or ulterior motives. International organizational law recognizes the principle of express mandate which asserts that authority must be explicitly stated and cannot be assumed. Without this clarity an action is ultra vires—an action beyond the limits of legal authority.

Article 24 of the UN Charter clearly asserts that the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security rests with the UN Security Council. This is not merely a division of administrative duties; it is a constitutional rule in the post-1945 world order. If this function were carried out by another mechanism outside the authority, oversight, and accountability of the UN Security Council, it would amount to a tacit takeover.

What we are witnessing now is a hollowing out of the UN’s functions. The Charter is still cited, and resolutions are still referenced, but crucial decisions about peace are being transferred to a forum serving the interests of the powerful. This represents a new form of defiance against international law.

Indonesia’s decision to join is clearly not a neutral step. By participating, Indonesia indirectly acknowledges that peace can be discussed outside a mutually agreed legal framework. This involvement also indirectly reinforces the notion that the UN Charter is merely one option, no longer the primary foundation for international relations.

The Indonesian government’s policy is fundamentally problematic. For years, Indonesian diplomacy has consistently emphasized multilateralism and international law—not just as rhetoric, but as a core identity maintained since the dawn of independence.

By engaging in a peace mechanism outside the UN Charter, that position becomes tenuous. How can Indonesia assert its support for a rules-based order while simultaneously normalizing peace negotiated outside the law?

International legal theorists have long warned of the dangers of hegemonic multilateralism. It may appear benign—multilateral on the surface—but it is controlled by one party. The Trump Gaza Board of Peace exemplifies this pattern clearly. The initiative originates from the United States, leadership resides with Trump, the agenda is set in Washington, membership is selectively chosen, financial contributions are the price of entry, and there is no accountability to the UN General Assembly, which is meant to be representing the international community.

If peace is determined by the party who leads, funds, and wields informal veto power, it is fair to ask: Is this a global Board of Peace or merely the Board of America dressed up to appear legitimate?

In international legal theory, the UN is often regarded as a constitutional instrument of the international community. Its Charter is no ordinary treaty; it is the lex superior, the primary framework governing the exercise of power on a global scale. When mechanisms like the Board of Peace operate outside this framework, we witness what Martti Koskenniemi describes as the fragmentation of international law.

This fragmentation is not merely an academic concern; it reflects a tangible reality. Today, one major country forms a Board of Peace. Tomorrow, another could establish a Board of Stability or a Coalition for Order and claim alignment with UN resolutions. In such a scenario, the UN Charter gradually transforms from binding law into mere symbolism—referenced but no longer respected.

Supporters of the Board of Peace will undoubtedly argue that the world needs a quick solution, claiming that the UN is too slow, complicated, and often paralyzed. This argument has some merit. However, international law does not promise speed; it offers legitimacy and accountability.

Peace without a legal framework, even if at first blush it appears stable, is always tenuous from a normative perspective. History has shown that stability without legitimacy rarely endures.

The world is indeed changing, and international law must adapt. The question is whether Indonesia is prepared to build a world where peace is maintained not by law, but by the balance of power alone.

A.D. Agung Sulistyo is a researcher specializing in transnational law and public policy. He has previously worked as a researcher at both the PARA Syndicateand the Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate. This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/kolom/ilusi-dewan-perdamaian-donald-trump-2111160.

PDIP Affirms Commitment to World Peace and Palestinian Rights Through the UN, Not Other Channels 31 Januari 2026 https://m.jpnn.com/news/pdip-tegaskan-komitmen-perdamaian-dunia-dan-hak-palestina-lewat-pbb-bukan-jalan-lain

In related news: