An operational definition of the unconscious: challenging and redefining psychoanalytic approaches
Transcript of the post by conducteam
https://healthselfdefense.substack.com/p/an-operational-definition-of-the
THE UNCONSCIOUS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS
FREUD → “The unconscious ‘speaks’ in many ways: in dreams, in neurosis, in symptoms...” / “In the unconscious there is no contradiction whatsoever” / “Everything conscious has a preliminary unconscious stage, while the unconscious can remain at this stage and yet aspire to the full value of a psychic function” / “Receptacle of contents repressed by consciousness because they are incompatible with it”
JUNG → “The psyche presupposes a conscious-unconscious totality” / “Consciousness is knowledge about the emotional value of the ideas we form about the motives for our actions” / “Consciousness comes from an unconscious that is much older than itself” / “The unconscious is a potential reality: the thought we are going to think, the deed we are going to perform, etc.”
LACAN → “The unconscious is structured like language and is language itself” / “Signifiers of a meaning repressed by consciousness, search for meaning through signifiers” / “The signifying structure reveals to me the possibility of using language to signify ‘something else’ from what is said; this being the reason why the signifier has no interpretation except in its relation to another signifier.”
DOES “THE UNCONSCIOUS” EXIST?
Behavioral Analysis rejects the existence of the “unconscious” as a physical and real entity. However, the fact that a “behaviorist” declares themselves unconcerned with this type of term does not mean they are not concerned with operationalizing and defining them in a more accurate way, for example, as “unconscious behaviors” and “conscious behaviors.”
A behavioral psychologist can account for unconscious phenomena based on typically psychoanalytic conceptions (Freud, Jung, Lacan, etc.) of unconscious repressions and psychopathology, but translating them into precise scientific terms (laws of learning, functional analysis of behavior).
“CONSCIOUSNESS” IN SKINNER
Skinner (1974) distinguished between two classes or types of “consciousness.” The first type refers to the “knowledge” that organisms have of their environment, as when we say that “we are aware of our surroundings.” People who lose consciousness are no longer under the stimulus control of situations either “inside” or “outside” their bodies, and can “speak without being aware of their effects on the listeners.” Humans and other species would be equally conscious in this respect. “We can perceive, and perceive that we have perceived.”
The second type of consciousness is probably restricted to humans due to their socio-verbal nature. It involves observing what you are doing and putting into words the Reasons that lead you to behave in that way. The verbal community organizes verbal contingencies for “the behavior that describes our behavior,” thus allowing us to determine rules about it and its relationships with the environmental variables that control it. The verbal community provides the necessary contingencies for the self-descriptive behavior that this different kind of awareness allows.
CONTINGENCY AWARENESS
In this post, we will focus on the second type of awareness that Skinner mentioned, which is the type of awareness that largely coincides with psychoanalytic approaches. This type of awareness is academically translated in English as “insight.” Our proposal in Spanish, following Carrasco’s line of thought, is to define and operationalize it as “contingency awareness.”
In this sense, we would distinguish between “conscious behaviors” and “unconscious behaviors.” An unconscious behavior is any response for which we are unaware of the causal variables that provoke it, and we cannot verbally describe that relationship. A conscious behavior is a response whose “contingencies” can be verbally described; that is, we can describe the causal relationship between the behavior and the environmental variables that control it. “Contingency awareness” is the phenomenon in which we are able to verbally describe the contingency (causal relationship) that exists between the behavior and the environmental stimuli. And, of course, if the causes of behaviors are multifactorial, you can get an idea of whether most of the behaviors we exhibit are, in this sense, conscious or unconscious.
When an “undeveloped” organism (in terms of language) responds according to a specific reinforcement schedule, it is not necessary to ask the animal why it behaves as it does (for example, a pigeon pecking for hours in an experimental box). Thus, control over their behavior can be attributed to a history of reinforcement without the possible “obfuscation” of a “present explanation” that may be “deceptive” (accounting for one set of reasons for behaving when the real reasons are different). However, when a human being performs any activity, it is possible to investigate “why you behave the way you do” and evaluate the explanation the subject themselves gives.
The question of the “unconscious” is reduced to a consideration of historical-present behavioral control and the correspondence between verbal behavior and action.
When someone supposedly “neurotic” cannot give an acceptable explanation for their present behavior, attention is directed to its historical sources (their learning history); whereas when someone supposedly “normal” gives an explanation for their present behavior, attention is directed to the supposed control factors present. In one case, behavior is thought to depend on unconscious processes, and in the other, on conscious processes.
But for some behaviorists, all activity is unconsciously controlled; behavior depends on the subject’s reinforcement history, and any verbal behavior used to justify that behavior is thus acquired through its own independent reinforcement history. Freud’s “rationalization mechanisms” and other “defenses” refer to the same thing.
Children often admit to “not knowing the reason for some of their actions,” but as they grow, they learn to explain their behavior when asked, and this is where we can try to sift through explanations that are “acceptable” or not.
“Rational” and “irrational” actions (consciously and unconsciously controlled) differ in that the former can be explained in the present, while the latter cannot. However, they do not differ if their explanations are sought in the history of the behaving organism.
Almost all activities are “irrational” in this sense, since the origins of everyday behavior can rarely be specified. Most people couldn’t say when they first learned to wash their face, brush their teeth, or eat the way they do, and yet they offer socially acceptable explanations for these behaviors. Freud was right to call some behaviors “rationalized” rather than “rational,” but the truth of his observation doesn’t require invoking an “unconscious mind.”
Because they contribute so much to human unhappiness, the origins of dysfunctional behavior have been extensively explored, but the sources of functional, everyday behavior don’t attract nearly as much interest. Consequently, explanations for the former don’t usually apply to the latter, although the division is rather arbitrary. Explaining a phobia in terms of “repressed antisocial desires” has a certain literary appeal; explaining face-washing in the same way does not. But there’s no reason to think that these two types of behavior are governed by different laws; in neither case can the origins of the behavior be verbalized. There is no need to imply an “unconscious” in one case and not in the other, and there is no need for the behaviorist to deny their interest in both cases.
THERAPEUTIC MECHANISMS OF “CONTINGENCY AWARENESS”
In a good number of studies (Aafjes-Van Doorn, 2017; Jennissen, 2018; Brien, 2018; Lovgren, 2019; Sohtorik and Halfon, 2019; Hoglend and Hangtvet, 2019; Hill, 2020; Deppermann, 2020; Front, 2021; Firmansyah, 2021; Mantilla and Traverso, 2021) moderate evidence has been obtained that “insight” (independent variable-cause) produced favorable changes in the clients in terms of their behaviors and emotions (dependent variable-effect).
The hypotheses about the “therapeutic mechanisms” that would be behind becoming aware of the contingency that controls your behavior (why what works works) are the following: (1) Knowing “why you do what you do” helps to escape the emotional discomfort caused by your own helplessness prior to not knowing how to verbalize those “whys” or “functions” of your behaviors; (2) These dysfunctional behaviors are “punished”, their frequency of emission is reduced, because the person, from now on, when they perform them, already knows that they are undesirable behaviors for them; (3) The person acquires a “sense of control” by being aware of the variables that control their behavior; they are “able” to better identify them in order to make it more likely that they will not be repeated.
“Most of the behaviors we perform are ‘unconscious,’ in the sense that we are unable to verbally describe the environmental contingencies that control them” - B. F. Skinner (1974).
“As the science of behavior advances and a more effective and precise vocabulary is developed, we will also expand this type of awareness: the average person will be able to increase their understanding of themselves” - B. F. Skinner (1957).









