Fernando Rosas (unfortunately not on Mastodon) asked on bsky:
"Has anyone figured out what exactly is the relation between the ideas of feedback, recurrence, and self-reference?"
A really interesting question.
He pointed to this paper for ideas: https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.02456
"Self-referential basis of undecidable dynamics: from The Liar Paradox and The Halting Problem to The Edge of Chaos"
I did some desk research and found this cool paper:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1112.2141
"Resolving Gödel's Incompleteness Myth: Polynomial Equations and Dynamical Systems for Algebraic Logic"
that argues there is no essential incompleteness in formal reasoning systems if you look closely enough (using a more elaborate formalism based on polynomial equations to represent and evaluate logical proposition).
I wonder if analogous construction could be created for related theorems like the halting problem in computability theory.
#DynamicalSystems #IncompletenessTheorem #PolynomialEquations #HaltingProblem #Undecidability #SelfReference #Recurrence
Self-referential basis of undecidable dynamics: from The Liar Paradox and The Halting Problem to The Edge of Chaos
In this paper we explore several fundamental relations between formal systems, algorithms, and dynamical systems, focussing on the roles of undecidability, universality, diagonalization, and self-reference in each of these computational frameworks. Some of these interconnections are well-known, while some are clarified in this study as a result of a fine-grained comparison between recursive formal systems, Turing machines, and Cellular Automata (CAs). In particular, we elaborate on the diagonalization argument applied to distributed computation carried out by CAs, illustrating the key elements of Gödel's proof for CAs. The comparative analysis emphasizes three factors which underlie the capacity to generate undecidable dynamics within the examined computational frameworks: (i) the program-data duality; (ii) the potential to access an infinite computational medium; and (iii) the ability to implement negation. The considered adaptations of Gödel's proof distinguish between computational universality and undecidability, and show how the diagonalization argument exploits, on several levels, the self-referential basis of undecidability.