At #IETF, gender is a list, not a scalar.
Gender (Check all that apply): ['man']
RE: https://fosstodon.org/@interlisp/115711583068137949
Drop what you're doing and listen to @masinter Larry Masinter talk about computing history and lore. He tells first hand stories on the early web, Gopher, Hypertext Coffee Pot Control Protocol, mailto:, and a whole lot more including Interlisp.
https://netstack.fm/#episode-17
@Jayhoffmann may be interested.
Episode 17 of the Netstack.FM podcast features an interview with @masinter Larry Masinter on Interlisp and the Medley Interlisp project, the Xerox PARC environment, the early history of the web, standards and protocols, and more.
https://netstack.fm/#episode-17
Reading RFCs from the terminal! 😎🐁
📄 **rfc_reader** — A TUI tool to browse RFC documents.
🔥 Supports offline caching, search, TOC navigation & more!
🦀 Written in Rust & built with @ratatui_rs
⭐ GitHub: https://github.com/ozan2003/rfc_reader
#rustlang #ratatui #tui #ietf #rfc #reader #devtools #terminal
Selon LWN.net (8 décembre 2025), un vif débat agite l’IETF autour de l’intégration du chiffrement post‑quantique dans TLS 1.3 : un projet de norme autorisant un échange de clés post‑quantique non hybride a été adopté comme document de travail, malgré des objections soulignant un affaiblissement potentiel de la sécurité. 🔐 Contexte cryptographique. L’article rappelle que Shor compromet les schémas asymétriques classiques (RSA, ECDH), d’où la migration vers des mécanismes post‑quantiques centrés sur l’échange de clés (les chiffrements symétriques restant largement épargnés). Des précédents comme la rupture de SIKE (2022) et des problèmes d’implémentation/side‑channels sur Kyber/ML‑KEM illustrent les incertitudes. En août 2024, le NIST a standardisé Kyber/ML‑KEM et recommandé des schémas hybrides combinant algos classiques et post‑quantiques, appuyés par le projet Open Quantum Safe.
ML-KEM Mythbusting
"There have been some recent concerns about ML-KEM, NIST’s standard for encryption with Post-Quantum Cryptography, related standards of the IETF, and lots of conspiracy theories about malicious actors subverting the standardization process. "
Very interesting #IETF #IAB workshop this week on IP Geo Location.
Meeting materials:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/ipgeows/materials/
Recordings are getting posted at the end of each day. I gave a presentation yesterday based on a position paper (https://www.ietf.org/slides/slides-ipgeows-paper-akamai-position-paper-for-iab-workshop-on-ip-address-geolocation-ip-geo-00.pdf)
For the absence of doubt, we've published an Internet Draft calling for a conclusion to the ARC (RFC8617) experiment we developed over 10 years ago, moving what we learned from it into work on the proposed DKIM2 specification.
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-adams-arc-experiment-conclusion-01.html
#ietf #email #security #authentication #standards #dmarc #arc #dkim
This document calls for a conclusion to the experiment defined by “The Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) Protocol,” (RFC8617) and recommends that ARC no longer be deployed or relied upon between disparate senders and receivers. The document summarizes what ARC set out to do, reports on operational experience, and explains how the experience gained during the experiment is being incorporated into the proposed DKIM2 work as the successor to DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM). To avoid any future confusion, it is therefore requested that ARC (RFC8617) be marked “Obsolete” by the publication of this Internet-Draft.