GitHub Actions の secrets、SVN認証情報を入れる時はリポジトリ単位で設定。複数プラグインを開発してると、Organization secrets でまとめて管理する方が楽。
ただし権限管理は丁寧に。
GitHub Actions の secrets、SVN認証情報を入れる時はリポジトリ単位で設定。複数プラグインを開発してると、Organization secrets でまとめて管理する方が楽。
ただし権限管理は丁寧に。
フォーク100超のAndroidプロジェクトで、共通基盤の更新取り込みをAIで仕組み化
https://qiita.com/mgre_tanabe/items/0f9a4105cebcc9df6f6e?utm_campaign=popular_items&utm_medium=feed&utm_source=popular_items
https://winbuzzer.com/2026/05/26/megalodon-hit-5561-github-repos-through-malicious-workflows-xcxwbn/
Megalodon GitHub Actions Backdoor Campaign Hits 5,561 GitHub Repos
I've been running Github Actions with custom runner images on a k8s cluster for about year and a half by now - and I could attest that this is absolute shitshow, especially in a last few releases.
Like, since December each upgrade ends in a troubleshooting because of the bugs and just missing changes.
Latest one follow the charge: helm upgrade of controller went ok, the GHA controller got upgraded to the right version; then the runners got upgraded (entities corresponding to the actual pods spawned for jobs); but the listeners (entity responsible for events from Github and represented by listener pod) are still of previous version. Thus action spawns runner pods of previous version.
WAT?
Update for clarity: you may upgrade one component, but you have to uninstall and install again another, while both of them are parts of the same release.
📰 AIで加速するプロダクトの変化を、開発チームの外に届ける仕組みづくり (👍 16)
🇬🇧 A practical workflow using Claude Code Actions to share fast product changes with non-engineering teams as AI speeds up delivery.
🇰🇷 AI로 빨라진 제품 변경 사항을 개발팀 밖에도 알리기 위해 Claude Code Actions로 만든 공유 워크플로를 소개합니다.
AWS MCP Server が GA になったのでGithub Copilot cloud agentから利用してみる
https://qiita.com/willco21/items/d31c9c32753870d8e563?utm_campaign=popular_items&utm_medium=feed&utm_source=popular_items
Oops:
Megalodon: 5.561 repository GitHub compromessi in sei ore con workflow CI/CD malevoli
In sei ore il 18 maggio 2026, la campagna automatizzata Megalodon ha iniettato 5.718 commit malevoli in 5.561 repository GitHub, esfiltrandone credenziali cloud, chiavi SSH e segreti CI/CD verso un C2 esterno. L'operazione, collegata al gruppo TeamPCP, rappresenta uno degli attacchi alla supply chain dello sviluppo software più rapidi mai documentati e ha spinto npm a invalidare migliaia di token di accesso con bypass 2FA.