so I gave this to chatgpt and asked to infer meaning

it explored some guess that went too far, told to try another guess and to re-read the first line

and so it infered sequential branch merging equations

... I guess I found my new PLT denotational assistant

#llm #plt #denotation #git #gpt

Sign Relations • Signs and Inquiry

There is a close relationship between the pragmatic theory of signs and the pragmatic theory of inquiry.  In fact, the correspondence between the two studies exhibits so many congruences and parallels it is often best to treat them as integral parts of one and the same subject.  In a very real sense, inquiry is the process by which sign relations come to be established and continue to evolve.  In other words, inquiry, “thinking” in its best sense, “is a term denoting the various ways in which things acquire significance” (Dewey, 38).

Tracing the passage of inquiry through the medium of signs calls for an active, intricate form of cooperation between the converging modes of investigation.  Its proper character is best understood by realizing the theory of inquiry is adapted to study the developmental aspects of sign relations, a subject the theory of signs is specialized to treat from comparative and structural points of view.

References

  • Dewey, J. (1910), How We Think, D.C. Heath, Boston, MA.  Reprinted (1991), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY.  Online.
  • Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), pp. 40–52.  ArchiveJournal.  Online (doc) (pdf).

Resources

cc: Academia.eduLaws of FormResearch GateSyscoi
cc: CyberneticsStructural ModelingSystems Science

#CSPeirce #Connotation #Denotation #Inquiry #Logic #LogicOfRelatives #Mathematics #RelationTheory #Semiosis #SemioticEquivalenceRelations #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations

The Project Gutenberg eBook of How We Think, by John Dewey.

Sign Relations • Definition

One of Peirce’s clearest and most complete definitions of a sign is one he gives in the context of providing a definition for logic, and so it is informative to view it in that setting.

Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic.  A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.  Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C.

It is from this definition, together with a definition of “formal”, that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic.  I also make a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my non‑psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally recognized.

— C.S. Peirce, New Elements of Mathematics, vol. 4, 20–21

In the general discussion of diverse theories of signs, the question arises whether signhood is an absolute, essential, indelible, or ontological property of a thing, or whether it is a relational, interpretive, and mutable role a thing may be said to have only within a particular context of relationships.

Peirce’s definition of a sign defines it in relation to its objects and its interpretant signs, and thus defines signhood in relative terms, by means of a predicate with three places.  In that definition, signhood is a role in a triadic relation, a role a thing bears or plays in a determinate context of relationships — it is not an absolute or non‑relative property of a thing‑in‑itself, one it possesses independently of all relationships to other things.

Some of the terms Peirce uses in his definition of a sign may need to be elaborated for the contemporary reader.

  • Correspondence.  From the way Peirce uses the term throughout his work, it is clear he means what he elsewhere calls a “triple correspondence”, and thus this is just another way of referring to the whole triadic sign relation itself.  In particular, his use of the term should not be taken to imply a dyadic correspondence, like the kinds of “mirror image” correspondence between realities and representations bandied about in contemporary controversies about “correspondence theories of truth”.
  • Determination.  Peirce’s concept of determination is broader in several directions than the sense of the word referring to strictly deterministic causal‑temporal processes.  First, and especially in this context, he is invoking a more general concept of determination, what is called a formal or informational determination, as in saying “two points determine a line”, rather than the more special cases of causal and temporal determinisms.  Second, he characteristically allows for what is called determination in measure, that is, an order of determinism admitting a full spectrum of more and less determined relationships.
  • Non‑psychological.  Peirce’s “non‑psychological conception of logic” must be distinguished from any variety of anti‑psychologism.  He was quite interested in matters of psychology and had much of import to say about them.  But logic and psychology operate on different planes of study even when they have occasion to view the same data, as logic is a normative science where psychology is a descriptive science, and so they have very different aims, methods, and rationales.

Reference

  • Peirce, C.S. (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.  Online.

Resources

cc: Academia.eduLaws of FormResearch GateSyscoi
cc: CyberneticsStructural ModelingSystems Science

#CSPeirce #Connotation #Denotation #Inquiry #Logic #LogicOfRelatives #Mathematics #RelationTheory #Semiosis #SemioticEquivalenceRelations #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Arisbe - Peirce MS L75

*wonders if Domain Theory is still used for parallel computing proofs*

#cs #scott #denotation

< xhv:related <#HttpRange14>. #LinkedData SemanticWeb #AWWW #Web #Denotation #Connotation.

This is how it feels to me. Anyone else speak #Spanish and #ASL?

#language #connotation #not #denotation #deafculture #deaf

This week on Denotation IO, our video series 'AI in the Woods' continues 🌳 🦊 This time, a short introduction to the formal notions of meaning and possible worlds. Discover how you routinely generate a multitude of parallel worlds as you speak, and how you can 'point' at objects in those worlds using your meaning faculty.

Can AI systems do this yet? Ur... not really.

Find out more at https://denotation.io/aiinthewoods/ or right here: https://vimeo.com/785994052

#ai #meaning #semantics #denotation

AI in the Woods

Denotation IO
Procedural Reflection in Programming Languages
(1982) : Smith, Brian Cantwell
url: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/15961
#denotation #semantics #meta #reflection #3_lisp #lisp #dissertation #my_bibtex
Procedural reflection in programming languages

Procedural Reflection in Programming Languages
(1982) : Smith, Brian Cantwell
url: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/15961
#3_lisp #denotation #dissertation #lisp #meta #reflection #semantics
#my_bibtex
Procedural reflection in programming languages

@balslev Jeg kendte ikke begreberne #denotation og #konnotation. Hvis jeg skal tage efter dit eksempel, så synes jeg egentlig at begge sætninger er rent beskrivende — der er ikke nogen opdeling i godt eller dårligt — men den denotative (?) sætning beskriver noget man traditionelt vil kalde “ydre”, mens den konnotative fortrinsvis beskriver noget “indre”.

I Jungs univers vil sansning være “ydre”, mens intuition, følelser og tanker alle er “indre”, så måske var det fjollet at blande Jung ind i det, men det var den association jeg fik da jeg læste dine eksempler.