📢 CVE-2026-4747 : CHERI neutralise un stack buffer overflow dans FreeBSD découvert par LLM
📝 📅 **Source et contexte** : Article publié le 28 avril 2026...
📖 cyberveille : https://cyberveille.ch/posts/2026-05-03-cve-2026-4747-cheri-neutralise-un-stack-buffer-overflow-dans-freebsd-decouvert-par-llm/
🌐 source : https://cheri-alliance.org/cheri-memory-safety-mitigates-llm-discovered-vulnerability-in-freebsd/?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email
#CHERI #CVE_2026_4747 #Cyberveille
CVE-2026-4747 : CHERI neutralise un stack buffer overflow dans FreeBSD découvert par LLM

📅 Source et contexte : Article publié le 28 avril 2026 par Brooks Davis (Capabilities Limited) sur le site de la CHERI Alliance. Il s’inscrit dans un contexte de discussions récentes sur l’utilisation des LLMs pour la découverte et l’exploitation de vulnérabilités. 🔍 Vulnérabilité identifiée : La vulnérabilité CVE-2026-4747 affecte le composant RPCSEC_GSS du noyau FreeBSD. Il s’agit d’un stack buffer overflow classique permettant potentiellement une exécution de code à distance (RCE), classée de sévérité Critique. Elle a été découverte à l’aide d’un LLM (modèle de langage de grande taille).

CyberVeille
BSDCan https://www.bsdcan.org/2026/ Talk Saturday 2026-06-20: 14:30 - 15:20 DMS 1130
Bringing memory safety to BSD with CHERI
Brooks Davis
https://www.bsdcan.org/2026/timetable/timetable-Bringing-memory-safety.html
To register https://www.bsdcan.org/2026/registration.html @bsdcan #openbsd #freebsd #netbsd #cheri
BSDCan - BSDCan

BSDCan is a technical BSD conference held in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

BSDCan
TIL about the #CHERI technology. If you are into anything from programming languages to computer architecture and haven't encountered it yet, I suggest you have a look:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability_Hardware_Enhanced_RISC_Instructions
https://cheri.cst.cam.ac.uk/
https://cheri-alliance.org/
Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions - Wikipedia

When we originally created #CHERIoT, we added an instruction to make accessing globals uniform with respect to the rest of RISC-V. We fairly quickly realised it wasn’t a great design, but the toolchain changes required to eliminate it took a while.

We’ve finally done it and I spent a bit of time this week writing up our journey. Removing this instruction is something we always planned to do before rebasing on the upcoming RV32YE base.

#CHERI #RISCV

Removing the AUICGP instruction

Perfection is achieved, not when there is nothing more to add, but when there is nothing left to take away – Antoine de Saint-Exupéry

CHERIoT Platform

A couple of talks I've given recently about #CHERI have had people ask about performance overheads. That's a difficult question to answer, so probably benefits from a longer answer:

First, measuring performance overhead of hardware features is hard. A small tweak to a prefetcher, for example, may cause a 15% speedup on some workloads, but a 10% slowdown on others. I saw this with some Arm performance data on MTE, where one benchmark got measurably faster with MTE enabled. It turned out that enabling MTE disabled a specific prefetcher and this prefetcher made the benchmark performance worse (but made performance of others better and was typically a net win).

This is especially complicated for hardware because building an SoC is complicated. There are a lot of design decisions that trade performance, area, and power in different ways. Designers will optimise performance within the other constraints for workloads that they expect customers to care about. If you want to have a completely fair measure of how much feature X costs or helps performance, you need to have two equally competent teams build implementations, with the same budget.

If you do that (which, to be clear, is infeasible), you still have the problem of measurement. For example, AVX probably makes things faster (wider vectors, yay!), but moving between SSE and AVX vectors can make things slower. Turning on AVX can cause thermal throttling to kick in earlier and so make things slower. Even with a feature designed solely for performance, determining the degree to which is makes things faster (or if it does) is hard.

So, where does this leave us? We can talk about the unavoidable costs of CHERI. Capability checks must happen on every load, store, or jump, but that's a handful of fairly simple ALU operations in the load-store units. Those are very simple in comparison to memory-access logic. Pointers get bigger, and that's a real concern for performance, but you typically don't see a gradual decline from this, you see a cliff when workloads suddenly stop fitting in each layer in the cache hierarchy or in the TLB. An SoC design can size some of these structures differently to mitigate this, and you may be able to use larger cache lines rather than more associativity sets. There's a lot of performance tuning to be done here in a production SoC and it's not clear what the real impact would be. Beyond that, you have a bit of area overhead at the bottom of the memory hierarchy for storing tags. But that's basically everything.

What about the flip side? How much does CHERI improve performance? If you're doing mitigations against transient execution vulnerabilities, such as speculative taint tracking, CHERI can improve things. In a conventional STT implementation, an instruction that adds two integers to compute an address and then does a load can't retire until after both are untainted. On a CHERI system, only the capability operand needs to be untainted, the offset can be an arbitrary speculated value. Similarly, knowing that something is a pointer and what its bounds are enables better prefetching. There are even some fun things like connecting register writeback to the branch predictor (for shorter pipelines), because you know which things in the register are executable pointers and so can make a very good guess about which address is going to be a jump target. And that's ignoring the performance gains from simply disabling a load of weaker mitigations that people are shipping today.

That's all at the small scale though. Being able to share object graphs between mutually distrusting components can eliminate some large defensive copies. Last time I did a detailed look, Apple's XPC framework for process-base compartmentalisation did seven copies of objects sent between processes. In a CHERI system, that would be either zero or one, depending on your threat model, and would involve a lot less TLB pressure.

The kinds of overheads we see are hard to measure because they're well into the noise. The performance improvements we see from being able to actually build the systems programmers want to construct, without fighting hardware designed with totally different goals in mind, are much easier to measure. They tend to be complexity-class improvements: turning O(n) things into O(1) things. Or, sometimes, just a factor of 2-3 speedup.

@me_
Brooks Davis will be giving a talk on Cheri memory safety at @bsdcan
2026 happening June 17-20th in Ottawa:
https://www.bsdcan.org/2026/timetable/timetable-Bringing-memory-safety.html

Remember, just like last year, the BSDCan reception on Saturday night is free if you register early. This year you must register before May 1, 2026:
https://www.bsdcan.org/2026/registration.html

We look forward to seeing you in June
#runcheri #RUNBSD #cheri

Bringing memory safety to BSD with CHERI

Our Morello system has arrived!

#CHERI #ARM #Morello #capabilities

FreeBSD with John Baldwin - Software Engineering Daily

FreeBSD is one of the longest-running and most influential open-source operating systems in the world. It was born from the Berkeley Software Distribution in the early 1990s, it has powered everything from high-performance networking infrastructure to game consoles and content delivery networks. Over three decades, it has evolved through major architectural shifts, from symmetric multiprocessing

Software Engineering Daily

To those who miss (part of) #CHERI Blossoms, good news, from the organizers:

> the presentations and recordings will be available on the cheri-alliance.org website a week or so after the event.

🥳

CHERI Blossoms in Cambridge!

#cheri #cheriot #capabilities #Cambridge