@gimulnautti @aram There are also some further complications created by the behavior of some of the nonprofits towards the fighting core of the communities they claim to represent.

Suppose a liberal nonprofit with a history of ignoring some of folks in the community is raided by the FBI on spurious charges? Suppose the call goes out for the community to surround the attackers with a siege of their own, the way ICE is handled in Minneapolis?

Activists now get a "no good options" scenario: either put out at serious personal risk for those who didn't put out for them, or allow an enemy certain to come for them later to chalk up an easy win.

This resolves essentially into a choice between forward defense and withdrawing to a prepared defense. A scorched earth withdrawal in a war with few front lines and few defined territories is usually impossible.

A withdrawal to a few fortified positions against a power such as the US concentrates opponents into a few convenient pots. This plays right into the hands of most counterinsurgency strategies: isolate and surround the insurgents.

With the fortress strategy off the table, this leaves forward defense or after the fact guerrilla action as options.

For a forward defense resistance fighters would meet raids by "swarming" tactics as in Minneapolis. Goal would be to put enough pressure on the attackers to force them to break off the attack and withdraw. The fighters in Minneapolis have often been able to force ICE to abandon attacks in exactly this manner.

In traditional siege warfare, one of the few ways for the beseiged party to win is for a relief army to arrive and counterattack the beseigers. This is still a valid strategy today, as events in Minneapolis have shown.

This does have its risks: an enemy with few or no restraints has the abiity to launch "bait raids" whose sole purpose is to draw resistance forces out into a place of the enemy's choosing. In combat it is almost always a mistake to follow an enemy into a place they have selected.

It is believed that Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland during the Troubles came from a failed attempt by the British army to draw out the IRA and destroy them. By chance, the IRA was not there and the slaughter of civilian protesters caused the attack to backfire against the UK's occupation.

If this kind of threat makes a forward defense impossible, the third option is the classic guerilla strategy: stay out of the way of major attacks to the extent possible, then make them pay at a time and place chosen by the resistance. Make the fight as expensive as possible for the regime, but never overcommit to any single mission.

Things like raids on nonprofits would face protests that do not overcommit themselves, rather than an all-out, committed swarm. This is to avoid the "bloody Sunday" scenario. Protesters would harass and sting, then melt away before the enemy can mount a determined counterattack. The real action comes later, when the attackers were hoping to get some sleep.