#Signal was warranted again, and as always they gave the only data they could give: time of registration in Unix miliseconds, and time of last connection in Unix miliseconds.

yet another reminder that you can't give away data you don't have in the first place.

https://signal.org/bigbrother/santa-clara-county/

Search warrants for Signal user data, Santa Clara County

Because everything in Signal is end-to-end encrypted by default, the broad set of personal information that is typically easy to retrieve in other apps simply doesn’t exist on Signal’s servers.

Signal Messenger
@Yuvalne Then we've got Telegram trying to drag Signal through the dirt 
@Yuvalne But what if one day the authorities demand all IM operators to keep certain user data and to provide them on request? What if the authorities cut off connections to IM operators that don't comply with? Is Signal ready to become an "illegal" organization and to operate anonymously?
@Yuvalne Well, if it wouldn‘t be so hard to convince „normal folks“ to switch from whatsapp/iMessage to signal…

@Yuvalne Does anyone know how #Signal gets away with not handing out FCM/APNs tokens that technically must be associated to Signal accounts in order to send push notifications?

No intention to bash, especially since all messengers distributing in the official app stores are affected by this. I'm just curious whether there is a technical or legal loophole that Signal is using here.

@f09fa681 @Yuvalne I'm not 100% sure, but isn't this what the sealed sender does?

https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/

Technology preview: Sealed sender for Signal

In addition to the end-to-end encryption that protects every Signal message, the Signal service is designed to minimize the data that is retained about Signal users. By design, it does not store a record of your contacts, social graph, conversation list, location, user avatar, user profile name, ...

Signal Messenger
@DonTheMaster @Yuvalne To my knowledge, the sealed sender feature only allows to conceal the sender of a message that is relayed by the Signal server. But the Signal server still needs to know how to deliver push notifications to the receiver.

@f09fa681 @Yuvalne in this case the warrant only requested the timestamps; it didn't ask for messages or anything else. I guess they know asking for messages is pointless?

I have to assume if the warrant demanded push keys that Signal would fight it, but as far as I know that hasn't happened.

@adrake @Yuvalne Yeah, you're right, they specifically requested the timestamps. I missed that. Obviously I don't know the intent of or the legal constraints under which those requests where made and why the timestamps in particular were requested.
@f09fa681 @Yuvalne maybe no connection to the phone number?
@Yuvalne They gave only the data they currently have (we assume). They [say they] [currently] throw away other data they obviously have had, e.g., who messages whom.
@edavies @Yuvalne You're free to read the source to see how sealed sender works and confirm that they don't actually have what you naively claim they "obviously" have or that you're having to assume/trust they don't have...
@dalias @Yuvalne Interesting, I didn't know about that. But still they “obviously” have connection times, IP address, etc which, if they chose to give in to some pressure and log, would go a long way to bypassing that.
@Yuvalne interestingly, the request PDFs did not ask for more than these two timestamps, or am I misunderstanding something? (Or do they only ask for data they know exists?)

@Yuvalne

yet another reminder that you can't give away data you don't have in the first place.

Law enforcement is not the only (and may not be the most important) adversary where this matters. If your system is compromised, it can leak data that you collect. You may be liable for that leak but you'll suffer reputation damage even if not.

If the thing that's leaked is 'User with UUID {...} logged in at UNIX timestamp {...}' (with no way of linking a UUID to a human) and contains no PII, then you are probably not even legally required to disclose the breach to your customers.

@Yuvalne good grief, SIX orders to delay notification about the warrant 😭
@Yuvalne the question is not what you store but what you can be forced to implement upon receiving a national security letter
@Yuvalne That's not true, as @signalapp does have #PII like #PhoneNumbers and they will hand them over if subopena'd because they don't make any moey and certainly not enough to pay staff to risk life in prison...