Israel Is Missing Its Big Chance in Lebanon - Ibbit
Suddenly, Israel has a remarkable opportunity for a diplomatic breakthrough in
Lebanon. You’d be forgiven for not knowing about this, because both Israel and
Hezbollah seem committed instead to a spiraling conflict. Hezbollah apparently
decided to plunge itself, and Lebanon, into the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran
because it believes that it faces an existential crisis. Israel destroyed much
of the organization’s missile arsenal in 2023–24, decimated its ranks of
commanders, and wiped out most of its political leadership. Hezbollah seems to
have concluded that it needs to act now to restore deterrence. For its part,
Israel has apparently reached an equal and opposite conclusion about Hezbollah:
that now is the golden opportunity to reduce the organization to irrelevance.
The war that ended in 2024 did not completely neutralize Hezbollah, and the
organization was making some headway in rearming itself, despite the Lebanese
government’s efforts to prevent this. [Read: Something new is happening in
Lebanon
[https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/03/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-iran/686262/]]
The chance to settle its unfinished business with the group presented itself on
March 1, when Hezbollah launched some ineffective missile and drone attacks over
the Israeli border. The Israeli military responded by bombing Hezbollah-related
targets in Lebanon. Ominously, it called on Lebanese civilians to evacuate the
south of the country and the southern suburbs of Beirut, where Hezbollah has its
support base. Israel seems to be anticipating a long campaign in Lebanon,
possibly including a renewed occupation of the south. Israel, the United States,
and other actors have long pressed the Lebanese government to do more to disarm
Hezbollah in southern Lebanon; now Israel is demanding for this to be a priority
throughout the country, saying that if the Lebanese state cannot or will not
disarm Hezbollah, Israel will do so by means of war. In Gaza, Israel’s war
involved the displacement of huge numbers of people and the thorough destruction
of physical infrastructure. Israel has suggested it will pursue the same course
in Lebanon. One official has said
[https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-troops-launch-limited-operations-against-hezbollah-south-lebanon-2026-03-16/]
that until Israeli war aims are secured, the country’s almost 1 million
[https://time.com/article/2026/03/16/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-displaced/] newly
displaced people will not be allowed to return to their homes, and another
[https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1497598/beiruts-southern-suburb-will-soon-resemble-khan-younis-says-smotrich.html]
vowed to reduce Beirut’s southern suburbs to a moonscape comparable to the
leveled city of Khan Younis, in Gaza. But Hezbollah is not the adversary it was
before 2023. It is also in a much worse position now inside of Lebanon, whose
government has been maneuvering to transform the militia into a normal political
party, rather than a quasi-state actor with power over war and peace. So far,
dragooning Lebanon into the current war does not seem to be doing Hezbollah any
additional favors. Rather, it has led the Lebanese government to declare
Hezbollah’s military activities illegal, and popular anger against the
organization appears to have reached an all-time high. Israel’s actions,
however, could throw the group a lifeline: A renewed occupation of southern
Lebanon would give Hezbollah and other extremist groups a plausible rationale to
remain armed. In seeking to impose its will on its Arab neighbors, particularly
the Palestinians and Lebanese, Israel has frequently made the mistake of failing
to differentiate among its adversaries. For example, it has steadfastly refused
to accept the fact that only the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine
Liberation Organization offer a practical alternative to Hamas. The equivalent
in Lebanon is Israel’s failure to understand that the Lebanese state is the only
viable alternative to Hezbollah’s domination. For Israel’s military campaigns to
become political successes requires the adoption of policies that strengthen the
Lebanese government and the Palestinian Authority. These would serve to counter
Hezbollah and Hamas, respectively. [Bilal Y. Saab: How Washington can help
Lebanon
[https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/03/lebanon-diplomacy-hezbollah-opportunity/686421/]]
The Lebanese government has said that it wants to negotiate with Israel
directly, and France has reportedly proposed a grand bargain, whereby Lebanon
would recognize Israel in exchange for Israel ceasing to bomb the country and
withdrawing from areas it has held since 2024. Such an agreement could be a
win-win for Israel and Lebanon, while leaving Hezbollah even more isolated and
exposed. Unfortunately, Israel has evinced little interest in such talks. That
would be an astonishing missed opportunity. But it is also consistent with the
mindset of a government that has reduced Gaza to rubble without eliminating
Hamas as a political and paramilitary force. A similar approach in Lebanon will
not yield better results. It could even end up saving Hezbollah from its own
miscalculations rather than finishing the organization off. — From The Atlantic
[https://www.theatlantic.com/] via this RSS feed
[https://www.theatlantic.com/feed/all/]
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