#SmartApeSG #RemcosRAT #Stealc #SecTopRAT
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/32826
2025-08-15 (Friday): Here are some images from a post I wrote for my employer on other social media platforms.
This is from a #LummaStealer infection that led to #SectopRAT (#ArechClient2).
A #pcap of the infection traffc, along with the associated #malware and artifacts are available at https://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2025/08/15/index.html
We've observed an interesting infection chain βοΈ in the wild, starting with #LummaStealer spread through a fake gaming website and resulting in #Latrodectus and #SectopRat πͺ²ππ
See below for more β¬οΈ
2025-07-15 (Tuesday): #LummaStealer infection with #SecTopRAT.
A #pcap of the #Lumma traffic and #SecTop #RAT activity, the #malware/artifacts from an infection, and the associated IOCs are available at https://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2025/07/15/index.html
Enterprise networks were targeted in a campaign that involved SectopRAT and the deployment of BlackSuit ransomware via a trojanized Zoom installer.
πRead more: https://www.technadu.com/fake-zoom-installer-deploys-blacksuit-ransomware-in-enterprise-targeted-attack/582839/
Been awhile since the last #ArechClient2 / #SectopRAT #malware #infrastructure update. Let's take a look:
A new cluster has formed in Germany using HETZNER-AS (24940):
/167.235.102.163
/144.76.163.55 on port 15648 instead of 15647 for comms
/144.76.163.20 as above
Back in early May a new IP, this time in North Holland was observed: /185.73.125.96 - XHOST-INTERNET-SOLUTIONS (208091). It remains active.
A number of new Russian IPs have been added with Prospero:
/91.215.85.23
/91.215.85.26
And Medialand:
/45.141.87.16
/45.141.87.218
A number of IPs previously tracked have either gone offline completely or have stopped serving the "EncryptionStatus" banner:
/194.26.135.180
/152.89.217.229
/176.111.174.142
/2.57.149.77
/185.161.248.159
In part one of our blog series, we discussed how a Rust based application was used to download and execute the IDAT Loader. In part two of this series, we will be providing analysis of how an MSIX installer led to the download and execution of the IDAT Loader.