May 12, 1994: An End to the Bloodshed

Russia’s Defense Minister Pavel Grachov invited his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts, Serge Sargsyan and Mamedrafi Mamedov, to Moscow on February 18, 1994. A protocol was signed envisaging a halt to military operations on March 1. Later Mamedov explained, “The subject of the negotiations was the Armenian withdrawal from six regions, except for Shushi and Lachin. According to the document, the Armenians were to release Aghdam and Fizuli within a month and then, within three months, another four regions. The subject of the negotiations between the sides remained Shushi, Lachin and NK’s status. For reasons unknown to me that project was not implemented.”

In the military field, an exhausted Azerbaijan was exerting its last efforts with the hopes of regaining something on the ground. That was the reason why, at the end of January, Baku once again rejected Russia’s next suggestion to stop the firing. On March 9, Kozirev urged Ter-Petrosyan and Kocharyan to return one of the regions occupied in the autumn of 1993 to Azerbaijan. On April 15, during the CIS summit in Moscow, where Ter-Petrosyan and Aliyev were also present, a ceasefire announcement was approved.

Battles continued with some breaks until the end of April. The NK forces began a counter-attack towards Mir Bashir (present-day Terter) and Aghdam-Barda, liberating several Armenian villages that had been occupied earlier. From mid-April on, battles resumed in the northeastern sector of Martakert. Opposing calls from Yerevan to cease the advance, the NK side initiated operations to take Mir Bashir and its adjacent territories. At the end of April about 50 thousand residents from the Mir Bashir region and its adjacent territories abandoned the villages and found shelter in Barda and Yevlakh. The Azerbaijani side was waiting for a new extensive assault, but the command was given to stop the attack.

Nelson Soghomonyan, one of the commanders of the Martuni front, recalls that during the last days of the war Samvel Babayan visited the front line every day, raised issues on the spot, redistributed the forces and appealed for urgency. “Probably Babayan knew that the war was going to be stopped. If military actions had not been halted, we were going to enter Mir Bashir, within a maximum of three days, if not in one.”

When referring to the May ceasefire, Vladimir Kazimirov even today recalls Babayan with laughter. “I remember his arrogant announcement. He even blamed us, the mediators, the Russian mediator, that by putting an end to the military actions we hindered him in coming out at … Baku.”

Victory day

In December 1993, Meditkhan Sherimkulov, Speaker of the Parliament of Kyrgyzstan, also acting as the Chairman of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, participated in the NK settlement seminar/meeting on the Aland Islands. A peacemaking group for the NK conflict was created during the session. Sherimkulov suggested holding a next meeting and continuing the dialogue between the two sides in Bishkek. Before that, at the end of March and in the first days of April, Sherimkulov’s peacemaking group visited Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert.

From May 4 to 5, the leaders of the parliaments, in addition to Guliyev, gathered in Bishkek. President Aliyev had left for Brussels and on May 4, at NATO’s headquarters, he signed the document to join the “Partnership for Peace” program. Guliyev remained in Baku in order to manage Azerbaijan until Aliyev’s return.

“That is why Azerbaijan sent Deputy Chairman of Parliament Afiaddin Jalilov. In Moscow, before leaving for Bishkek, I had set out in writing the draft Bishkek Protocol. The main point of the Protocol was the call for a cease-fire. It was important that the parliament speakers endorse the cessation of fighting. The night of May 9 was selected by mutual agreement beforehand, since we hoped that it would be associated with the Victory Day for all the peoples of the Soviet Union. We hoped to show that common sense prevailed in the NK conflict,” Kazimirov recalled.

Armenia, Nagorno Karabakh, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and representatives of the CIS and Russia’s Foreign Affairs Ministry signed the document. The Deputy Chairman of Azerbaijan’s Parliament refused to do so.

Kazimirov recounts: “Everyone except for Jalilov signed the protocol in Bishkek. He explained that he could not sign it since we hadn’t permitted Nizami Bahmanov, head of the Azerbaijani community of NK, to sign it. In fact, a few days later on May 21, Haydar Aliyev revealed in Baku why Jalilov didn’t sign the protocol. Aliyev said that he had instructed him not to sign any document without his approval. On May 4-5, 1994, Aliyev was in Brussels and we were in Bishkek. I called Guliyev from Bishkek and tried in vain to persuade him to empower his deputy, Djalilov, to sign the document. The others, with the exception of Azerbaijan, signed it. We agreed that if Azerbaijani parliamentarians so decided, they could join the Bishkek Protocol later on. That is why after coordinating with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozirev I had to rush to Baku to discuss the Bishkek Protocol with Heydar Aliyev and Rasul Guliyev. I went to Azerbaijan on May 7.”

On May 5, Aliyev returned from Brussels to Baku, making a stop in Turkey on the way. On May 8, Kazimirov’s meeting with Azerbaijan’s president began. Guliyev, Jalilov, Foreign Affairs Minister Hasanov, Defense Minister Mamedov and Azerbaijan’s Ambassador to Russia, Rzaev, were seated next to Aliyev.

“I was representing the mediators alone. Aliyev immediately rushed to the attack saying that we had again drafted a document disregarding the interests of Azerbaijan. I said that the Armenians didn’t like everything in the text either. I said, ‘Find just one formulation that neglects the interests of the Azerbaijani people.’ I was alone. The others, naturally, defended their boss. Finally, Rzaev made the first sober comment; that the bloodshed must be stopped. He had close personal relations with Guliyev. So Guliyev supported his friend Rzaev, and here came the turning point. I told them that the document was not legal but political. They added the word ‘international’ before the word ‘observers’ in the text, though, if they meant the Russians, they too were international. Quite a meaningless amendment. The second amendment was to replace the term ‘held territories’ with ‘occupied territories’. The last and the most comical one, was that they again began insisting on putting Bahmanov’s signature on the document as well. As before, in Bishkek, I asked what institution Bahmanov represented; was it a legislature? We argued for long time, but they insisted on both amendments and wound up adding Bahmanov’s name under the Protocol”, recalls Kazimirov with a smile.

However, they could not find Bahmanov in Baku for him to sign as well. However, the signature of another, Jalilov or Guliyev, was important for Azerbaijan to agree to the document.

“Aliyev said, ‘Affiyaddin, sign it.’ But Jalilov suddenly replied that he could not sign the document since he had publicly stated his position. And I thought, ‘Oh, damn! Why do we need Jalilov’s signature when Guliyev is present here?’ Perhaps Guliyev-Jalilov relations were tense. Guliyev said that for some people their prestige was more important, but that for him it didn’t matter much; what was important were the interests of his people. I’m simplifying it now, but that was the gist. And Aliyev told Guliyev to sign. I took the paper and called Yerevan and Stepanakert”, recalls the Russian mediator.

On May 9, Victory Day, Kazimirov was drafting another ceasefire document in his hotel room in Baku and coordinating the details with Yerevan and Stepanakert. On the same day, Mamedov signed the document in Aliyev’s private office. The Russian mediator denied Guluzade’s assertions that the document was signed by Yerevan and Baku, and that NK’s signature was added secretly by Kazimirov.

“I still have in my archive the very first draft without Yerevan’s name; only the names of Mamedov and Babayan are inscribed on it for signature. Later on, Aliyev said that it would be better to add Yerevan’s signature, which was in line with our intentions. I had been telling Ter-Petrosyan and the other Armenians for months that there was no need to hide behind NK’s back. ‘You are a full-fledged party to the conflict and it is necessary to participate in these proceedings directly,’” says Kazimirov.

Aliyev agreed and so did Ter-Petrosyan. But Baku refused to sign the paper with Nagorno Karabakh. For that reason the Russians didn’t want to waste valuable time on organizing a trilateral meeting.

Kazimirov continues: “We employed an unusual, semi-diplomatic trick. Each one of the parties signed the paper separately, without the presence of the other parties. Since 1993, when short term cease-fire arrangements were signed, we had the experience of ‘fax diplomacy’. This arose because of the urgency of the matter and the impossibility of gathering the parties around a table, giving the Russian mediator no other choice but to agree upon matters over the phone and to quickly commit them to paper using fax-machines. The first cease-fire agreement bore only Mamedov’s signature; the other signatories’ names and positions were inscribed in the document. I took this signature and left for Moscow. I asked Serge Sargsyan to send the agreement with his signature to Moscow via fax. Then Samvel Babayan sent his signature. I had in my hands all three papers and therefore the cease-fire agreement. There are three different papers containing one signature each with two other names and positions inscribed on them without signatures. They didn’t want to sign the paper together. Of course, it was an unusual method. I consistently struggle with the OSCE because they label the agreement ‘non-official’ in their annual reports. I ask - ‘What is non-official about this?’ True, there is no single joint paper but it doesn’t mean the agreement is unofficial.”

On May 9, the Defense Minister of Azerbaijan addressed a letter to Russia’s Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministers, as well as to Kazimirov, announcing the willingness of the conflicting sides to cease firing in the early hours of May 11, 1994. On the next day the Defense Minister of Armenia did the same, followed by the Commander of NK’s Defense Forces on May 11.

Recalling the May ceasefire, Mamedov has said, “We were carrying out military actions; we stopped and went on the defense. The opponent decided that we were powerless to attack and could start a counter-attack. In order to avoid that, it was necessary to reach a ceasefire agreement.”

On February 23, 2001, during his speech in parliament, Aliyev referred to the incidents of seven years before. “I am again stating that the cease-fire achieved in May 1994 was a very important measure and we did this with full conscience. Although the problem has not been solved, yet the cease-fire was necessary. Unfortunately, many have forgotten the war; they are living quietly and comfortably. Unfortunately, they have forgotten the war.”

Did Baku sign the agreement out of a sense of overall exhaustion on both sides, or out of fear of losing further regions?

“One didn’t contradict the other. One wouldn’t have happened without the other. Our efforts would have yielded no results if Aliyev’s situation hadn’t been critical. Essentially, Aliyev faced losing not only other territories but his power as well. It is often said in Baku that Kazimirov threatened that the Armenians would take Gyanja. Why did I threaten? Stubborn fighting was going on in the Terter region. That is, ahead lay Barda, Yevlakh, Mingechaur, and the repetition of the southwest scenario. There [in the southwest] the Armenians reached the Arax River; in this case, relatively speaking, they would have reached the Kur River. Just imagine Aliyev’s position if the northwest of Azerbaijan had been ‘cut off’. Accordingly, signing the cease-fire agreement wasn’t a matter of goodwill but a struggle for survival,” says Kazimirov.

Samvel Babayan does not agree. “We were ready to continue the war; it was not an issue of exhaustion. Azerbaijan had to accept those terms that would end the war. From the experience in 1993 we knew that after each of our successes Azerbaijan agreed to all conditions, only in order to reenergize. It was apparent to us that we had to move in the Mir Bashir and Barda directions and put Azerbaijan in a situation where he had to sign the peace agreement, and accept and delineate Karabakh’s territory; instead of merely taking a formal ‘time-out’ If we had advanced the 5-6 kilometers remaining to Mir Bashir, today we would have Karabakh’s territory set down on paper. At that time I knew that Baku would agree to recognize NK only in a deadlock.”

The ceasefire was put into force on May 12. On May 16-17, a meeting between Serge Sargsyan, Mamedrafi Mamedov and Samvel Babayan took place in Moscow, during which the “protocol on the method to implement the February 18, 1994 protocol” was discussed. An agreement was signed to stop the shooting on May 17 at midnight sharp. A document was prepared which envisaged the separation of the NK and Azerbaijani armies, creating a buffer zone between the sides and allocating peacekeeping forces. Grachov, Sargsyan and Babayan signed the document. Mamedov did not sign the document. He was called back to Baku immediately. Azerbaijan refused to sign the summarizing protocol of the Moscow agreement, but the ceasefire became a reality.

Years later Aliyev said, “Russia was the major mediator, although there was the Minsk Group as well. But Russia took the initiative. A cease-fire agreement was signed and immediately after, the Russian Defense Minister asked the Armenian and Azerbaijani defense ministers to come to Moscow and discuss how to liberate the lands seized. We believed him. We sent Mamedov there. What happened the next day? Out of the blue, I was informed that Moscow TV was showing Grachov holding an extended session and suggesting what should be done in Azerbaijan. I immediately got worried. I contacted our defense minister. It turns out that talks were being held there with Rasul Guliyev’s consent, and in the presence of our ambassador in Moscow, on sending Russian peacekeeping troops to the region to ensure the ceasefire.”

Vladimir Kazimirov recalls an interesting scene from this meeting in Moscow. “During the meeting, which had been organized at Grachov’s initiation, the employees of the defense ministry, probably familiar with past ceasefire agreements failures, had prepared a document draft proposing the cessation of gunfire as of May 18. That’s to say, five days after the official ceasefire had already been put into effect.”

Truly, it was hard to believe that a ceasefire had finally been established and the bloodshed was finally being stopped.

On one occasion, more than ten years later, Kazimirov said that if the ceasefire somehow transformed into a peace treaty, he would get up and dance.

From Tatul Hakobyan’s book – KARABAKH DIARY; GREEN and BLACK

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Sumgait 1988: The Armenian Pogroms

Sonia Hakobyan had moved to her new apartment three days before the massacres started in Sumgait. Armenians were scattered all over Sumgait and only during the day of the massacres did Sonia realize how many Armenians lived in the city. She and her family, together with another 5,000 Armenians, found shelter from the slaughterer in the huge cultural center building under the control of the naval infantry close to Lenin Square.

Sumgait was to serve as a “cruel lesson” for other peoples in the Soviet Union, who also had demands regarding national issues. “Rallies in Yerevan and NK demanded unification with Armenia. This was the reason behind the massacres. We did not think they would come and drive us out of our homes. We had been waiting for an apartment for 12 years. My husband and I worked in factories and finally we received the three-room apartment where we lived for just three days. Currently an Azerbaijani family from Amasia (northwestern Armenia) is living in our apartment,” says Sonia. Her family, as well as many others from Sumgait, has settled in the village of Mughni, not far from Yerevan.

An official from the Kremlin, Grigory Kharchenko was in Sumgait three days after the massacres. Apart from the horrifying scenes, something else had shaken him – the Armenians wanted to depart for Russia and not Armenia. “No one that we spoke to expressed a desire to fly to Armenia. They all asked for Krasnodar, Stavropol, and Rostov regions. Why? They said, ‘No one in Armenia needs us. They don't think of us as real Armenians, we are not real Armenians’”.

Only a fraction of Armenians, with roots in Karabakh, who were living in Sumgait, moved to Karabakh or Armenia.

Lida Alexanian is one of those who did. She says that during the massacres Azerbaijani friends of her son, who was then in military service, defended them. “My son was serving in Germany. After the massacres my husband and I went to the military commissariat and told them that we were moving to Yerevan. I asked them to inform my son not to return to Sumgait. They refused, saying that Armenians had to return to their birthplace. And so we waited for 10 months after the massacres. On November 29, 1988 my son returned from military service and the next day we came to Armenia. Later, both of my sons moved to Russia, as our standard of living here was very low,” she says.

Samvel Shahmuratyan recorded dozens stories by the survivors of Sumgait in the spring of 1988. Certain Azerbaijanis claim that the killings of the Armenians in Sumgait were carried out by Azerbaijanis allegedly deported from Kapan, a city in southern Armenia. Among those responsible for the killings, there also could have been Azerbaijanis who were banished from Armenia earlier. It is clear that among the more than 80 Azerbaijanis who were convicted in court, not one was from Kapan.

Constantin Pkhakadze, a Georgian, who along with his Armenian wife lived in Sumgait, said that on February 21 he heard from his Azerbaijani friend that one week later there would be anti-Armenian protests. At the time, Pkhakadze took this as a joke. On the evening of February 26 in Lenin Square, Pkhakadze had seen a few dozen people had gathered. One of them, not giving his first or last name, had said that he had escaped from Kapan with his Azerbaijani compatriots and that Armenians there had killed his and his wife’s relatives.

“We have escaped from Kapan,” an Azerbaijani with a long face and thin mustache had said to those gathered in the square. He was the leader of the protest rally. The next day more stories were added to this – Armenians had supposedly raped Azerbaijani girls in Kapan, cutting off their breasts. The man claiming to be an Azerbaijani from Kapan concluded his remarks by proclaiming: “Armenians, out of Azerbaijani lands! Death to the Armenians!”

On the afternoon of February 27, Sumgait Deputy Mayor Malek Bayramova appealed to the participants of the rally - “It is not necessary to kill the Armenians. Gorbachev has said that no one will be taking Karabakh away. The territory is and will remain Azerbaijani. Allow the Armenians to leave Azerbaijan freely, give them the chance to leave.”

After discussions with the Armenians of Sumgait it became clear that the mob had resorted to violence because the Armenians were demanding Karabakh. A short while later the issue of Karabakh was relegated to the back burner. With evident impunity, several groups comprised of dozens of thugs, were killing Armenians and looting their homes.

Vladimir Grigoryan recounted, “I looked out my window. There was a rally in Lenin Square. Nothing could be heard, I opened the window. They were saying, ‘Calm down, we will not give Karabakh to the Armenians, Karabakh is ours.’ Another said that two Azerbaijanis were killed in Karabakh, one 16 another 22 years of age.” His wife Marina added that after Katusev’s speech, the Azerbaijanis became more indignant.

USSR Deputy Prosecutor Alexander Katusev, who was in Baku, stated over Azerbaijani T.V. on February 27 that five days earlier two young people had been killed in Askeran, stressing their Azerbaijani last names. This news further inspired killings of Armenians and the stealing of their belongings by the eager mob.

During the last three days of February, as a result of the organized Armenian massacres, 29 Armenians and 6 Azerbaijanis were killed. About 400 – the majority of whom were Armenian – were injured. The 18,000 Armenians of the city became refugees. The six Azerbaijanis were most probably killed by soldiers of the Caspian Infantry Fleet and Land Regiment when these forces moved in the direction of young thugs gathered at the Sumgait bus station. But this was on the evening of February 29 when the slaughter of the Armenians had already ended. Perhaps this attack on the Azerbaijanis took place in order to give the massacre in Sumgait an international nuance.

The fact that the murderers were all armed with the same metal rods, that they had the addresses of the Armenians and were organized into groups speaks to the fact that the slaughter was premeditated. On the other hand, it is obvious that if ordinary Azerbaijanis had not sheltered Armenians in their homes the number of those murdered and injured would have been much higher. It was only on the afternoon of February 29 that Soviet troops received orders to forcibly intervene to save the thousands of terrified Armenians from being massacred.

On February 28, the Moscow central television program Vremya described the Armenian massacres as “acts of hooliganism.”

The next day, during a session of the Politburo, Gorbachev informed the Soviet leadership that - “Not less than a half a million people have taken to the streets in Yerevan. There have been clashes between Azerbaijanis and Armenians in Karabakh and two people were killed. Pamphlets were distributed throughout Yerevan calling for people to stop protesting and take up arms and pressure the Turks. But I must say that even when there were a half a million people on the streets of Yerevan, there were no anti-Soviet activities. The masses were moving forward wearing the masks of the members of the Politburo. Only the extremists were raising the notion of self-determination. All the speeches were about uniting Karabakh with Armenia. There is evidence of Azerbaijani families escaping from Armenia. Vladimir Ivanovich has reported that 55 people have left, Razumovsky has said, 200.”

Defense Minister Dimitry Yazov proposed to enforce a curfew given horrible scenes taking place in the city. “They cut off the breasts of two women, the head of another, and they skinned a girl. Alas, this is the kind of savagery there.”

Kharchenko and Filip Bobkov, Deputy Chief of the USSR KGB, were among the first officials to arrive from Moscow. They reached Sumgait via Baku on February 28 and witnessed the savagery with their own eyes. Kharchenko did not accept Gorbachev’s claim that the forces were only three hours late in arriving in Sumgait. They were late for a whole day, awaiting their orders.

“I don't want to show you the photographs. I simply destroyed them. With my own eyes I saw dismembered corpses, a body mutilated with an axe, legs, arms, practically no body left,” Karachenko said. “They took the remains of dry leaves off the ground, scattered them over corpses, took petrol from the nearest car and set fire to them. Horrific corpses.”

Soviet history is full of bloody episodes, but what took place in Sumgait was unprecedented. First of all, the massacres took place in a time of peace. Second, the massacres weren’t political in nature but rather ethnic, and finally, the massacres were not carried out by the Soviet central or republican authorities as they were one year later in Tbilisi. This possibility, however, was handed over to the working class due to the inaction of the central authorities. Gorbachev had hoped that the working class would be able to establish public order.

According to Pkhakadze, the leader of Sumgait Communist Party, Jahangir Muslimzade, replaced Bayramova on February 27.The Azerbaijani who claimed to be from Kapan once again alleged that Armenians had killed his relatives and those of his wife and had raped two Azerbaijani girls in the dormitory. Muslimzade then took the microphone and reiterated what Bayramova had said: “Brothers, we must let the Armenians leave freely.”

Azerbaijani scientist Zardusht Alizadeh wrote that on February 27 Baghirov and PM Seidov came to Sumgait. “They met with citizens and refugees. But what could they say to these people? Shrieks and cries of the people who were offended, insulted and expelled from their country silenced the speeches of the leaders. They ran away through the back door of the club and literally fled.”

“On February 28, Muslimzade headed for the ill-fated rally, where tempers were furiously boiling. Karabakh would never be relinquished to Armenia, he said, there was no cause for concern. There is Article78 of the USSR Constitution and if they violate it and adopt the decision to seize Karabakh, then he would join the ranks of the protestors. They placed Azerbaijan’s flag in his hand and demanded that he prove that he was with the people and ready to demonstrate. Standing alone, with the Azeri flag in his hand and surrounded by agitated crowd, Muslimzade gave in to the will of the mob and went with them. When the procession headed by Muslimzade made its way, pre-arranged groups of thugs carrying metal pipes ran to the different parts of the city and began looting the apartments of Armenians,” writes Alizade.

Soviet Armenian authorities condemned the brutal massacre in Sumgait two and a half months after the fact. On June 15, the Supreme Soviet passed a similar decision, under pressure from those who had not come out into the streets. In the meantime, the leadership of Azerbaijan issued a communiqué, “expressing its deep sympathy and sincere compassion to the families and friends of the victims including all those who were injured as a result of the disorder that took place in Sumgait.”

On March 12, representatives of Sheikh-ul-Islam Khadji Allahshukyur Pashazade, the spiritual leader of Azerbaijani Muslims, visited the Mother See in Etchmiadzin. They conveyed their leader’s message, expressing pain and dismay in connection with the tragedy in Sumgait, to the Catholicos of All Armenians,

In mid-March, the plenary session of the Politburo of Azerbaijan’s Communist Party, in which Baghirov participated, relieved Muslimzade from his responsibilities “for his display of political carelessness, for allowing great flaws in organizational and political activities and for his non-party conduct, all of which brought tragedy to the city.”

Around 90 criminals stood before courts in different cities of the Soviet Union charged with implementing inter-racial massacre, violence, rape and other charges in Sumgait. Only one of them received the maximum death sentence. The Soviet justice system did its utmost to avoid referring to the nationality of the criminals during the court cases. The insistence that some of the killers were not Azerbaijanis also served that purpose.

Note- This chapter is from Tatul Hakobyan’s book- Karabakh Diary; Green and Black

An exceptional and informative work based on a rich and varied source base. Its impartiality is striking. A much needed monograph destined to persevere as the ‘textbook’ for Armenian diplomacy. As a pioneering initiative that presents an accurate reinterpretation of the Karabakh struggle for self-determination, this book captures the essence of the issue with an illuminating portrayal of many of the key figures and events that have come to define the Karabakh issue. The conflict cruelly shaped the destinies of thousands of average people and the ordeals they bore underline the responsibility of those at the top, in whose hands a resolution of the Karabakh conflict rests. The author’s secret, revealed in the pages of Green and Black , is that he does not shy away from presenting those facts and realties no longer considered expedient to remember. Anyone wishing to be informed and regarding the Karabakh conflict must read this book.

Paperback: 416 pages,
Language: English,
2010, Antelias,
ISBN 978-995301816-4.

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Text of resolution of Nagorno Karabakh [NKAO] requesting incorporation in Soviet Armenia: February 20, 1988

[20 February 1988]

Text of resolution by the government of Autonomous Region of Mountainous Karabagh requesting incorporation in Soviet Armenia

SPECIAL MEETING OF THE 20TH SESSION, THE SOVIET OF PEOPLE’S DEPUTIES, AUTONOMOUS REGION OF MOUNTAINOUS KARABAGH.

RESOLUTION:

Regarding mediation for the transfer of the Autonomous Region of Mountainous Karabagh (ARMK) from the Azerbaijani S.S.R. to the Armenian S.S.R.

After listening to and reviewing the statements of the people’s deputies of the Autonomous Region of Mountainous Karabagh Soviet “regarding the mediation of the S.S.R. Supreme Soviet between the Azerbaijani S.S.R. and Armenian S.S.R. for the transfer of the Autonomous Region of Mountainous Karabagh from the Azerbaijani S.S.R. to the Armenian S.S.R.,” the special session of regional soviet of Mountainous Karabagh

RESOLVES,

Welcoming the wishes of the workers of the Autonomous Region of Mountainous Karabagh to request to supreme soviets of Azerbaijani and Armenian S.S.R.s that they appreciate the deep aspirations of the Armenian population of Mountainous Karabagh and to transfer the Autonomous Region of Mountainous Karabagh from the Azerbaijani S.S.R. to the Armenian S.S.R., at the same time to intercede with the Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R. to reach a positive resolution regarding the transfer of the region from the Azerbaijani S.S.R. to the Armenian S.S.R.

[Sovetakan Gharabagh, Feburary 21, 1988]

The Karabagh File, Documents and Facts, 1918-1988, First Edition, Cambridge Toronto 1988, by the ZORYAN INSTITUTE, edited by: Gerard J. LIBARIDIAN, p. 90.

Photo: Ruslan Sargsyan

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Nagorno Karabakh – The Road To Independence: from September 2 to December 10, 1991

This chapter is from Tatul Hakobyan ’s book – KARABAKH DIARY; GREEN and BLACK

An Assassination Attempt on Polyanichko

TASS journalist Vladimir Gondusov hurried from the second floor of the NK regional committee building up to the third. Doctors were already bandaging Vladimir Polyanichko’s head. “I remember his words, ‘be sure to write that this is the second assassination attempt,’” recalls the journalist.

On May 10, 1991, a rocket was launched from the Stepanakert stadium towards the Regional Council building. Polyanichko was miraculously saved. The Armenians had many reasons for displaying such hostility towards him and to Commandant Safonov as well.

Polyanchikov was building the town of Khojalu for the Azerbaijanis and Meskhetian Turks and resettling Krkzhan, a suburb of Stepanakert, with Azerbaijanis. “We were stoning each other during the time of Volsky; during Polyanichko’s time, we started shooting each other. I remember that during a funeral in Shushi he urged us to take revenge on the Armenians,” says Ramil Ghambarov, an Azerbaijani from Shushi. The “Ring Operation” which Polyanichko had used for the first time in the city of Kandahar in Afghanistan, was reworked anew in NK. They gave the Armenians the opportunity to flee from the bombed villages, and Soviet TV station broadcast interviews of those who had been driven out, thanking the Soviet army for saving their lives.

During 1990-1991, NK had an Azerbaijani population of around 40,000, mostly centered in Shushi, Khojalu and several villages. They supported the activities of the Organizational Committee. The situation was different for the Armenian population.

In 1990, Rauf Rajabov headed a group of around ten experts that was established in NK and prepared reports for the leadership of the Organizational Committee and the central authorities in Baku. “Two buildings were side by side - Polyanichko, in the Regional Council building and the Armenians, in the Regional Executive Committee building. But there was no cooperation between them. There was a certain amount of cooperation between the Organizational Committee and the regions and villages. It was important to solve the many issues of the villages, right? It would have been more correct if the Organizational Committee had worked with the local Armenian leadership than with Moscow,” says Rajabov.

The actions of Polyanichko’s Organizational Committee and the “Ring Operation” were a forceful blow to the Karabakh movement. The first cracks in Movement’s ranks began in the spring and summer months. A segment of intellectuals and officials in NK, seeking a way out of the hellish situation, proposed coming to terms with the Azerbaijanis, thus saving NK from being cleared of Armenians altogether. Another group considered that any compromise was equivalent to betrayal. A third group held a central position of negotiating with the authorities in order to gain time.

A large group of activists in the Movement had previously decided to send a letter to Moscow, appealing for the cessation of the “Ring Operation”. The letter was supposed to have been delivered to Moscow in June. Delegation member Levon Melik-Shahnazaryan recounts: “The essence of the letter was that whatever we have done was wrong and that we apologize. Cease the massacre of Armenians and we will agree to your political decision. I angrily addressed the meeting, arguing that sending such a letter meant betraying not only NK, but all Armenians. It meant surrendering, and those who surrender are defeated to the very end. I suggested two modifications which changed the substance of the letter. The letter was sent. The delegation met with Ter-Petrosyan before it left for Moscow.”

On May 23, at the joint meeting of NK officials, Semyon Babayan offered an assessment of the situation created in the region. Afterwards, the participants discussed whether to immediately start negotiations with the Organizational Committee or to completely break all forms of ties with Azerbaijan. Henrikh Poghosyan noted that waging armed resistance against Azerbaijan and the Kremlin was not in the cards since the balance of forces was unequal and Armenia could not offer military assistance. He suggested choosing the route of negotiation. The leaders of the Askeran, Hadrut and Martakert regions naturally approved this proposal. Robert Kocharyan’s position was that Baku would, without doubt, consider the consent to negotiation with Azerbaijan, as a sign of surrender. The first thing that Azerbaijan would do is to demand that the NK void is previous political decisions and announcement. Was the population of NK in agreement? Kocharyan stressed that the idea of negotiations should be approached carefully and not be made into a public spectacle. Arkady Manucharov considered the proposal of entering into negotiations acceptable, in principle. However, he considered it necessary to first of all decide on the framework of the issues and only negotiate on those issues. Dashnaktsutytun representative Georgy Petrosyan did not support the idea of negotiations arguing that there was no guarantee that the Kremlin would soften its stance as a result.

The delegation that left for Moscow on June 24 was received by USSR Vice President Yanayev, Chairman of the Supreme Council Lukyanov, Defense Minister Yazov, Interior Minister Pugo and former Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Apart from Shevardnadze, the others were well-known putschists who were preparing a coup d’état.

“Poghosyan was the head of the delegation. Our first meeting was with Yanayev. During the meeting with Pugo, Poghosyan appealed for the cessation of the operation against the Armenians,” says Melik-Shahnazaryan. “I spoke unflinchingly; I was nervous, scared. The point I was making was that, ‘we declare war on you.’ I repeated several times, ‘we declare war on you’, but I was in a trance. That was no longer diplomacy, but it was the right diplomacy for the moment.”

Gorbachev lifted the state of emergency on July 4, 1991, declaring that the situation in and around NK was returning to normal. A few days later, soldiers of the 23rd Division of the Soviet Fourth Army and Azerbaijan OMON units surrounded the Armenian villages of Buzlukh, Erkej and Manashid in the Shahumyan region. On July 13-14 these forced went in and occupied them.

A regional council meeting took place on July 19. Oleg Yesayan participated in that meeting. “The question remained - to accept Baku’s proposal and participate in the presidential elections, or not? Going to Baku for negotiations was proposed by Moscow. We discussed it and rejected the proposal to participate in the elections, but a decision to send a delegation to Baku was approved,” he said. “That was necessary to gain time. Leonard Petrosyan, Georgy Petrosyan, I and many others took part in the discussion. The political leaders of the Movement, including Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan, were aware of this decision. It was decided to send a delegation, with the aim of gaining time and avoiding extreme measures. I was not against the delegation visiting Baku to gain time and to avoid further pressures, but I was against being in the actual delegation.”

Georgy Petrosyan was definitely against the proposal for negotiations with Baku. “In 1988, when the Karabakh Movement began, it had taken on the issue of rights repressed and restricted in the totalitarian state. Peacefully, via the Movement, we began to restore those rights back to life. The response to our efforts was Sumgait. The issue of rights was transferred to the arena of inter-ethnic clashes,” Petrosyan said. “I was against Baku deciding the issue of our rights. Not because one doesn’t want to have contact with Baku. The issue is whether or not we are going to hand over the issue of our rights to someone else. Should we go to Baku and say that we agree to them interfering in our internal life?”

Boris Arushanyan placed importance on the factor of rights. “Azerbaijan, with the help of Moscow, wanted to bring NK to its knees and, by emptying certain regions of NK, force us to remain within Azerbaijan in the form of an enclave,” he said. “One portion of our intellectuals felt that we should accept those compromises in order to save at least a tiny part. Others, including myself, held an extreme position. We were sure that no compromise to Azerbaijan would have any results. There was a third group who held a central position. They thought about gaining time. Those in the delegation to Baku were from that group. Of course those people did not savor the prospect of remaining a part of Azerbaijan, but they believed they could gain time.”

Approval was given for the NK delegation to visit Baku and negotiate with Mutalibov. It came after three days of heated debate in an Armenian parliament session and also with the intervention of Ter-Petrosyan. The delegation met with Mutalibov in Baku on July 20 and its members assured him that NK was prepared to negotiate “on the basis of the USSR and Azerbaijan Constitutions” and that it wanted to discuss a timetable for new NK elections. According to Zori Balayan, “Today, no one has the right to criticize the decision of the NK that was also approved by the Supreme Council of Armenia on July 16. They don’t have the right if only because one doesn’t judge winners. One of the participants of the delegation, Valery Grigoryan, was killed. He was killed on the way back to Stepanakert from Baku. Many did not know that this law-abiding man tragically became a victim of Polyanichko’s carefully developed campaign. To inflame passions, Polyanichko publicly praised the participants of the meeting in Baku, particularly Valery. He coldly calculated that this one patriot would receive ‘his sentence’.”

In the summer of 1999, Zhanna Galstyan, one of the activists of the Karabakh Movement, told Swedish researcher Erik Melander, “We would have threatened the life of anyone who signed such a document - a document that was invalid because neither we nor the people could have tolerated it. The person would simply have been shot, even if the individual was a close friend of ours.”

According to Melik-Shahnazaryan, there were no groups in NK that cooperated with Polyanchiko. But there were individuals that did and Valery Grigoryan was one. “That delegation heading to Baku in 1991 was breaking the nation’s backbone. I think that killing was necessary. I will say even more. Leonard Petrosyan, who was heading the delegation to Baku asked, ‘I’m not on the list, am I?’ Targeting Valery was not random. It was not only for his going to Baku, but for a series of other steps also.”

Grigoryan was killed on August 10, in Stepanakert on present-day Azatamartikneri Street. 18 bullets were fired at Grigoryan; 11 struck his chest and came out and 7 remained in his body. 5 of the bullets were sent to Baku for forensic examination. The attempt to cover up the crime by sending the case to the Baku was a clever, but also cynical and shameful, ploy.

Valery’s son, Arthur Grigoryan, a twice injured veteran of the Karabakh conflict, believes the murder of his father was political. “Presently, the criminal case has been curtailed since the identity of the perpetrators of the crime has not been discovered.” Arthur talked to many people and tried to gather information as to why his father was killed. All of them said that now is not the right time for that.

“Valery was in favor of a peaceful resolution to the NK issue. Two days prior to the killing, there was a meeting of regional leaders. He was disillusioned with some of the leaders,” says Arega Hayrapetyan, Valery’s wife. “Groups had developed, each wanting to advance its own concept they thought to be the right solution. My husband’s murder was the first political killing in NK. The second was that of Arthur Mkrtchyan. At one time, Volsky proposed that Valery go with him to Moscow. If he had gone, he would still be alive today and he would have helped NK. We have not come to our senses since Valery’s murder.”

Gorbachev: “I Returned to Another Country”

The unsuccessful coup d’état of 1991 accelerated the demise of the Soviet state. The Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities registered the events of August 19-21 differently. Ter-Petrosyan and the ruling ANM rejected the authority of the State Emergency Committee (SEC). Mutalibov and Polyanichko publicly declared their support, anticipating that the power-seeking hard-liners in Moscow would take a firmer line on the NK issue - to the advantage of Azerbaijan - which would give them the opportunity to finally destroy the Karabakh movement.

On October 19, Mutalibov was in Iran. Upon hearing the news about the Moscow coup, the leader of Azerbaijan declared solidarity with the rebels. Leaders of several countries - Saddam Hussein, Yasser Arafat, Muammar Gaddafi, and Slobodan Milosevic – did the same.

Mutalibov’s advisor, Vafa Guluzade, writes that he had requested that Mutalibov refrain from commenting on the events in Moscow. “We left for Tabriz. The Iranian side persuaded Mutalibov to give an interview, next to the Shahriyar’s monument, on purely cultural issues. We were standing a little to one side. The journalists asked one or two questions about culture. The next was about the coup d’état. Mutalibov expressed his support and criticized Gorbachev. I was in a state of shock. Then Polyanichko phoned, saying “Hurrah, our guys have taken it.” Mutalibov said, “I told you so, didn’t I, Vafa, the military hasn’t had its say.” When we returned to Baku, the coup d’état had failed.”

On April 23, 1991, in Novo-Ogaryovo, Gorbachev had met with the leaders of nine republics and declared the launch of the draft Union Treaty. The six republics, including Armenia, which had refused to take part in the referendum on maintaining the USSR in its old form, had not been invited. Ter-Petrosyan was in France during the second meeting on May 24 and did not participate in the third meeting which took place on June 2, in protest against the position held by Moscow on the NK issue.

Armenia participated in the last of the Novo-Ogaryovo meetings on July 23. Ter-Petrosyan emphasized that Armenia was striving for independence but that the referendum to be held on September 21 would express the people’s will. There were those who supported remaining within the renewed union’s structure. These were according to Ter-Petrosyan, “the Communist Party, Dashnaktsutyun, and some units of Karabakh-born Armenians who reside in Armenia.” “They declare that Armenia must sign the Union agreement; so that it has a chance to resolve the NK reunification issue. And the residents of that territory have approved a decision on May 16 to play the discussion and negotiation card with Azerbaijan. The first delegation, led by [Leonard] Petrosyan, head of the NK Executive Committee, has returned from Baku where Mutalibov has presented his program. The Armenian Parliament voted on June 16 approving that initiative.”

The text of the Union treaty was published in the press on August 16 and was to have been signed four days later. Since the beginning of August, Gorbachev had been vacationing at the Foros dacha in the Crimea. Kryuchkov assigned KGB Generals Alexei Yegorov and Vyacheslav Zhizhin and Commander of the Armed forces, Pavel Grachov, to draw up a list of measures to be taken in a state of emergency. On the morning of the coup, Kryuchkov informed the leadership of the KGB that, “restructuring is terminated”. Radio and television programs begin with a reading of the State Emergency Committee’s message.

Tatyana Dyachenko woke her father up. “They are showing something unintelligible on the TV.” Shortly after, several self-proclaimed democratic figures gathered in Yeltsin’s dacha. Yeltsin attempted in vain to contact Gorbachev and Yanayev. He’s able to contact Grachov. Putting the earpiece down, Yeltsin says, “Grachov is ours.” Troops start to move towards Moscow. Almost 4,000 soldiers and 800 tanks and armored vehicles enter the capital city. During a KGB debate, Kryuchkov expressed his hope that it will be possible to come to an agreement with Yeltsin.

A meeting in support of democracy and Yeltsin, who had been elected President of Russia on June 12, gathers steam by the statue of Yuri Dolgorukii. Yeltsin, in a telephone conversation with Kryuchkov, refuses to recognize the SEC. Then he calls on his supporters from the turret of a tank from the Tamanyan division, proclaiming the SEC illegal and labels the event a coup d’état.

Generals Achalov, Grushko, Adeyev, Gromov and Lebed, are preparing an attack on the White House, which was being defended by several thousand people. Three individuals are killed on the night of August 21. Achalov reports to Yazov, “Blood has been spilled”, to which Yazov replies, “Halt the attack”. On the same day, the SEC delegation goes to the Crimea, but Gorbachev refuses to see them, including Kryuchkov and Lukyanov. Gorbachev demands the immediate restoration of communications with the outside world. He calls Moscow and declares, “The situation is completely under control.”

Gorbachev travels to Moscow on the evening of August 22 on Alexander Rutskoy’s plane. The coup leaders travel on another. In Moscow, Kryuchkov and Yazov are arrested on the airport runway. Yanayev is arrested in his office. Pugo and his wife commit suicide. Then Pavlov, Starodubtsev, Lukyanov, and the other rebels, are arrested. In a session of the Supreme Council of Russia, Yeltsin signs the order for the disbanding of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev, in his first press conference after the rebellion, makes his well-known comment, “I returned to another country.” He awarded posthumous Hero of the Union medals to three defenders of the White House - Dmitrii Komar, Vladimir Usov and Ilya Krychevski. The three defenders of the White House were the last heroes of the Soviet Union.

Independence Parade

On August 30, 1991, the Supreme Council in Baku approved the “Reestablishment of the State Independence of Azerbaijan” proclamation. There was no mention made of the two autonomous entities; NK and Nakhijevan. In the proclamation it notes that Azerbaijan was a “free, internationally recognized state” from 1918-1920.

If the proclamation applied to the 1918-1920 Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan’s borders, about which the proclamation makes no direct mention, then both NK and Nakhijevan were included later, in 1921 when the Musavatist Azerbaijan no longer existed. The proclamation did not refer to Soviet Azerbaijan (within whose structure NK and Nakhijevan existed). No such reference exists in the text. On the other hand, as was the case with all Soviet republics, they were internationally recognized having those borders with which they formed part of the Soviet Union.

On September 2, a joint meeting of the Regional Councils of NK and Shahumyan took place in Stepanakert. A declaration concerning the borders of NK and Shahumyan is approved, based on the law “Concerning the procedure of secession of a Soviet Republic from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” which was passed by the USSR Supreme Council on April 3, 1990.

The crux of that law was the concept of a referendum for secession from the USSR. If a republic of the union wished to secede from the USSR, which was permitted in the Article 72 of the Constitution, the procedure was a referendum, a public vote. The decision to hold a referendum is taken by the Supreme Council of the republic of the union, either on its own initiative or based on the demand of a ‘yes’ vote by 10 percent of eligible voters in the population of the republic.

In a proclamation, the regional council and its executive committee are regarded as the temporary state authority and supreme governing body in NK until new elections and the formation of a new authority and governing structure. Leonard Petrosyan is elected President of the Executive Committee of NK.

Ter-Petrosyan was in Moscow on September 3. Regarding the Declaration of Independence of NK he stated, “Nothing will change from the legal point of view, since similar decisions have been taken over the past three years. But it is of political significance. In the list of enormous issues for the USSR, the Artsakh [Karabakh] issue becomes timely since there are moves afoot to find some temporary solution to the Artsakh issue for the Armenians, the Azerbaijanis and the Artsakh-Armenians. Yeltsin and Nazarbayev have presented such an initiative.”

On September 8, Mutalibov is elected president of Azerbaijan by 98.5 percent in an election boycotted by the Popular Front. In NK, 12 percent of the population (exclusively Azerbaijanis) participated in the election. Mutalibov signs the “Constitutional Act of State Independence of Azerbaijan” on October 18, in which the foundation of the state, political and economic structure of independent Azerbaijan is set. In this document, it clearly states that Azerbaijan is the legal successor to the 1918-1920 Musavatist Azerbaijan Republic. It declares that the document of December 30, 1922, on the formation of the USSR, is annulled in respect to Azerbaijan.

Armenia, in contrast to Azerbaijan and NK, had already adopted a declaration on August 23, 1990. On September 21 of the following year, the referendum on independence had taken place in Armenia. around 94.5 percent of those eligible to vote had participated and over 99 percent said ‘yes’ to the dream of the Armenian people of having a free, sovereign state.

The referendum took place - as do all of Armenia’s future elections - only in the territory of Soviet Armenia which meant that in essence the 1989, December 1st decision by the joint Supreme Council of Armenia and NK National Council meeting for reunification was considered null and void. Later in 1998, the President of Armenia, during an early election, used that decision for political purposes, to wit, selectively.

Photo - Stepanakert in 1998

Karabakh Diary

An exceptional and informative work based on a rich and varied source base. Its impartiality is striking. A much needed monograph destined to persevere as the ‘textbook’ for Armenian diplomacy. As a pioneering initiative that presents an accurate reinterpretation of the Karabakh struggle for self-determination, this book captures the essence of the issue with an illuminating portrayal of many of the key figures and events that have come to define the Karabakh issue. The conflict cruelly shaped the destinies of thousands of average people and the ordeals they bore underline the responsibility of those at the top, in whose hands a resolution of the Karabakh conflict rests. The author’s secret, revealed in the pages of Green and Black , is that he does not shy away from presenting those facts and realties no longer considered expedient to remember. Anyone wishing to be informed and regarding the Karabakh conflict must read this book.

Paperback: 416 pages,
Language: English,
2010, Antelias,
ISBN 978-995301816-4.

The post Nagorno Karabakh – The Road To Independence: from September 2 to December 10, 1991 appeared first on Aniarc.

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