Bez podsłuchiwania rozmów na Discordzie. Protokół DAVE szyfruje audio i wideo
Platforma komunikacyjna Discord oficjalnie ogłosiła zakończenie wieloletniego procesu wdrażania domyślnego szyfrowania end-to-end (E2EE) dla połączeń głosowych oraz wideo.
Po fazie testów i usunięciu z kodu aplikacji mechanizmów pozwalających na nieszyfrowane połączenia zapasowe, pełna ochrona prywatności stała się standardem. Bezpieczeństwo rozmów gwarantuje autorski, w pełni otwarty protokół o nazwie DAVE.
Protokół DAVE, czyli bezpieczne konsole i smartfony
Wdrożenie pełnego szyfrowania w ekosystemie Discorda było gigantycznym wyzwaniem inżynieryjnym ze względu na skrajną heterogeniczność platformy. W jednej rozmowie grupowej mogą jednocześnie uczestniczyć użytkownicy korzystający z komputerów, smartfonów, przeglądarek internetowych oraz konsol PlayStation i Xbox.
Aby zapewnić spójne bezpieczeństwo bez generowania opóźnień w przesyłaniu dźwięku i obrazu, Discord we współpracy z uznaną firmą audytorską Trail of Bits opracował protokół DAVE (Discord Audio & Video End-to-End Encryption). Wykorzystuje on nowoczesny standard Messaging Layer Security (MLS) do bezpiecznej i skalowalnej wymiany kluczy kryptograficznych w rozmowach wieloosobowych.
Nowe zabezpieczenie działa automatycznie i nie wymaga od użytkowników aktywacji jakichkolwiek opcji w ustawieniach. Szyfrowaniem objęto:
Jedynym wyjątkiem pozostają kanały typu Stage, które ze względu na swoją architekturę służą do publicznych transmisji i masowych paneli dyskusyjnych, a nie prywatnej wymiany informacji.
Dlaczego czaty tekstowe pozostają jawne?
Wielu użytkowników zastanawia się, dlaczego rewolucja kryptograficzna ominęła tradycyjne wiadomości tekstowe. Władze platformy wyjaśniają to ogromnym długiem technologicznym. Większość kluczowych funkcji Discorda – takich jak zaawansowana moderacja treści przez boty, przeszukiwanie historii wiadomości, indeksowanie linków czy podgląd multimediów – została od podstaw zaprojektowana przy założeniu, że serwery mają bezpośredni wgląd w tekst. Przebudowanie tych struktur pod kątem pełnego szyfrowania end-to-end wymagałoby napisania architektury czatów całkowicie od nowa. Na ten moment firma nie planuje takiego kroku.
Discord ze wsparciem dla Handoff. Aplikacja ułatwia przełączanie się między iPhonem, iPadem i Makiem
#cyberbezpieczeństwo #Discord #E2EE #endToEnd #iMagazine #protokółDAVE #prywatność #Software #szyfrowanieNice!
Postitive #sideEffect: Nobody will ever complain about drawbacks or disadvantages of current #OMEMO #encryption again 😃
If you're already talking to someone, you might as well compare notes on whether your key directories agree. That's the entire premise.
New preprint (https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1010): MINGLE detects Key Transparency split-view attacks in E2EE messengers via in-band gossip. 119 bytes of overhead per message, detection within minutes.
The problem: KT systems like those in Signal and iMessage commit identity-to-key bindings into an append-only directory, making malicious key substitution auditable. But a malicious operator can still equivocate — serving different, individually valid views of the directory to different clients. Current deployments delegate detection to a small set of third-party auditors, a trust bottleneck that can be pressured or fail to audit continuously.
The fix that needs no new infrastructure: clients already hold locally verifiable KT state. MINGLE embeds their current commitment into outgoing message plaintexts before encryption. If two commitments refer to the same epoch but different roots, both are operator-signed — together they're a publicly verifiable proof of misbehavior. Because gossip sits inside the AEAD layer, the server can't remove it without breaking authentication. The only way to prevent detection is to permanently isolate the two forked client populations, which gets harder to sustain as the social graph densifies.
We formalize the protocol, prove correctness and soundness, simulate under realistic messaging workloads derived from a user study, and prototype in the actual Signal Android client. We've been running custom clients for the past few weeks.
On a personal note: explaining this project to friends meant making them fish out their phone, navigate into Signal settings, and compare QR codes (often at a party at 2am). Prior work documents why nobody does this voluntarily. They are correct. MINGLE is designed to make it unnecessary.
Fasllija, Heimberger, Paul
Graz University of Technology
#cryptography #e2ee #keytransparency #signal #transparency #privacy #graz

End-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messengers such as Signal, WhatsApp and iMessage increasingly deploy Key Transparency (KT) to make malicious key substitution detectable. Yet KT only delivers its intended protection if users are anchored to the same global append-only KT history. A malicious operator can break this condition by equivocating, presenting incompatible views of the KT directory to different clients. Current deployments delegate detection to a small set of third-party auditors, creating a centralized trust bottleneck that can be pressured, compromised, or fail to audit continuously. We ask whether clients can detect equivocation themselves, without dedicated infrastructure, simply by comparing KT state as they communicate. We introduce MINGLE, an opportunistic in-band gossip protocol for end-to-end encrypted messengers. MINGLE piggybacks compact KT commitments on a subset of ordinary messages before encryption, keeping gossip indistinguishable from regular application data while requiring no external services or overlay network. Rather than asking users to manually verify safety numbers or relying on a small set of auditors, MINGLE distributes the consistency check across the entire communication graph: an adversary wishing to sustain a split view must permanently isolate targeted clients from the rest of the network, preventing any cross-partition message from ever being delivered, a requirement that grows increasingly difficult to maintain covertly as the social graph densifies. MINGLE inherits the Trust-on-First-Use (TOFU) assumption standard in E2EE messengers: equivocation that begins at registration evades immediate detection, though the append-only log ensures it remains retroactively exposable once any cross-partition gossip event occurs. Using a temporal communication model, we show that under eventual cross-partition connectivity, conflicting KT views yield publicly verifiable evidence. We prototype MINGLE in the Signal Android client using Signal's KT Server implementation, incurring a payload overhead of 119 bytes per gossip-carrying message without UI changes. Simulations under realistic messaging patterns show that MINGLE achieves high reliability and fast evidence generation without aggressive gossip flooding. MINGLE yields evidence of a targeted split view in a \(12000\)-client deployment within about \(5\) minutes when only \(20\%\) of clients participate and gossip is attached to roughly \(5\%\) of messages, suggesting that ordinary client communication can serve as a practical audit layer for KT.
A win for privacy. Google and Apple keeps their promises about End-to-End Encryption for RCS.
#Discord finally rolls out end-to-end #encryption by default for all voice and video calls

Discord has implemented end-to-end encryption by default for voice and video calls, using the DAVE protocol, enhancing user privacy. Stage channels and text messages are excluded from this rollout because of engineering challenges.
I don't know how well E2EE will benefit me if they are trying to surveil me in other ways.
Discord now has end-to-end encryption on all calls - Engadget
https://www.engadget.com/2177277/discord-now-has-end-to-end-encryption-on-all-calls/
https://www.xda-developers.com/discords-voice-and-video-calls-e2ee/
Discord now can use End-to-End-Encryption for video & audio calls.
Discord however says there are no plans to even try to add E2EE for text messages
(of course not, how do you think they make money? From Nitro subscriptions alone?)
🚨 NEWS: Discord Attiva la Crittografia End-to-End per Tutte le Chiamate Voice e Video: Una Svolta per la Privacy
Ecco i punti chiave in breve:
💡 La piattaforma di comunicazione Discord ha compiuto un passo storico per la privacy digitale, annunciando l'attivazione della crittografia end-to-end (E2EE) per tutte le chiamate v...
#crittografiaEndToEnd #discord #privacyChiamate #sicurezzaGaming #e2EE