Passend zum #did: "Tech-Konzerne denken nicht an einen sofortigen Stopp ihrer Überwachungsmaßnahmen. Google, Meta, Microsoft und die Snapchat-Mutter Snap kündigten am Samstag in einer gemeinsamen Erklärung an, dass sie „weiterhin freiwillige Maßnahmen ergreifen werden“, um entsprechendes Material auf ihren Plattformen zu identifizieren." (https://heise.de/-11245882)

Wechsle jetzt zur #europeanalternative welche deine privaten Nachrichten nicht scannt: https://twonly.eu/de/blog/05-diday.html

#Privacy #E2EE

Chatkontrolle: Tech-Riesen wollen trotz ausgelaufener EU-Regeln weiter scannen

Die Gesetzesbasis zur anlasslosen Suche nach Missbrauchsmaterial ist erloschen. Google, Meta Microsoft & Co. halten dennoch an der umstrittenen Praxis fest.

heise online

Today is again #did digital indipendence day.

Perfect opportunity to find a #europeanalternative to #googlephotos or #icloud and migrate your data somewhere safe.

We personally would never settle for something less than #e2ee, full native apps on android/ios and easy sharing with friends/family in original quality.

That's why we built #zeitkapsl.

#didit #degoogle #madeineu

When a CEO of a encrypted messaging app does this, after having vulnerabilities verified by trail of bits, run in the other direction:

'told 404 Media in a LinkedIn direct message: “The information is incorrect! The person who gave you the technical information has completely misled you. That person is not competent!”'

https://www.404media.co/a-secure-chat-apps-encryption-is-so-bad-it-is-meaningless/

#swisscows #e2ee #privacy #TeleGuard

A Secure Chat App’s Encryption Is So Bad It Is ‘Meaningless’

TeleGuard is an app downloaded more a million times that markets itself as a secure way to chat. The app uploads users’ private keys to the company’s server, and makes decryption of messages trivial.

404 Media
Proton Meet: Ende-zu-Ende verschlüsselte Videokonferenzen

Proton hat Meet vorgestellt, einen Videokonferenzdienst, der alle Gespräche Ende-zu-Ende verschlüsselt. Er ist kostenlos für bis zu 50 Teilnehmer.

heise online

Der Privatsphäre- & Sicherheits-Alptraum TeleGuard
Vertrauen verspielt?

https://digiprax.maniabel.work/archiv/1183

#messenger #teleguard #privacy #e2ee #Datenschutz #up2date

A Secure #Chat App’s #Encryption Is So Bad It Is ‘Meaningless’

TeleGuard, an app that markets itself as a secure, end-to-end encrypted messaging platform …implements its encryption so poorly that an attacker can trivially access a user’s private key & decrypt their messages,…#TeleGuard also uploads users’ private keys to a company server, … could decrypt its users’ messages, & the key can also at least partially be derived from simply intercepting a user’s traffic
#e2ee

https://www.404media.co/a-secure-chat-apps-encryption-is-so-bad-it-is-meaningless/

A Secure Chat App’s Encryption Is So Bad It Is ‘Meaningless’

TeleGuard is an app downloaded more a million times that markets itself as a secure way to chat. The app uploads users’ private keys to the company’s server, and makes decryption of messages trivial.

404 Media

Proton launched end-to-end encrypted video conferencing on March 31.

Proton Meet uses the open-source MLS protocol; even Proton can't access your calls. Free for up to 50 participants.

A real European alternative to Zoom and Teams, built in Switzerland.

https://builtineu.eu/news/proton-meet-encrypted-video-conferencing-europe-2026

#Privacy #Proton #E2EE #EUTech #VideoConferencing #ProtonMeet

Proton Meet Gives Europe a Zoom Alternative With Real Privacy

Proton launched end-to-end encrypted video conferencing. Proton Meet uses open-source MLS encryption and supports up to 50 free participants.

BuiltInEu
CW: discussion of child sexual abuse material in the context of EU legislation

I finally finished my deep dive into Chat Control and the various issues it has both legally and technically feel free to give it a read, or don't its a rather long piece at 7878 words ^^

https://vixen.moe/chat-control-the-technical-and-legal-case-against-mass-scanning/

#eu #law #chatcontrol #privacy #surveillance #security #ai #tech #datenschutz #e2ee
Chat Control: The Technical and Legal Case Against Mass Scanning

The EU is moving to make a temporary emergency measure permanent. The proportionality questions it was supposed to defer? Still unanswered.

Vixen

Wer hört mit und schaut zu? Falls jemensch ein Bedürfnis nach digitaler Souveränität verspürt, könnte der neue Proton-Service ProtonMeet eine Alternative zu BigTech sein.

Mehr dazu: https://digiprax.maniabel.work/archiv/1158

#digitalesouveränität #proton #protonmeet #privacy #e2ee #videocalls #up2date

Older paper but worth reading: "Our findings reveal that mechanisms embedded in modern E2EE messaging architectures – such as delivery receipts and multi-device support – can have significant implications on user privacy. Consequently, it is essential to balance functional requirements, usability and convenience with privacy and security, particularly in E2EE applications that are inherently privacy-sensitive per design."
https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.11194
#cybersecurity #carelesswhisper #E2EE #chat
Careless Whisper: Exploiting Silent Delivery Receipts to Monitor Users on Mobile Instant Messengers

With over 3 billion users globally, mobile instant messaging apps have become indispensable for both personal and professional communication. Besides plain messaging, many services implement additional features such as delivery and read receipts informing a user when a message has successfully reached its target. This paper highlights that delivery receipts can pose significant privacy risks to users. We use specifically crafted messages that trigger delivery receipts allowing any user to be pinged without their knowledge or consent. By using this technique at high frequency, we demonstrate how an attacker could extract private information such as the online and activity status of a victim, e.g., screen on/off. Moreover, we can infer the number of currently active user devices and their operating system, as well as launch resource exhaustion attacks, such as draining a user's battery or data allowance, all without generating any notification on the target side. Due to the widespread adoption of vulnerable messengers (WhatsApp and Signal) and the fact that any user can be targeted simply by knowing their phone number, we argue for a design change to address this issue.

arXiv.org