RT by @SwiftOnSecurity: ๐Ÿš€ ๐—ก๐—ฒ๐˜„ ๐—ถ๐—ป ๐— ๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐˜€๐—ผ๐—ณ๐˜ ๐——๐—ฒ๐—ณ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ ๐—ณ๐—ผ๐—ฟ ๐—ข๐—ณ๐—ณ๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐—ฒ 365

Security teams can now trigger key email remediation actionsโ€”๐—ฆ๐˜‚๐—ฏ๐—บ๐—ถ๐˜ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐— ๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐˜€๐—ผ๐—ณ๐˜, ๐—”๐—ฑ๐—ฑ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น๐—ผ๐˜„/๐—ฏ๐—น๐—ผ๐—ฐ๐—ธ ๐—น๐—ถ๐˜€๐˜, and ๐—œ๐—ป๐—ถ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ฒ ๐—ฎ๐˜‚๐˜๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—ถ๐—ป๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜๐—ถ๐—ด๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ปโ€”directly from the ๐—”๐—ฑ๐˜ƒ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—›๐˜‚๐—ป๐˜๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด interface.

No policy changes needed. Enabled by default since Nov 10, 2025.

Streamlined threat response, powered by your queries.

#MicrosoftDefender #AdvancedHunting #CyberSecurity #incidentresponse

๐Ÿฆ๐Ÿ”—: https://nitter.oksocial.net/0x534c/status/1988608813323411545#m

[2025/11/12 14:04]

Thought I'd start sharing some advanced hunting queries I run in Defender as part of my role.
I run the below when I need to figure out if any of the password spray attempts were successful.
I'll comment the 1st summarize statement and uncomment the 2nd while I filter out error codes.
When I get down to what I want to see I'll revert back and investigate individual sign in logs further to see what might be the cause of the error (e.g. excessive MFA prompt expiry on interactive logins).
I look out an for abnormally high count of a certain error against a user.
#KQL #Defender #AdvancedHunting #InfoSec

AADSignInEventsBeta
// ConditionalAccessStatus 0 == success, 1 == failure and 2 == Not apllied
// ConditionalAccessStatus 2, is expected for "bootstrap" scenarios in non-interactive sign-ins (some successful logins will show even if they would fail on CA policies, e.g. geo fencing)
// use https://login.microsoftonline.com/error to lookup error codes
|where AccountUpn contains "@PeterDodemont"
|where Country == "AU"
|where ErrorCode != "0" // successful login
|where ConditionalAccessStatus != "0"
|where ErrorCode != "70043" and ErrorCode != "700082" // expired token
|where ErrorCode != "50076" and ErrorCode != "50074" // MFA required
|where ErrorCode != "700084" // SPA token expired
|where ErrorCode != "70044" // Session Timeout
|summarize Count = count(), take_any (UserAgent,ClientAppUsed) by AccountUPN = tolower(AccountUpn),Country,LogonType,ConditionalAccessStatus,ErrorCode
//|summarize Count = count(), take_any (UserAgent,ClientAppUsed) by Country,LogonType,ConditionalAccessStatus,ErrorCode
|sort by Count desc

๐Ÿ“ข New blog out!

๐Ÿ’ก If you isolate an endpoint during IR, you probably don't have time to notify stakeholders like the help desk that might be reached out for troubleshooting by the user. This logic app is based on #KQL and identifies the isolation action, adds a tag for your #DefenderXDR portal and sends an email.

#MicrosoftSecurity #MicrosoftSentinel #MicrosoftDefender #LogicApps #MicrosoftAutomation #Automation #AdvancedHunting

https://www.michalos.net/2024/02/20/isolated-an-endpoint-automate-tag-adding-and-notifications/

Isolated an Endpoint? Automate tag adding and notifications

If you are part of a big organization, you might need to reach out to some colleagues and teams, in case you isolate an endpoint. An end user will probably reach out to your help desk in order to iโ€ฆ

Michalis Michalos
Investigating initial access in compromised email accounts using Microsoft 365 Defender

Introduction Fortra recently released a report indicating that business email compromise (BEC) attacks are at their zenith. Why not? As ENISA mentions in its 2022 Threat Landscape Report, financialโ€ฆ

Michalis Michalos

Stay ahead in the world of cybersecurity with the latest advancements in network protection! ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Microsoft Defender for Endpoint is continuously evolving to provide comprehensive security for your network environment.

๐Ÿ” New Signatures for SSL, DNS, and NTLM Protocols

We're excited to announce that we've added new signatures for SSL, DNS, and NTLM protocols. These signatures enhance our ability to detect and respond to potential threats, bolstering your network's defense against evolving cyberattacks.

๐Ÿšจ Deprecation of "NetworkSignaturesInspected" Signatures

Starting July 18, 2023, we will be deprecating a subset of signatures found in the "NetworkSignaturesInspected" action type of Advanced Hunting. Our integration with Zeek has led to more comprehensive network visibility, allowing us to consolidate signatures and provide you with a more streamlined experience.

๐Ÿš€ Zeek Integration Unleashes New Capabilities

Our integration with Zeek has revolutionized network threat detection. With Zeek's advanced protocol parsing capabilities, we now offer enhanced visibility into network sessions, enabling us to identify anomalies and threats more effectively. This empowers you to take proactive measures against potential breaches.

๐Ÿ”— Expanded Query Possibilities

The Zeek integration brings a wealth of opportunities for advanced hunting. From HTTP and SSH connections to ICMP and SSL sessions, you can now execute more intricate queries to uncover potential vulnerabilities and malicious activities.

๐Ÿ’ก Actionable Insights from Protocol Data

Whether it's identifying suspicious user agents, detecting file downloads from HTTP, or even spotting potential ping scans, our advanced hunting examples showcase the power of Zeek-based events in uncovering threats that might go unnoticed.

๐ŸŒ Leveraging SSL and DNS Insights

Our SslConnectionInspected and DnsConnectionInspected action types provide detailed information about SSL and DNS connections, both inbound and outbound. These insights allow you to monitor network activity and identify potential risks associated with these protocols.

๐Ÿ”’ Securing NTLM Traffic

The introduction of the NtlmAuthenticationInspected action type allows you to track NTLM authentication events on managed endpoints. This invaluable data aids in monitoring and securing NTLM traffic, ensuring a strong defense against unauthorized access.

Stay vigilant and up-to-date with these enhancements to Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. By harnessing the power of Zeek integration and these advanced action types, you're empowered to defend your network against even the most sophisticated threats.

https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-defender-for-endpoint/enrich-your-advanced-hunting-experience-using-network-layer/ba-p/3794693

#Cybersecurity #NetworkProtection #MicrosoftDefender #AdvancedHunting #ThreatDetection #zeek #edr #xdr #microsoft #azure #cloud #cloudnative

Enrich your advanced hunting experience using network layer signals from Zeek

Expand your investigation, hunting, and detection capabilities using a variety of Zeek-based events in advanced hunting.

TECHCOMMUNITY.MICROSOFT.COM

Discovering internet-facing devices using Microsoft Defender for Endpoint

MDE is expanding device discovery capabilities through our existing network telemetry and RiskIQ integration.

Find out how to discover your internet-facing devices through Microsoft 365 Defender portal and Advanced Hunting.

https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-defender-for-endpoint/discovering-internet-facing-devices-using-microsoft-defender-for/ba-p/3778975

#mde #edr #xdr #discovery #easm #riskiq #microsoftsecurity #microsoft365defender #advancedhunting #hunting #kql #soc #securityplatform #secops #network #discovery #microsoft #cloudsecurity

Discovering internet-facing devices using Microsoft Defender for Endpoint

Last year, we announced the evolution of the device inventory view in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. The revamped device inventory view gave SOC analysts visibility into all discovered devices, counts and functional features (such as, search) that enhanced the overall user experience. To build on ...

TECHCOMMUNITY.MICROSOFT.COM
So #zeek is officially part of #Defender now, I found the files on a few computers. But, to my major disappointment, you can't interact with the logs at all. Not that I'm finding, at least. I was hoping that I could export the logs into #Rita or #ACHunter but it's looking like I'll still have to install zeek a second time for that to happen. I can't even find the zeek logs in #AdvancedHunting...

Who has been clicking on Windows tray notifications & what's the url? #Defender #AdvancedHunting #malvertising

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("msedge.exe","chrome.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has ("--notification-launch-id")
| extend u=tostring(split(ProcessCommandLine,"|",4)[0])
| where u startswith "http"
| distinct u,AccountUpn,DeviceName,FileName,DeviceId