Youth activist abducted after opposing Constitutional Amendment Bill during public hearing - DCP says - NewZimbabwe.com

A youth activist and member of the Defend the Constitution Platform (DCP) Denford Sithole was allegedly abducted shortly after making a submission rejecting the proposed Constitutional Amendment Bill No. 3 during public hearings held at Nketa Hall on Monday. Sithole was allegedly taken soon after delivering what witnesses described as a confrontational presentation rejecting the […]

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The Mugabe Mixtape — The Anti-Imperialist Archive - Lemmy

Interviews between 1976 and 2003 with Robert Mugabe, the revolutionary socialist president of Zimbabwe who led the country until 2017. The collection, compiled by Ian Anderson [https://xcancel.com/starsalwayslost], features archival audio spanning Mugabe’s role during the Rhodesian conflict through the early decades of his post-independence leadership. Mugabe died in 2019, two years after stepping down.

Zimbabwe's 2023 Election: Dynamics, Candidates, and Implications for Democracy, the Economy, and International Relations — Afripoli [2023-08-22] - Lemmy

##### Introduction On 23 August 2023, Zimbabwe will have a general election to elect a President, Members of the Senate and the House of Assembly (HoA), and local authorities. Zimbabwe runs a mixed electoral system [https://www.zec.org.zw/the-electoral-system-in-zimbabwe/] where the President, 210 HoA members, and 1970 council seats are elected through a first-past-the-post system. Meanwhile, an additional 60 female members of the HoA, 60 senators, 10 youths, and +/-590 women (30% of local authority seats) are elected through a party-list proportional representation system. An additional 20 senators will be drawn from traditional chiefs (18) and people with a disability (2). The presidential election also has a provision for a run-off election on 2 October. It kicks in if no presidential candidate garners an absolute majority (50% plus one vote). The election has attracted significant international interest because of the violent turn of the 2018 election and global economic interests, especially associated with the just energy transition, on account of Zimbabwe’s vast strategic mineral wealth. However, locally, the election’s run-up processes have been relatively muted and arguably less vibrant than past elections due to limited civil society engagement with the process, and citizens’ limited hope that elections can change things in the country. During the tenure of the late Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe made headlines for disputed elections and allegations of undermining democratic processes. Since Mugabe’s fall from power in 2017 and the emergence of a new dispensation amidst a violent post-election period, there is value in tracing how far the country has moved from the brink and assessing whether a new democratic dispensation is on the horizon. The 2023 election provides an interesting test for Zimbabwe’s democratic progress or lack thereof. It is an opportunity for the country to “show and tell” the world the “progress” made around electoral and political reforms and enhance Zimbabwe’s place in re-engagement processes and conversations. The Zimbabwe government and ZANU-PF are intent on shaking off a stubborn pariah status characterised by sanctions, limited diplomatic engagements, and suppressed foreign direct investment. How the election pans out both in terms of processes and outcomes could determine whether Zimbabwe is ready to return to democratic norm compliance, in the process lending a huge amount of legitimacy, locally and abroad, to the state and those presiding over it. ##### Who Are the Contenders? The composition of candidates for the 2023 election was subject to several court cases [https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-07-30-heavy-handed-judiciary-could-make-zimbabwes-elections-a-non-event/] meant to eliminate on technical grounds at least 12 opposition Member of Parliament candidates, three opposition presidential candidates, and many councillors from the ballot. Following the resolution of most cases [https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/7209767.html], the election pits 18 political parties [https://www.herald.co.zw/zec-declares-readiness-for-credible-free-polls/] against each other across the board, 4648 Council candidates, 582 candidates vying for the 210 HoA seats, and 11 vying for the presidency. These numbers are lower than the 2018 races, with 23 presidential candidates and 49 political parties. The presidential ballot will feature one woman, Elisabeth Valerio of the United Zimbabwe Alliance [https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/elisabeth-valerio-becomes-sole-woman-in-presidential-election/7187427.html], down from four in 2018, with only 70 women vying for the 210 HoA seats, down from 237 out of 1648 candidates in 2018. There is also a decline in voting intentions, with Afrobarometer estimating that only 67% of registered voters intend to vote [https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/AD630-Zimbabweans-look-to-policy-choices-in-upcoming-election-Afrobarometer-11april23.pdf] on 23 August, down from close to 80% (77%) in 2018 [https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/zim_r7_presentation_07062018.pdf]. In addition, the new constituency and ward boundaries also mean that many voters may go to the wrong polling station on voting day and may not be able to vote. The presidential electoral contest pits the ruling ZANU-PF party, which has ironically claimed Goliath status [https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/92215-we-are-as-big-as-goliath-we-will-crush-nelson-chamisas-ccc-like-lice-vp-chiwenga-vows.html], against a nascent opposition, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC). ZANU-PF has forwarded 80-year-old lawyer Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emmerson_Mnangagwa], who hopes to maintain the 60-year-old party’s unbroken hold on power since independence in 1980. The CCC, a party launched in February 2022, has deployed 45-year-old lawyer and pastor Nelson Chamisa [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nelson_Chamisa], who hopes to start a new winning chapter for opposition politics in Zimbabwe after doing away with the legacy and identity of his mother party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), formed in 1999 but afflicted by splits and allegations of capture by ZANU-PF. In the 2018 election, Mnangagwa officially got 50.8% of the vote to Chamisa’s 44%. Chamisa disputed this result, with the incumbent eventually claiming the presidency through a refereeing decision of the Constitutional Court [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/8/24/zimbabwe-court-rejects-opposition-bid-to-annul-election-results]. The period leading up to the 2018 elections was characterised [https://www.veritaszim.net/observer-reports] by a peaceful atmosphere and unrestricted political engagement. However, the legitimacy of the election was compromised [https://www.nangozim.org/publications/gunning-down-people-legitimacy-and-hope-forward-to-the-past/] shortly after its conclusion. This occurred due to the actions of soldiers who caused the death of six people [https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/03/zimbabwe-least-6-dead-post-election-violence] and injured at least 35 others in the aftermath of post-election demonstrations. The 2023 elections are a high-stakes game offering redemption and opportunities for internal power consolidation and legitimacy for both the leading contenders. Mnangagwa, whose party is said to be rife with factionalism [https://www.theafricareport.com/215009/zimbabwe-mnangagwa-braces-for-potential-challenge-from-his-vp-chiwenga/], will be keen to show that he is the undisputed “one centre of power” and can achieve an uncontested victory and perform just as well or better than his party, which had more votes than him in 2018. Chamisa seeks to prove his claims made in 2018 of being the preferred candidate by winning the 2023 presidency. However, 2023 is a sterner test for Chamisa, who has been accused of limiting internal democracy [https://www.zimeye.net/2022/09/09/critical-reflections-on-nelson-chamisas-leadership-style-and-approach-justice-mavedzenge/] and accountability. A dismal performance on 23 August 2023 may bring further difficulties for him and his inner circle, especially after suspicions that he deliberately sidelined senior figures [https://www.herald.co.zw/biti-ncube-snub-chamisa/] to create space for loyalists. Chamisa will be banking on a decisive victory or clear rigging to save his new party from splitting as its predecessor, the MDC, did after almost every election. Like Mnangagwa, win or lose, Chamisa will use the 2023 election as a building plank for a post-election and post-MDC era in Zimbabwe’s politics. Chamisa may use any attempts at criticising or removing him from the helm of CCC to disarm internal party opponents and replace them with a more supportive entourage. APRI Elections Hub #### Explore all APRI’s Insights in Africa’s ongoing Elections ##### Campaign Platforms, Strategy, and Issues Mnangagwa and Chamisa are relatively new hands in presidential politics, maturing as party alphas and distrusting traditional party structures. Mnangagwa has kept senior ZANU-PF office bearers and structures in check by supporting the emergence of presidential support groups called the “4ED” movement. These groups include openly partisan private voluntary associations such as Forever Associates Zimbabwe (FAZ) [https://faztrust.com/], Lawyers4ED [https://www.herald.co.zw/lawyers-4ed-launched-challenged-to-advance-development/], Young Women 4ED [https://www.herald.co.zw/young-women-for-ed-marks-first-anniversary/], MenBelievED, and others, including Teachers, Internet Trolls (Varakashi), Touts, and Prophets. This strategy is already causing discomfort amongst formal ZANU-PF party structures [https://www.newsday.co.zw/local-news/article/200001402/parallel-structures-split-zanu-pf], which Mnangagwa has tried to dispel by providing over 800 all-terrain vehicles [https://www.newsday.co.zw/thestandard/news/article/200011865/zanu-pf-splashes-on-800-more-cars] and distributing them across constituencies in addition to rumoured USD20,000, 4000 litres of fuel and 17,000 sets of caps, bandanas, and t-shirts per constituency. Mnangagwa is running a campaign that banks on ZANU-PF’s overall performance, especially at the parliamentary level, through a chasing and mobilising strategy [http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/4142/] to support his presidential bid. For his part, Chamisa has not created parallel structures but has done away entirely with “old-fashioned” traditional party structures [https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/we-dont-do-structures-chamisa/] as part of his strategic ambiguity approach to keep political opponents guessing, stem infiltration, and build a new citizen-based winning coalition for the CCC. However, critics accuse Chamisa of using strategic ambiguity, as a red-herring and an ambiguous strategic [https://www.chronicle.co.zw/zimbabwes-opposition-politics-a-case-of-strategic-ambiguity-or-an-ambiguous-strategy/] void, which he can manipulate without party members’ popular and legitimate participation. Chamisa is primarily running a presidential campaign and has extensively targeted perceived ZANU-PF strongholds through his rural mobilisation strategy, called Mugwazo [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=idEUW4v-Now], and using “change champions” comprising ward coordinators, household, street, and village champions [https://hararepost.co.zw/ar/the-news/local-news/6418-ccc-to-establish-street-champions], citizens caucuses, and stakeholder consultations [https://allafrica.com/stories/202304030114.html]. Mnangagwa’s and Chamisa’s foci on rural areas and new ways of organising may yield positive results because, although Chamisa has his base amongst youths and urbanites and Mnangagwa would want some urban presence, youths, and urbanites do not vote [https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/young-zimbabweans-far-less-likely-than-their-elders-to-be-registered-and-to-intend-to-vote-in-2023/] as much as their older rural counterparts. However, unlike ZANU-PF, the CCC has struggled to raise campaign resources, relying on diaspora-driven crowdfunding and various candidate efforts to fundraise independently. This approach puts them out of the patronage and clientelist politics race in the rural areas and may cost the CCC seats in places where ZANU-PF is investing heavily in chasing campaign programmes, patronage, and clientelist politics, like Cowdry Park [https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/analysis-zim-elections-prof-mthuli-ncube-brings-out-big-guns-in-star-rally-20230802] in Bulawayo and Mabvuku Tafara [https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-233613.html] in Harare. ##### Framing the Contest: A new great Zimbabwe versus delivering the Zimbabwe you want The leading candidates’ campaign tactics are mainly unchanged from 2018 [https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90965/1/Lewanika_ZimElections2018_Author.pdf]. The CCC is banking on Chamisa’s charisma. It continues the “Touch Me, See Me, Feel Me” strategy, where Chamisa makes impromptu and seemingly unscripted stops in traffic [https://iharare.com/watch-zanu-pf-driver-thrilled-after-greeting-ccc-leader-nelson-chamisa-in-traffic/] and at centres to meet the people. Chamisa has deployed beguiling tales that frame ZANU-PF and Mnangagwa as failures that have led the country to poverty, unemployment, and millions fleeing [https://www.voanews.com/a/zimbabwe-opposition-leader-launches-campaign-with-promise-of-prosperity-/7183046.html]. He has been selling the vision of a “New Great Zimbabwe [https://www.zimeye.net/2023/08/09/download-ccc-manifesto-a-new-great-zimbabwe-blueprint/]” with God and citizens at the centre [https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2023/08/placing-god-at-the-centre-of-bid-for-presidency-chamisa-lays-out-plan/] and visions of an inclusive 100 Billion dollar economy in ten years. Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF have also been framing the opposition as clueless and inept toddlers [https://www.herald.co.zw/president-tells-off-daydreaming-political-toddlers/] who have failed to run urban councils, leading to the government declaring a state of disaster on waste management in Harare [https://www.herald.co.zw/harare-waste-management-declared-state-of-disaster/]. He has also been highlighting his performance during the five years he has been President and distributing largesse at rallies, including party regalia and fast food. He has been touting the state’s various infrastructure development projects [https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/live-blog-zanu-pf-harare-metropolitan-star-rally], including road, interchange, airport construction, Lithium processing plants [https://www.africanews.com/2023/07/06/chinese-mining-company-opens-lithium-processing-plant-in-zimbabwe/], and normative stability in the economy [https://www.herald.co.zw/economy-on-right-track-mthuli/], and restraining the black-market forex trade. ZANU-PF has yet to release an official manifesto, arguing that its work is the manifesto [https://www.chronicle.co.zw/our-work-is-our-manifesto-zanu-pf/] and framing Mnangagwa as a man of action rather than words. ZANU-PF’s campaign efforts have been a shameless show of incumbency’s power, giving it a clear advantage and opportunities to abuse state resources and leverage state projects as ZANU-PF achievements. The issues that both candidates have been focusing on are resonant with the public. According to Afrobarometer [https://www.afrobarometer.org/countries/zimbabwe/], the Brenthurst Foundation [https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/publications/survey-of-voter-opinion-zimbabwe/], and Public Policy Research Institute Zimbabwe (PPRIZ), [https://zw.linkedin.com/in/public-policy-and-research-institute-of-zimbabwe-b0a336266] leading issues for citizens include the economy, corruption, unemployment, infrastructure development, and electricity and water supply. ##### Does the Opposition Stand a Chance? The electoral field favours the ruling party because it controls critical institutions such as the police, the judiciary, public media, and government coffers, in addition to allegations of a Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) capture by ZANU-PF [https://nehandaradio.com/2023/01/23/zec-remains-captured-continues-to-work-as-an-appendage-of-zanu-pf/]. Nonetheless, the 2023 election still presents an opportunity for Chamisa, who lost the 2018 presidential election by 30,000 votes, to capture the presidency despite some tactics used to frustrate his party. A poll by the Brenthurst Foundation shows 53% of respondents favouring Nelson Chamisa and 40% supporting Emmerson Mnangagwa. However, on 10 July 2023, the more popular Afrobarometer released survey results that indicated a 7% decline in Chamisa’s support (27% down from 35% in 2022) and a 2% increase for Mnangagwa (35% up from 33%). This difference places the incumbent eight percentage points ahead of his primary challenger. The best chance of an opposition victory lies in persuading the undeclared block of voters captured in the 26% of respondents who refused to share their preferences for the presidential elections during the Afrobarometer survey. Most of these are urban, and many are opposition sympathisers who refrain from stating their intentions for fear of victimisation. Chamisa’s “mango” strategy, where he has been encouraging people to go along with ZANU-PF (green on the outside) to avoid victimisation and missing out on hand-outs during the campaign but vote CCC on election day (yellow on the inside), may capture this vote. A lot will depend on turn-out strategies; ZANU-PF is adept at turn-out buying and driving, especially in rural areas where many voters are coerced and “assisted” to vote. Low voter turnout will advantage Mnangagwa’s ZANU-PF unless Chamisa and the CCC stage a miracle of turning out urban voters during a relatively low-interest election. But as in the David and Goliath story, sometimes all that is needed is a political sling and stones to fell a giant; Chamisa will have to find these quickly as events in the election run-up indicate that he may not have enough ammunition. ##### Local (dis)Interest, State of Play, and the Possibilities of Apathy ahead of the Election Locally, the election period has been muted and characterised by limited to no civil society voter education and voter mobilisation, concerns about the political environment, decreases in electoral competition, inclusive politics, and citizens’ voting intentions. Limited civil society engagement in the 2023 elections has been due to a myriad of challenges, including shrinking civic space [https://monitor.civicus.org/country/zimbabwe/], resource challenges, late or no accreditation of civil society organisations to conduct voter education and the disciplining effect of repressive legislation such as the Patriotic Act [https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/07/zimbabwe-presidents-signing-of-patriotic-bill-a-brutal-assault-on-civic-space/] and the Private Voluntary Organizations Amendment Bill [https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-01-23-zimbabwean-government-passes-law-designed-to-throttle-independent-civil-society/]. Both legislations impede freedoms of association, assembly, and expression, with the latter threatening deregistration and excessive executive control of the sector. Zimbabwe’s 2023 election has also been highly uncertain procedurally, including around candidates, and very litigious throughout the electoral cycle, leading to opposition and civil society concerns [https://www.crisiszim.org/post/open-letter-to-president-mnangagwa] about whether the playing field is even. Allegations abound of the routinisation of procedural uncertainty to manipulate the election in subtle ways, such as urban voter suppression during registration [https://www.newsday.co.zw/local-news/article/17088/rgs-office-frustrating-urban-voters-ccc], doubtful integrity of the voter’s roll [https://www.theafricareport.com/294068/zimbabwe-errors-in-voters-roll-could-derail-the-election/], disputed delimitation processes [https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2023/02/chigumba-resists-political-pressure-over-delimitation/], and banning [https://www.theafricareport.com/315335/zimbabwe-police-ban-92-ccc-opposition-party-campaign-rallies/] and disrupting opposition canvassing [https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/zimbabwes-opposition-party-claims-supporter-stoned-death-ruling-101992056]. In addition, the 2023 election has been distinctive in using exclusionary financial, administrative, regulatory, and legal tactics to further tilt the electoral race in the ruling party’s favour. Financially, the fees gazetted for presidential and parliamentary races, at USD 20,000 and USD 1000 (up from USD 1000 and USD 50), respectively, were exorbitant and exclusionary, posing significant barriers to political participation [https://accountabilitylab.org/zec-petitioned-over-exorbitant-candidate-nomination-fees/#%3A%7E%3Atext=The+nomination+fees%2C+as+per%2CParliament+and+Provincial+Councils+are], particularly for marginalised groups such as young people, women, and persons with disabilities. Only ZANU-PF and CCC were able to field full slates of candidates. ##### The International Community and Zimbabwe’s Interests: 2023 elections geopolitical implications Although it has not been proclaimed at rallies during the campaign, the 2023 election is crucial to Zimbabwe’s efforts to re-engage with the Western-led international community and shake off a stubborn pariah status characterised by sanctions, limited diplomatic engagements, and suppressed foreign direct investment. Zimbabwe has been attempting to re-establish cordial relations with the UK, EU, USA, and other Western states and have critical individuals and companies removed from the sanctions list [https://allafrica.com/stories/202202230091.html]s. It has also sought to rejoin the Commonwealth [http://www.zim.gov.zw/index.php/en/news-room/vision-2030/483-commonwealth-speeds-up-zim-readmission] and is in the middle of an African Development Bank (AFDB)-led multi-stakeholder debt and arrears clearance process [https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/zimbabwe-hosts-fourth-structured-dialogue-platform-arrears-clearance-and-debt-resolution-process-61076], which places it in conversation with its debtors over its +17 USD billion debt but has both economic and governance-related issues on the agenda. Even less spoken about in this election but remarkably prescient for the future is the global critical minerals’ race and Zimbabwe’s attempt to build a USD 100-billion-dollar economy [https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2018/06/zimbabwe-opposition-pledges-100b-economy-if-it-wins-vote/] in ten years if Chamisa wins and achieve an upper middle-income economy by 2030 [https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/10/12/achieving-zimbabwe-s-vision-2030-will-require-significant-acceleration-of-productivity-growth] if ZANU-PF is still in charge. Zimbabwe sits on vast mineral reserves, including minerals critical to the clean energy transition, such as Chromium, Nickel, Coal, Platinum, and Lithium [https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/critical-minerals-to-the-rescue-zambia-and-zimbabwe-implement-divergent-policies-amid-climate-upheaval/]. Zimbabwe’s Lithium, where the country is the world’s fifth largest producer despite modest investments, is a significant part of what Zimbabwe will bank on for its development [https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/zimbabwe-bets-on-lithium-to-boost-mining-sector-and-economy/4y8304h] in the next five to 10 years. Yet its significant buyers, beyond the Chinese, are Western countries, especially EU members, the US, and Japan [https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/ALL/year/2019/tradeflow/Imports/partner/WLD/product/283691]. Despite most of these players’ needs, it will take much work for them to justify to their local constituents’ engagement with a rogue regime with contested legitimacy. The preceding makes the 2023 election a crucial opportunity for Zimbabwe to show the world that it has gone over the bend of violent and undemocratic politics. To witness this, Zimbabwe has invited an unprecedented 50+ international media houses and over 60 election observer missions [https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/over-60-foreign-observer-missions-invited-for-elections], including 46 countries, to observe and report on the elections. Despite the rhetoric around being anti-West and broaching no interference, this move by the Mnangagwa regime seeks to communicate its openness and willingness to engage as part of righting Zimbabwe’s image in the West. However, this invitation has not been an open check as the government has cherry-picked observers, denying accreditation to both international and local observers they deemed acrimonious. The substantial foreign interest and presence at the 2023 elections place a reputational burden on ZANU-PF, Mnangagwa, and the ZEC to stage a clean-enough election to keep re-engagement processes with the international community and the AFDB-led multi-stakeholder debt and arrears clearance process [https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/zimbabwe-hosts-fourth-structured-dialogue-platform-arrears-clearance-and-debt-resolution-process-61076] alive and to pave the way for more clients for its critical minerals. The 2023 elections and expected judgments by election observers about credibility, freeness, and fairness will be crucial to Zimbabwe’s bilateral and multilateral engagements and geopolitical interests post-election. ##### About the Author avatar [https://lemmy.ml/api/v3/image_proxy?url=https%3A%2F%2Fafripoli.org%2Fuploads%2Fprofile%2F202308%2Favatar_86_64e47461e02b4.jpg] Dr. McDonald Lewanika is a political scientist with over 20 years of experience working on governance and development issues in Zimbabwe. He is the Regional Director for Southern Africa at Accountability Lab and researches African politics, election campaigns, governance, and accountability issues.

Lithium Mining and National Economic Development in Zimbabwe — Afripoli [2024-09-18] - Lemmy

Too long to embed > Zimbabwe holds the largest lithium reserves in Africa and ranks fifth globally, positioning it to potentially benefit from the global clean energy transition. The paper examines the dynamics of a recent “lithium fever” driven by Chinese investment, noting that major acquisitions include the US$422 million Arcadia Mine deal and Sinomine’s US$180 million purchase of Bikita Minerals. While the government’s Vision 2030 and National Development Strategy (NDS1) aim to leverage mineral wealth for upper-middle-income status, the study identifies significant challenges: corruption in mining lease allocations, illicit financial flows, and the exclusion of local artisanal miners in favor of foreign syndicates. A 2022 ban on raw lithium exports was intended to promote local beneficiation, but the paper notes exemptions for politically connected companies. “Resource endowments alone cannot be a basis for broad-based development,” the authors conclude, recommending tighter tax regimes, technology transfer requirements, and regional collaboration on battery manufacturing to avoid the “resource curse” that has plagued other African extractive economies.

SADC Sustainable Energy Week opens in Zimbabwe — CGTN [2026-02-24] - Lemmy

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Sustainable Energy Week kicked off on Monday in Zimbabwe’s resort city of Victoria Falls, with calls to promote renewable energy and energy efficiency. Running through Friday, the event, themed “Driving Regional Economic Growth through Clean Energy and Energy Efficiency,” will bring together stakeholders in the energy sector, including regional institutions, government agencies, private sector players, academia, and development partners, to strengthen regional cooperation in the sector. In his opening remarks, Zimbabwean Minister of Energy and Power Development July Moyo said there is a need for combined efforts to expand renewable energy in the southern African region. “We need to strengthen our regulatory systems by synchronizing laws, tariffs, and the application of systems,” Moyo said. The region is grappling with the challenge of expanding renewable energy, he said, adding that both the public and private sectors have a major role to play in addressing it. “Energy efficiency plays an important role in ensuring adequate supply to productive users of energy. Our machinery in industry, in mining, and across the entire economy must be energy efficient if we are going to realize the benefits of the available energy resources in our countries,” Moyo added. SADC is a regional economic community comprising 16 member states: Angola, Botswana, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe’s education was once the envy of Africa. Not anymore — African Arguments [2022-11-02] - Lemmy

::: spoiler Expand article ### Educators during the country’s post-independence golden age wanted for nothing. Today’s teachers say they barely scrape by. Zimbabwe education in turmoil [https://lemmy.ml/api/v3/image_proxy?url=https%3A%2F%2Fafricanarguments.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2022%2F11%2FGPJNews_Zimbabwe_EC_TeacherIncentives_042_L-e1667387046608.jpg] Local parent Sinikiwe Masola, right, takes time out to help her neighbours’ children, Christina Mutavire, left, and Munashe Maringahosi, complete the day’s school lesson at their home in Mutare, Zimbabwe. Credit: Evidence Chenjerai/GPJ. It wasn’t just his well-fitted suit, the crisp shirt, and the neatly paired tie that caught everyone’s attention. When Amos Mawoyo walked through the rural areas of Imbeza, a timber estate in the Eastern Highlands of Zimbabwe [https://africanarguments.org/category/african-arguments/country/southern/zimbabwe/], almost everyone looked at him in awe. Some offered to carry his bag, others stopped just to greet him. The villagers referred to him as Teacher Mawoyo, just like “the British confer an honorary title of Sir to highly esteemed people”, he recalls. Back then, with his salary as a teacher, he could afford a car, a house, all the necessities of a comfortable life and even to send his children to boarding schools – the equivalent of today’s rather expensive private schools. That was Zimbabwe in the 1980s and ’90s. Today, the retired teacher says, “I see young teachers milling around during working hours far from their schools”. Instead, they work part-time jobs that have nothing to do with teaching. When he asks why, “they say that this pays them better than going to work”. Frustrations over pay and workload have resulted in a standoff between teachers and the government. Teachers went on strike for more than two weeks in early February, demanding salaries two to three times more than what they earn. They returned to work after the government offered a 20% salary increase and other incentives, including payment of school fees for up to three biological children per teacher. But months later, even as schools opened for the third and final term of the school year on 5 Sept, the government’s promises are yet to be fulfilled, teachers say. For a country that held education as one of its topmost priorities after becoming independent in 1980 and has since been among the most literate nations in Africa, Zimbabwe today is in the middle of a crisis with the torchbearers of this sector feeling disillusioned and undervalued. “People are back at work fearing victimisation and salary cuts,” teacher Leonard Mabasa says. “The ugly difference [of salaries compared] with other fellow civil servants is further dampening the spirit of poor teachers. The morale is at its lowest ebb.” Teacher Danny Malingeni says that he and his colleagues do go to work, but they are not really teaching children. “They show up at schools, but not much teaching is done in the classes…due to frustration over remuneration and other welfare packages.” The pay dispute began in late-2018 when teacher salaries were drastically reduced following the country’s switch back to local currency after almost a decade of using the US dollar. In 2009, the government – in an attempt to salvage an economy experiencing extreme hyperinflation – abandoned the old Zimbabwean dollar and adopted a multicurrency system that included the US dollar. The return to a single-currency system with a rebooted Zimbabwean dollar sparked another rise in inflation, effectively reducing the teachers’ wages. And inflation has only skyrocketed further since then. “As long as inflation is rising, your real purchasing power keeps eroding,” says economist Prosper Chitambara, of the Labour and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe, a nonprofit research think tank. “This has been happening in Zimbabwe over the past couple of decades — which is how the real incomes of teachers have eroded.” Frustrations over pay and workload have resulted in a standoff between teachers and the government. In Zimbabwe, a teacher earns less than $100 per month based on an unofficial exchange rate that is widely used for goods and services in the country. Teachers are demanding they be paid in US dollars and not Zimbabwean dollars, where the official exchange rate fluctuates daily. Currently, Zimbabwe uses two main currencies, the US dollar and the Zimbabwean dollar. Teachers are paid in Zimbabwean dollars, except for coronavirus-related allowances that are paid in U. dollars. It is important to put pressure on the government to return the teaching profession’s historic pride, Chitambara says, which can only happen if teachers get paid as well as they did in the past. “Zimbabwe has nurtured many astute academics globally, and it is the education sector from the 1980s that we owe the production of such brains to,” he says. “To have quality education just like in the old days, remuneration issues must be addressed.” The literacy rate in Zimbabwe is about 91%, according to a 2019 household survey conducted by the national statistics office and UNICEF. That’s far above the average rate of 66% for the sub-Saharan Africa region. The achievement dates to Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, when the newly elected government promised free and compulsory primary and secondary education to all children to redress the imbalances of the colonial educational system that excluded black pupils. To achieve this goal of universal education, teachers were immediately in high demand. Since then, education has become less of a priority. Even in 2015, education still accounted for 22% of the country’s total budget; but by 2021, it was 13%, according to a 2021 UNICEF report. The recommended level is 20%. Even so, education expenses far exceed budget. In fact, budget overruns have widened since 2018, according to the report. In 2020, there was a 99% budget overrun. High inflation and the dwindling value of the local dollar were cited as the main reasons. Beyond the numbers, the impasse also threatens the future of the children of Zimbabwe. Final exams that determine university and class placements are given during the third term. And a year of learning was already lost due to school closures during the coronavirus pandemic. Some parents have paid for private tutors but not everyone can afford the hired help on top of regular school fees. Sinikiwe Masola says she had to have her child repeat a grade after he scored badly. “Government needs to realise every person’s career goes through the hands of a teacher, and if they are unhappy, an entire generation’s future suffers,” she says. Education officials insist the government is working for the welfare of the children and has already offered several incentives to the teachers. “The ministry is there to provide quality, relevant and inclusive education for all Zimbabweans, and has provided a vast array of incentives [for teachers] such as allowances for pandemic, housing, transport and duty-free importation of motor vehicles,” says Taungana Ndoro, director of Communications and Advocacy for the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education. “There’s no strike,” he says. “It’s just wishful thinking by teachers’ union leadership.” Even though the teachers are back to work, Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe president Takavafira Zhou says “their patience has been overstretched, and anything can happen as teachers do not have money to report for work daily”. Mawoyo, the retired teacher, was among those who enjoyed the golden period for educators in the country. But in 2019, when he realized how everything was changing, he decided to seek an early retirement – a decision he doesn’t regret. “The pension is not much, but it is money that is coming while I am sitting at home,” he says. “The amount is almost like what those going to work today are getting. They need to pay for the transport to work, lunch and other things from their salary’s money. I realised I was better off at home.” — This story was originally published by Global Press Journal [https://globalpressjournal.com/africa/zimbabwe/riches-rags-zimbabwe-education-story/]. Global Press is an award-winning international news publication with more than 40 independent news bureaus across Africa, Asia and Latin America. ::: > Details of the decline of Zimbabwe’s education system from a post-independence golden age—when teachers like Amos Mawoyo “could afford a car, a house, all the necessities” and were treated with the reverence of a “Sir”—to a present crisis where real wages have collapsed and morale is “at its lowest ebb.” Teachers earn less than $100 per month under an unofficial exchange rate, and while the literacy rate remains high at 91% (above sub-Saharan Africa’s 66% average), education’s share of the national budget fell from 22% in 2015 to 13% by 2021, far below the recommended 20%. A 2021 UNICEF report noted a 99% budget overrun in 2020 due to inflation and currency devaluation. Teachers report showing up to work but “not much teaching is done in the classes… due to frustration over remuneration.” Economist Prosper Chitambara warns that “to have quality education just like in the old days, remuneration issues must be addressed,” while parents like Sinikiwe Masola caution that “if they are unhappy, an entire generation’s future suffers.”

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