“The metaphors we use deliver us hope, or they foreclose possibility”*…

It feels only too clear that the global order that defined geopolitics, geoeconomics, and life in the world’s constituent parts is changing fundamentally. But what lies on the other side of this change? It’s a sucker’s bet to try to predict that outcome with any precision; there’s just too much fundamental uncertainty. As Antonio Gramsci said (of another era, though he might have been describing ours): “The old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born: now is the time of monsters.”

Still, it’s important that we try. It’s only by wrestling with what’s going on to determine what’s possible, then what’s desirable, that we can shape a future in which we want to live.

The models and metaphors that we use are key to that wrestling. Our natural inclinations seem to tend in one of two directions. Either we tweak the models we have to try to accomodate the change that we see… which seems to work until (given that the change just keeps on coming) it doesn’t. Or we flip to the opposite– we imaging that everything simply falls apart. In geopolitical/geoeconomic terms, we assume that we get an incrementally-revised version of the world order that we’ve known; or we imagine dissolution (into what tends to be called a “multi-polar” world)… neither of which imagines materially different world orders that, as hard as they are to describe, are entirely plausible. Part of our problem in visualizing those new orders is our lack of models and metaphors for them…

The two pieces featured here posit frameworks and metaphors that, while they may or may not prove to be “accurate” in any comprehensive way, can help us open our thinking, and model the ways in which fresh metaphors can help us see problems anew and find new solutions.

First a piece from Trine Flockhart, from the Global (Dis)Order International Policy Programme of the British Academy and The Carnegoe Endowment for International Peace, part of a recent book)…

Is global order a thing of the past? Is the liberal international order fraying and what is
happening to previously stable alliances and cooperative relationships such as the
transatlantic relationship or the relationship between the United States and Canada? Not
such a long time ago, these questions would have been regarded as alarmist, but today the
prospect of large-scale order transformation is part and parcel of daily debates. This rupture
is probably as important as the transformation that followed the end of the Second World War,
and together with the simultaneous transformations in technology and science, the impact
on people and societies may well be on par with the Industrial Revolution. As Gramsci wrote
from his prison cell, we live ‘in times of monsters’ where ‘the old world is dying and the new one
struggles to be born’(Gramsci & Buttigieg 1992). In these circumstances, we see the political
consequences in populist parties as voters seek certainty in an uncertain and turbulent world,
whilst policymakers struggle to find their feet in the emerging world and seek to manage the
fallout from the ending of the old world.

To ensure that the policy decisions of today are relevant for the geopolitical reality of tomorrow,
policymakers must have a clear sense about the likely outcome of the ongoing transformation
– in other words what kind of global order will be in place and what kind of relationships can
be expected within it? These are big and complex questions that have no easy answers, yet
many scholars and policy practitioners seem to already have their answer – the world will be
multipolar (Ashford 2023; Bekkevold 2023; Borrell 2021). At least anecdotally, it seems there
is widespread agreement that the international system is transforming from a unipolar system
anchored in American hegemony, to a multipolar system reflecting the shift of power to a larger
number of states. However, although the idea that the international system will be multipolar
is persuasive, and although the use of analytical concepts such as polarity can be useful for
gaining an overview of complex matters, we must be aware that polarity as a concept rests on
a specific form of analysis that tends to emphasize states, sameness, power and interest, and
which is only partially sighted when it comes to values, identities, lesser powers and complexity.
I worry that the focus on multipolarity, means that policymakers are trying to understand the
current order transformation through conceptual lenses that are blurred and not very relevant.

This article presents a different position. It starts from the counterintuitive position that
it is logically implausible for the global ordering architecture to return to an international
system that was in place a century ago. Those suggesting that we are currently witnessing
a return to multipolarity emphasise shifts in the global distribution of power and the rising
number of powerful states, most notably China. These are certainly important changes, but
The arrival of the multi-order world and its geopolitical implications
other important changes are overlooked, which suggest a fundamentally different global
ordering architecture is in the making. Continuing to portray the world as multipolar belies the
complexity, significance, and extent of many other important changes. This paper presents an
alternative interpretation of the ongoing global order transformation, demonstrating why it will
be neither bipolar nor multipolar but rather multi-order.

A multi-order world is a global ordering architecture consisting of several international orders.
Gramsci was right that order transformations take time, so the multi-order architecture is still
in development, but can be glimpsed through the existence of three independent international
orders already clearly visible within the global ordering architecture – the American-led liberal
international order (albeit that American leadership under Trump is currently in question),
the Russian-led Eurasian order, and the Chinese-led Belt and Road order.1 Other orders and
other forms of relationships of importance are also in the making suggesting a more complex
architecture than a multipolar one. The paper does not claim to present a full picture of the
emerging ordering architecture but seeks merely to demonstrate the importance of embracing
new thinking to contemplate the possibility of an entirely new form of international system
in which multiple international orders with very different dynamics and different behavioural
patterns make up the global ordering architecture. The perspective brings into light important
relationships and dynamics that are not readily apparent in the multipolar perspective –
especially that relationships within orders are just as important as relations between different
international orders, and it leaves room for considering other aspects than powershifts and for
acknowledging the importance of other actors than just a handful of “pole states”. I argue that
awareness of the subtle differences between the multi-order architecture and more traditional
polarity-based understandings is an essential first step towards timely strategic policymaking
fit for the multi-order world.

The paper proceeds in four moves. First, I outline three significant events over the past four
years which only partially fit the polarity-based narrative. Second, I outline the multi-order
perspective by focusing on order as a condition, a social domain, and as practices of ordering.
Thirdly, I show how changes in three characteristics of the global system indicate a multi-order
world rather than a multipolar one. Finally, I briefly consider some of the broader geopolitical
implications of a multi-order world and demonstrate the importance of ordering dynamics
within and between international orders. The picture that emerges challenges some of the
most foundational assumptions about international relations and global order including the
prospect of achieving convergence around common rules in multilateral governance to meet
shared challenges…

– “The arrival of the multi-order world and its geopolitical implications”

The second, by Jessica Burbank, takes a different– and in some ways, more provocative– tack…

… A new world order is here. States (countries) are no longer the highest form of power globally. Power has shifted to wealthy individuals who work in groups and operate across borders: syndicates of capital.

Syndicates of capital cannot be categorized as legal or illegal. They exist primarily in the extralegal sphere, where either no regulations apply to their behavior or, where laws do exist, there is no entity powerful enough to enforce them in a manner that asserts control over the syndicates’ behavior.

In many occasions, capital is both the power source for syndicates, and the shared goal. Wealthy individuals form syndicates if their strategic objectives align. Those objectives typically revolve around securing new capital flows and preserving existing ones. Syndicates’ power is vast but fragile. If all members of a syndicate were cut off from accessing capital and the resources they control, they would lose their power.

Author’s Note: ​​Sorry to disappoint the conspiracy theorists, but I am not speaking of secret societies, the illuminati, or a cabal. Syndicates of capital do not hide their power, nor do they operate in secret. Their multi-billion dollar deals and contracts are publicly disclosed. They are also not united in ethnic background, religious, or political beliefs.

It is not enough to say: ‘democracies are being replaced with oligarchies because wealthy individuals have too much power in society.’ That may be true, but is not the full picture. Oligarchies are states run by a small group of wealthy individuals. That may accurately describe the politics of one nation, but it does not suffice to describe how power is organized on a global scale.

‘Global oligarchy’ also falls short of describing how power is organized in our world, because there is not one small group of wealthy individuals, there are many, and they compete. Still, the identification of oligarchs is useful for global political analysis because many of the oligarchs within a state also operate globally as leaders or members ofsyndicates of capital.

The new world order emerged before it could be identified. Platitudes like: “our world has gone crazy,” served as an emotional crutch, and an implicit acknowledgement that we lack a sound analysis of contemporary global power. What has felt like an ineffable force, an inexplicable undercurrent of darkness, is the ambiance of global dominion by syndicates of capital.

Though abstract, examining how global power is organized is essential to understanding the world we live in. Developing a coherent framework for evaluating global affairs allows us to more effortlessly make sense of current events. You’ll be surprised how quickly things click and how easily your mind makes connections when you absorb the news with a conception of syndicates of capital…

– “Syndicates of Capital“

Both are eminently worth reading in full: whether or not one buys all– or any– of either set of conclusions, the mental calisthenics are the point…

* Robert Macfarlane

###

As we muse on metaphors, we might recall that it was on this date in 1279 that Mongol forces led by Kublai Khan were victorious at the Battle of Yamen— ending the Song dynasty in China. Kublai has already conquered parts of northern and southern China, and had declared the Yuan dynasty (with himself as the emperor “Great Yuan”). With the fall of the Song, the Mongols ruled all of continental East Asia under Han-style Yuan rule, which was a division of the Mongol Empire.

Битва при Ямені
https://buymeacoffee.com/valdeloir/jekiwacado

#історія #Китай #династіяСун #монгольськізавоювання #битваЯмень
#history #China #SongDynasty #MongolEmpire #BattleOfYamen

Tani Bunchō's "Gazing at a Waterfall" captures the serene fusion of nature and humanity through a majestic winter landscape. The scene invokes Li Bai's poetry, bridging cultures and time. What emotions does this harmony evoke for you?

#Art #ClevelandArt #TaniBuncho #ChineseArt #SongDynasty
https://clevelandart.org/art/1972.16

Died #OTD in 1283: Wen Tianxiang, Chinese general, scholar and one of the 'Three Loyal Princes of the Song'

All men are mortal, but my loyalty will illuminate the annals of history forever. ~Wen Tianxiang

#history #China #SongDynasty

Zhengyi Tao/Dao

In pinyin: Zheng Yi Dao. It’s also known as: the Way of Orthodox Unity, Teaching of the Orthodox Unity, & Branch of the Orthodox Unity.

This is a Chinese Taoist movement that traditionally refers to the same Taoist lineage as: the Way of the Five Pecks of Rice & Way of the Celestial Masters. But in the period of the Tang Dynasty & its history thereafter.

The leader of Zhengyi Taoism is known as a Celestial Master, like in the Way of Celestial Masters (Tianshi Dao).

The term Zhengyi (Orthodox Unity) has been used since Taoism became an organized religion in 142 AD. This was when Taishang Laojun granted the Covenant with the Powers of Orthodox Unity (zhengyi mengwei) on Zhang Daoling. Zhang Daoling was a Chinese Taoist religious leader during the Eastern Han dynasty. He founded the Way of the Five Pecks of Rice millenarian movement.

Zhang’s followers called his teachings the Way of the Five Pecks of Rice, while the Six Dynasties Period. The Southern Taoists called it the Way of the Celestial Masters. The Covenant, Five Pecks of Rice, & Celestial Masters all refer to the Zhengyi branch of Taoism but in different periods.

Celestial Master communities suffered from many migrations in the late Three Kingdoms & Five Dynasties & Ten Kingdoms periods. Cao Cao resettled them in the North. Then they joined mass migrations to the South after the loss of Northern China in 317 to the Uprising of the Five Barbarians.

In the 5th century Abridged Codes for the Taoist Community, Lu Xiujing lamented that Taoist Assemblies no longer observed the proper rules & the position of libationer had become hereditary. A libationer is a religious official that’s responsible for leading pa6rishes & performing rituals.

By the Tang Dynasty, the title of Celestial Master had been degraded to where ANY prominent Taoist could claim the title. Celestial Master priests no longer figured prominently in Taoist texts.

Emperor Xuanzong (7 12-756) canonized the first Celestial Master, Zhang Daoling, during his reign. This didn’t have any effect/benefit to the original base of Celestial Masters in Sichuan. It did, however, benefit a temple in the Jiangnan area of Jiangxi Province.

This temple was located at Mount Longhu. This is claimed to be the spot where Zhang Daoling had gotten the Tao & where his descendants still lived. Recognized by the emperor as the legit descendants of Zhang Daoling, these new Celestial Masters established a new patriarchy at their base at Mount Langhu.

The importance of the Zhangyi school grew during the Song Dynasty. The Celestial Master frequently got imperial appointments. In 1239, the Southern Song Dynasty‘s Emperor Lizong commanded the 35th Zhang Keda to unite 3 schools: Lingbao School, Shangqing School, & Zhengyi Dao. The new unified school kept the Zhengyi name & stayed based in Mount Longhu.

Shortly after the schools were united, the Mongols, under Kublai Khan, conquered the Southern Song Dynasty. Kublai Khan established the Yuan Dynasty in China. Kublai Khan accepted the claim that the Celestial Master of Mount Longhu was descended from Zhang Daoling. Kublai Khan also granted the school the right to control affairs relating to Taoism in the Jinagnan area.

In 1304, as result of Zhengyi Dao‘s increased importance the Mongols, all of the Taoist schools (except the Quanzhen school) were united under the banner of the Zhengyi School, with the 38th Celestial Master, Zhang Yucai, as the spiritual leaders.

The founding of the Ming Dynasty in 1368 started at the beginning of a long decline of the power of Zhengyi Taoism. The first Ming ruler, the Hongwu Emperor (1368-98), suppressed the use of the title of “Celestial Master” among the Zhengyi School.

By the Daoguang period (1821-50) of the Qing Dynasty, relations between the court & the Celestial Masters came to an end. The activities became more localized to regions in which the school was particularly important.

Even though their court association was over the Celestial Master themselves still had a great deal of prestige, & importance, among Taoists throughout China. This importance, that arose from the belief that they were descended from Zhang Daoling, was evident when the Celestial Master traveled & attracted crowds of people wherever they went.

Unlike prior incarnations of the Celestial Masters, like the school based at Louguan, the Zhengyi Taoists didn’t venerate Laozi as a god. They viewed him as the ancestor of the school’s teaching.

There are 2 main types of rituals performed by the Zhengyi Taoists: the jiao (offering) & zhai (retreat) rituals. The zhai rituals are performed as a way to gain benefits through purification & abstinence. They usually take place immediately after the jiao ritual.

In performing a ritual, the participant recites a litany of repentance first. Then notify the deities of the merits gained through repentance by submitting a document to Heaven. When the zhai ritual is done, the jiao ritual begins in which deities are given offerings & are thanked.

The jian ritual is usually performed over 3 days. A lot of the ritual is performed by priests in a temple. But can also involve religious processions through the city, musical performances & a mass offering in front of the temple.

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#1239 #1304 #1368 #1398 #142AD #1821 #1850 #317 #5thCentury #712 #756 #AbridgedCodesForTheTaoistCommunity #BranchOfTheOrthodoxUnity #CaoCao #CelestialMaster #CelestialMasters #China #ChineseTaoism #Covenant #DaoguangPeriod #EasternHanDynasty #EmperorLizong #EmperorXuanzong #FiveDynasties #HongwuEmperor #JiangxiProvince #KublaiKhan #Laozi #Libationer #LingbaoSchool #Louguan #LuXiujing #MillenarianMovement #MingDynasty #Mongols #MountLonghu #NorthernChina #Pinyin #PowersOfOrthodoxUnity #QingDynasty #QuanzhenSchool #ShangqingSchool #Sichuan #SixDynasties #SongDynasty #SouthernSongDynasty #SouthernTaoists #taishangLaojun #TangDynasty #Tao #TeachingOfTheOrthodoxUnity #TenKingdoms #ThreeKingdoms #TianshiDao #UprisingOfTheFiveBarbarians #WayOfOrthodoxUnity #WayOfTheCelestialMasters #WayOfTheFivePecksOfRice #YuanDynasty #Zhai #ZhangDaoling #ZhangKeda #ZhangYucai #Zhengyi #ZhengyiDao #ZhengyiMengwei #ZhengyiTaoism