32 Followers
111 Following
87 Posts
Security Researcher (https://coderlime.at), co-founder of Light Squares Ltd (https://lightsquares.dev) and CEO of Lins Security GmbH (https://linssecurity.com).
UniversityJohannes Kepler University Linz
Websitehttps://coderlime.at

from AWS status page: “we identified the trigger of the event as DNS resolution issues for the regional DynamoDB service endpoints. After resolving the DynamoDB DNS issue at 2:24 AM, services began recovering but we had a subsequent impairment in the internal subsystem of EC2 that is responsible for launching EC2 instances due to its dependency on DynamoDB.”

legitimately, if their whole system lost power simultaneously, would it even be possible to ever cold boot it again?

This is insane! A few researchers from UCSD and UMCP scanned bunch of satellite links, found much of the traffic is not encrypted, and went on to decode them. It's amazing what came out.

- T-Mobile backhaul: Users' SMS, voice call contents and internet traffic content in plain text.
- AT&T Mexico cellular backhaul: Raw user internet traffic
- TelMex VOIP on satellite backhaul: Plaintext voice calls
- U.S. military: SIP traffic exposing ship names
- Mexico government and military: Unencrypted intra-government traffic
- Walmart Mexico: Unencrypted corporate emails, plaintext credentials to inventory management systems, inventory records transferred and updated using FTP

While it is important to work on futuristic threats such as Quantum cryptanalysis, backdoors in standardized cryptographic protocols, etc. - the unfortunate reality is that the vast majority of real-world attacks happen because basic protection is not enabled. Lets not take our eyes off the basics.

Great work, Wenyi Zhang, Annie Dai, Keegan Ryan, Dave Levin, Nadia Heninger and Aaron Schulman!

https://satcom.sysnet.ucsd.edu/docs/dontlookup_ccs25_fullpaper.pdf

If you are interested in software supply chain security, join us today at #CCS at 14:30 (Taiwan local time) for the talk "Attestable builds: compiling verifiable binaries on untrusted systems using trusted execution environments" given by @mlins and Daniel Hugenroth.

Preprint paper is available at https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.02521 .

All open source software is available at https://github.com/lambdapioneer/attestable-builds and has been awarded all Reproducible Artifact badges - that means it not only works for us, but is open to be used by all :)

Attestable builds: compiling verifiable binaries on untrusted systems using trusted execution environments

In this paper we present attestable builds, a new paradigm to provide strong source-to-binary correspondence in software artifacts. We tackle the challenge of opaque build pipelines that disconnect the trust between source code, which can be understood and audited, and the final binary artifact, which is difficult to inspect. Our system uses modern trusted execution environments (TEEs) and sandboxed build containers to provide strong guarantees that a given artifact was correctly built from a specific source code snapshot. As such it complements existing approaches like reproducible builds which typically require time-intensive modifications to existing build configurations and dependencies, and require independent parties to continuously build and verify artifacts. In comparison, an attestable build requires only minimal changes to an existing project, and offers nearly instantaneous verification of the correspondence between a given binary and the source code and build pipeline used to construct it. We evaluate it by building open-source software libraries - focusing on projects which are important to the trust chain and those which have proven difficult to be built deterministically. Overall, the overhead (42 seconds start-up latency and 14% increase in build duration) is small in comparison to the overall build time. Importantly, our prototype builds even complex projects such as LLVM Clang without requiring any modifications to their source code and build scripts. Finally, we formally model and verify the attestable build design to demonstrate its security against well-resourced adversaries.

arXiv.org

The crates.​io team was notified of two malicious crates (with similar names as legitimate crates) which were actively searching file contents for Etherum private keys, Solana private keys, and arbitrary byte arrays for exfiltration. The malicious crates have been removed.

See the blog post for details: https://blog.rust-lang.org/2025/09/24/crates.io-malicious-crates-fasterlog-and-asyncprintln/

crates.io: Malicious crates faster_log and async_println | Rust Blog

Empowering everyone to build reliable and efficient software.

‘Russian hackers took control of a Norwegian dam this year, opening a floodgate and allowing water to flow unnoticed for four hours, Norway’s intelligence service has said.’ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/14/russian-hackers-control-norwegian-dam-norway?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other
Russian hackers seized control of Norwegian dam, spy chief says

Beate Gangås says attack in April by Norway’s ‘dangerous neighbour’ aimed to cause fear and chaos

The Guardian
"Is Proton leaving Switzerland? "Legal uncertainty" of proposed surveillance laws is pushing them to make several changes" https://www.techradar.com/vpn/vpn-privacy-security/is-proton-leaving-switzerland-legal-uncertainty-of-proposed-surveillance-laws-is-pushing-them-to-make-several-changes
Is Proton leaving Switzerland? "Legal uncertainty" of proposed surveillance laws is pushing them to make several changes

Several of Proton's products could be headed elsewhere in Europe in the wake of proposed surveillance laws

TechRadar

I am very happy to announce that our big architecture paper for the Digidow project on distributed digital identity systems with biometric authentication for physical interaction is now online on arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.10185.

While it can't have all the details, it summarizes the main design of our 5+ years of research on this topic and references a lot of the in-depth aspects. More detailed treatment of different parts, hopefully including a comprehensive formal analysis of the prototype protocol, is still to come.

An Architecture for Distributed Digital Identities in the Physical World

Digital identities are increasingly important for mediating not only digital but also physical service transactions. Managing such identities through centralized providers can cause both availability and privacy concerns: single points of failure and control are ideal targets for global attacks on technical, organizational, or legal fronts. We design, analyze, and build a distributed digital identity architecture for physical world transactions in common scenarios like unlocking doors, public transport, or crossing country borders. This architecture combines (biometric and other) sensors, (established and upcoming) identity authorities, attribute verifiers, and a new core component we call the \emph{Personal Identity Agent (PIA)} that represents individuals with their identity attributes in the digital domain. All transactions are conducted in a completely decentralized manner, and the components for which we currently assume central coordination are optional and only used for assisting with service discovery and latency reduction. We present a first protocol between these parties and formally verify that it achieves relevant security properties based on a realistic threat model including strong global adversaries. A proof-of-concept implementation demonstrates practical feasibility of both architecture and initial protocol for applications that can tolerate end-to-end latencies in the range of a few seconds.

arXiv.org

Good luck LosFuzzys!

The student team is taking part in the Finale of the CTF (Capture the Flag) Competition hosted by DEF CON in Las Vegas this weekend! They are there as part of a merged Austrian team called KuK Hofhackerei.

💪🚩🏆

https://youtube.com/shorts/fBEaxVSSZ4g?si=12d9slKzJDUozehB

Before you continue to YouTube

Email is critical infrastructure in today's digitalized world. Relying on foreign hosting is not a good idea for anybody at risk of political interference because of their profession.
Hosting email locally is still very much possible, even if it gets more involved year over year. Email is the one federated protocol that we have for direct communication. Even with all of its deficiencies in security and privacy, it is the common denominator that connects people. Don't give up control over your own, most basic digital communication channel. Use local hosting companies that you can still call in an emergency, ideally within your own (maybe extended, like EU level) jurisdiction.

Context: https://eupolicy.social/@bert_hubert/114511178410991783

Update: As pointed out by @ilumium, depending on your threat model, using an explicitly foreign email service provider can be beneficial if your *local* government is the main threat actor. However, if the local government can physically get you or your client devices, then don't assume too much protection through the email service.

bert hubert 🇺🇦🇪🇺🇺🇦 (@[email protected])

The chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has lost access to his (Microsoft) email and bank accounts. Prosecutions are faltering now. This all due to US sanctions. 'Microsoft did not respond to a request for comments'. Yet European governments are collectively moving their email and files to Microsoft, risking similar problems if they ever upset the US administration. https://apnews.com/article/icc-trump-sanctions-karim-khan-court-a4b4c02751ab84c09718b1b95cbd5db3

EUpolicy.social - A Mastodon server for the EU bubble

New Privacy Guides article 🔐✨
by me:

If you want to keep your password manager local-only, KeePassXC is a great solution!

It's free,
Open-source,
Easy to install and use,
Doesn't require an account,
Works on Linux, macOS, and Windows,
And the team is here! 👉@keepassxc

Here's how to set it up with a YubiKey: https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/03/18/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/

#PrivacyGuides #KeePassXC #Privacy #Security #PasswordManager #Passwords #FOSS

KeePassXC + YubiKey: How to set up a local-only password manager

This tutorial demonstrates how to install the local-only password manager KeePassXC and secure a password database with YubiKey.

Privacy Guides