@riskybiz in the last weekly when talking about the white house jumping into RPKI, there was a comment to the effect of “nobody will want to do all the pki infra except .gov, so this should help”
Maybe I got the wrong impression but as an operator RPKI is not in need of pki, it’s in need of enforcement. The solution has two sides; signed announcements (ROAs) from the originator, and Validating policy enforcement (ROV) done by each internet router. The signing part is very popular and most ASNs do this now. The RIRs (like RIPE) do this in the place where you manage your IPs, so it’s very easy.
The problem is how few people deploy the origin validation part for prefixes they learn. Doug Madory posted an article on APNIC blog in April (https://blog.apnic.net/2024/05/08/rpki-rov-deployment-reaches-major-milestone) showing how this probably over 50% now, but it’s stagnated for a while now.
Getting that last 50% is gunna need a bigger stick, so govt getting involved is a start, but the problem isn’t infra level, it’s ASNs not being bothered…

@campuscodi did you hear cogent got their dns registrar messed with last week? A few of us looked into it and you can see the history a little here:
https://web.archive.org/web/20240524193613/https://www.whois.com/whois/cogentco.com
https://x.com/August8964/status/1793986113931288829 DNS was shifted to a box in hetzner for about 6-8 hours and if you landed on that resolution the cogentco.com A record returned the same IP as the DNS (in hetzner) and the webpage you got was broken because it was using a cert with cogent.com in the common name (which they don’t own). The Whois registry was fixed in the early afternoon but it took hours for caches to clear. Long before that the hetzner box was dead in fairness - not sure if it died or was caught for abuse. Cogent are staying very quiet about it tho.