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143 Following
860 Posts

FR/EN

Account dedicated to #Offsec/#Infosec/digital stuff

Involved in
#UnifiedPush #MollyIm

Githubhttps://github.com/p1gp1g
Codeberghttps://codeberg.org/s1m/
Liberapayhttps://liberapay.com/S1m/
Bloghttps://s1m.fr
DigiCert β€” a certificate authority, the entity you're trusting to anchor your entire chain of trust β€” got compromised because a support analyst opened a .scr file from a chat session. In 2026. CrowdStrike was misconfigured on one endpoint and completely absent on another. Nobody noticed the second compromise for 10 days. The attacker grabbed EV code signing initialization codes and walked out with 60 certificates. Zhong Stealer, signed and shipped. (2/5)

I was wondering why I was seeing so many "Co-authored-by: Copilot" commits recently. It turns out VS Code added a "feature" that inserts that into your commits automatically, even if you're not using Copilot.

It looks like people complained about this, which went nowhere until this hit the front page of HN. After this was the top HN story Saturday, an MS engineer submitted a PR to switch this feature to default off an hour ago (midnight Redmond time).

What will they think of next?

Le sigh. Every time we go around and have to do this again and manually figure out wtf each of the ten thousand linux distributions provides their security updates and current status.

Spending my Saturday morning searching for CVE-2026-31431 and "copyfail" patch status is just πŸ‘.

Anyway, here's what I have so far:

This is epic, first time camera is working in #Waydroid 🀩 Thanks to @supechicken and the WayDroid-ATV project!

#LinuxMobile #NixOS #postmarketOS

Nextcloud talk just merged UnifiedPush support! It will be available with Nextcloud 34

#Nextcloud #UnifiedPush

I'm currently testing Signal's new incremental local backup with my daily data - because I uninstalled Molly by mistake  

It takes time, but seems to work well

I’m a bit surprised they did not wait till a patch was available for the major distros. Smells like an IPO or the next round of funding is coming soon.

You probably want to keep a close eye on any system you maintain where unprivileged users have shell access and update as soon as possible.

https://copy.fail

https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-31431

https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-31431

https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-31431.html

#copyfail

Copy Fail β€” 732 Bytes to Root

CVE-2026-31431. 100% Reliable Linux LPE β€” no race, no per-distro offsets, page-cache write that bypasses on-disk file-integrity tools and crosses containers. Found by Xint Code.

Xint

Signal is working on a standalone version for Signal Desktop that does not require a smartphone 🀩

Also more adjustable options when using Desktop as a linked device

πŸ‘‰ https://aboutsignal.com/news/signal-desktop-without-a-mobile-phone-standalone-version-in-development/

#signal #signalapp #signalmessenger #news #windows #linux #macOS #desktop #tech #aboutsignal

Signal Desktop without a mobile phone, standalone version in development

Signal is working on a standalone version of its desktop app that does not require a mobile phone. Signal Desktop will also gain additional options when used as a linked device.

AboutSignal

RE: https://mastodon.social/@pid_eins/116459585811044061

Someone wrote a postmortem on the security issues uncovered in uutils, "the Rust reimplementation of GNU coreutils"

https://corrode.dev/blog/bugs-rust-wont-catch/

It is an interesting read on its own. The author praises Rust for managing to entirely eliminate memory safety issues in uutils. My view here is unfortunately closer to that of Lennart: the remaining class of bugs are to a large part the fault of the Rust stdlib, and entirely avoidable.

(see also my last blog post https://hachyderm.io/@swick/116455985982945725)

A response to recent reporting in Germany, in service of clarity and accountability:

First, it’s important to be precise when it comes to critical infrastructure like Signal. Signal was not β€œhacked” β€” in that our encryption, infrastructure, and the integrity of the app’s code was not compromised. 1/