Martin Schmiedecker

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Automotive security by day, online privacy by night. Digital forensics & teaching it in between.
WebsiteSchmiedecker.net

Czech journalists claim to have identified another local company part of the Intellexa umbrella—Czech Sigi Consulting. The company's CEO was Juval Rabin, the son of former Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin.

https://www.investigace.cz/ceska-firma-intellexa-predator-spyware/

Česká firma inkasovala 2,2 milionu korun od tvůrců špionážního systému Predator - investigace.cz

Další česká firma je napojená na spywarovou Intellexu. Intellexa stojí za špionážním systémem Predator, který ke sledování opozice zneužívají vlády po celém světě. Irské pobočce...

investigace.cz
It is confirmed by TechCrunch : Sora was burning around $1 million every day. The problem is that there was no clear revenue for Sora and in the meantime, Claude was becoming better at coding, which actually makes money
https://techcrunch.com/2026/03/29/why-openai-really-shut-down-sora/
Why OpenAI really shut down Sora | TechCrunch

OpenAI's decision last week to shut down Sora, its AI video-generation tool, just six months after releasing it to the public raised immediate suspicions. The app had invited users to upload their own faces — so was this some kind of elaborate data grab?

TechCrunch

If someone comes to me today preaching about “post-quantum” security issues, I’ll remind them of the current state of security: the npm ecosystem gets abused daily, CI pipelines run left and right with full access to cloud services, so-called security devices like F5 and Ivanti are exposed (and compromised) to the internet, mailboxes get compromised just to change an IBAN in a PDF, and a simple phone call is still enough to get someone to hand over an MFA code.

But yes, by all means, let’s focus on post-quantum threats while handing AI tools SSH access like it’s a feature, not a confession.

#cybersecurity #stateoftheworld

Years ago, we've published an investigation into one core member of REvil, together with @maxzierer.bsky.social and @kaibiermann.bsky.social

Now, german authorities put out a Wanted poster for Mr. Shchukin

https://www.bka.de/DE/IhreSicherheit/Fahndungen/Personen/BekanntePersonen/CC_BW/DMS/Sachverhalt.html

Here's our reporting from back then
https://www.zeit.de/digital/internet/2021-10/ransomware-group-revil-member-hacker-russia-investigation

📣New OST2 class release!📣
The TPM trilogy is complete! "TC1103: Advanced TPM usage" by Dimi Tomov is now public at https://ost2.fyi/TC1103! Learn about advanced TPM policy access controls, protecting external keys in a TPM, implementing maximum security TPM-backed FDE, and more!

RE: https://social.heise.de/@heiseonlineenglish/116316847500488516

“Oh, we murdered 100 kids? Oh, that's unfortunate.

We just had some stale data in our Palantir Project Maven data lake that was used by our ‘highly accelerated, software-supported targeting process’. We'll clear the cache sometimes.”

I teach cybersecurity. And I genuinely don't know what to tell my students after this one. Federal reviewers spent years trying to get basic encryption documentation from Microsoft for its GCC High government cloud. They couldn't get it. One reviewer called the system a "pile of spaghetti pies," with data traveling from point A to point B the way you'd get from Chicago to New York: a bus to St. Louis, a ferry to Pittsburgh, and a flight to Newark. Each leg is a potential hijacking. They knew this. They said this out loud in writing. Then they approved it anyway in December 2024, because too many agencies were already using it. 🔐 That's not a security review. That's a hostage negotiation. Two things in this story should make every CISO and CIO uncomfortable:

🧩 Microsoft built its federal cloud on top of decades of legacy code that it apparently can't fully document itself
👮 "Digital escorts" often ex-military with minimal software engineering backgrounds are the firewall between Chinese engineers working on the system and classified U.S. networks 🤦🏻‍♂️

The scariest line in the whole ProPublica investigation isn't the "pile of shit" quote. It's this: FedRAMP determined that refusing authorization wasn't feasible because agencies were already using the product. Read that again. The security review process reached a conclusion based on sunk cost, not risk. Ex Post Facto Fallacy

If that logic holds, the compliance framework is just documentation theater. And right now, CISA is being hollowed out, so there are fewer people left to even run the theater.

https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/03/federal-cyber-experts-called-microsofts-cloud-a-pile-of-shit-approved-it-anyway/
#Cybersecurity #Microsoft #FedRAMP #Leadership #RiskManagement #security #privacy #cloud #infosec

Federal cyber experts called Microsoft's cloud a "pile of shit," approved it anyway

One Microsoft product was approved despite years of concerns about its security.

Ars Technica
A walkthrough on patching Dell UEFI firmware at the SPI flash level to disable pre-boot DMA protection — bypassing the BIOS password entirely. The interesting part: the UEFI UI still reports the setting as enabled, and TPM measured boot doesn't detect the NVRAM change, so BitLocker unlocks normally. The patch also persists through official Dell BIOS updates. From there it's DMAReaper to kill IOMMU + PCILeech for a SYSTEM shell. Significant measured boot policy gap. https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2026/03/disabling-security-features-in-a-locked-bios/
Disabling Security Features in a Locked BIOS - MDSec

Overview This post explores how modifying a Dell UEFI firmware image at the flash level can fundamentally undermine platform security without leaving visible traces in the firmware interface. By directly...

MDSec
What does it take to run a Tor relay at a university?
This real-world story from National Taiwan Normal University shows how a student made it happen. Read the full experience + lessons learned: https://blog.torproject.org/setting-up-tor-university-relay-taiwan/
Setting Up a Tor Relay at National Taiwan Normal University: A Practical Experience of Communicating with the University and Leaving Open Possibilities | Tor Project

A computer science student at National Taiwan Normal University successfully set up a Tor Relay on campus by working within institutional processes—communicating with administrators, completing paperwork, and explaining the difference between relays and exit nodes. This guest post from anoni.net shares practical advice for deploying Tor relays on university networks.

Valve: “We need a credit card on file to prove you’re 18”

Me: “My account is 23 years old”

Valve: “That just proves your account is old”

Me: “A credit card just proves you know someone with a credit card”