🕵🏻♂️ [InfoSec MASHUP] 23/2026 - Built Broken, Patched by Others.
Another week, another set of trojaned packages, hijacked registries, and one-click credential theft. The operational response is by now well-rehearsed: patch, rotate secrets, enable 2FA, audit your dependencies, check your CI/CD workflows. The patching teams are doing their jobs. The question this week's malware section keeps nudging at is a different one: why is so much of what they're patching broken at the point of creation?
The supply chain attack surface exists because the software ecosystem normalized shipping fast over shipping secure, because package registries scaled adoption without scaling trust infrastructure, and because the developer who published a package with a hardcoded credential and the organization running it in production are rarely the same person bearing the consequences. #IBM and #RedHat just committed $5 billion to fix this upstream. #CISA launched CI Fortify to help #OT operators survive worst-case scenarios downstream. Both efforts are necessary. Both are also symptoms of an industry that has spent decades externalizing the cost of insecure software onto the people least positioned to refuse it.
→ Week #23/2026 also covers: Palo Alto Networks Alto GlobalProtect auth bypass is actively exploited, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP reportedly paid $20M to keep client files quiet, and the #EU is moving to limit U.S. cloud in sensitive infrastructure
Full issue 👉 https://infosec-mashup.santolaria.net/p/infosec-mashup-23-2026-built-broken-patched-by-others
If you find it useful, subscribe to get it in your inbox every weekend 📨

ex-#OpenBSD (xsa@). Hacker. Open Source Advocate.






