The recent #Linux page cache write vulnerabilities only bypass one security layer, the traditional file permissions, right? So, any system they can be exploited on lacks defence in depth.
→ More userspace processes should run with NO_NEW_PRIVS.
The recent #Linux page cache write vulnerabilities only bypass one security layer, the traditional file permissions, right? So, any system they can be exploited on lacks defence in depth.
→ More userspace processes should run with NO_NEW_PRIVS.
I've been diving into this problem since last month. Along the way I found a vulnerability in a new sandboxing tool (sandlock) and fixed a known vulnerability in a much older tool (firejail).
Sadly, what I haven't found is a tool that could become a de facto standard for Linux userspace security. One of the reasons for this is that the kernel doesn't make it easy to create such a tool.
→ The kernel is missing an important security feature. This might be fixed in the not too distant future.
For anyone interested in #Linux security, a good explanation of a way to escape from the #Flatpak sandbox has been posted to the oss-security mailing list today: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/19/1
You might also want to read this article from last year: https://www.linuxjournal.com/content/when-flatpaks-sandbox-cracks-real-life-security-issues-beyond-ideal
cc @Seg