Daniel J. Bernstein2d ago
The IETF TLS chairs have now issued a "last call" for objections to non-hybrid signatures in TLS. Do they admit that their previous "last call" re non-hybrid KEMs ended up with a _majority_ in opposition, and that many opposition statements obviously also apply to signatures? No.
Show threadARGVMI~1.PIF2d ago

@djb

Why do they want non-hybrid KEMs and signatures, anyway? Seems like a bad idea to protect all of everything with nothing but unproven crypto.

Show threadDaniel J. Bernstein2d ago

@argv_minus_one I have an introductory chart https://blog.cr.yp.to/20260221-structure.html showing the arguments and counterarguments.

Most common argument from proponents: NSA is asking for non-hybrids, ergo support non-hybrids. This argument works for (1) companies chasing NSA money, (2) companies that take any excuse for extra options as a barrier to entry for competitors, and (3) people who think that "NSA Cybersecurity" isn't a conduit for https://www.eff.org/files/2014/04/09/20130905-guard-sigint_enabling.pdf but rather an independent pro-security agency.

Show threadrsalz2d ago
@darkuncle Sorry to see you promoting this. He's done great work, but this whole thread is crazy conspiracy thinking.
Show threadDaniel J. Bernstein2d ago
@rsalz @darkuncle You think https://www.eff.org/files/2014/04/09/20130905-guard-sigint_enabling.pdf is a conspiracy theory?
Show threadrsalz2d ago
@djb @darkuncle no I do not, but that does not mean that the NSA is corrupting the IETF.
Show threadDaniel J. Bernstein2d ago
@rsalz @darkuncle Let me see if I understand. You're agreeing that NSA has a large budget to sabotage "standards and specification for commercial public key technologies" etc., but you presume that this doesn't include IETF, since the document doesn't _specifically_ name IETF? Also, just checking: by the same logic, you presume that this doesn't include ISO? NIST? IEEE? When we recommend proactive steps to protect SDOs against sabotage, you accuse us of being crazy conspiracy theorists?
Show threadrsalz2d ago
@djb @darkuncle I presumed nothing. Read what I wrote. Twisting words to win an argument. Your better than this Dan.
Show threadPaul Hoffman2d ago
@rsalz @djb Do you have any evidence of that last statement, Rich?
Show threadDaniel J. Bernstein

@paulehoffman @rsalz Paul, great to see you showing up here!

We're currently discussing Rich's delusion that NSA doesn't attack IETF. On that topic, can you please state for the record how much NSA paid you for your promotion of TLS randomness extensions in IETF (https://web.archive.org/web/20260331174508/https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/08/04/is-extended-random-malicious/)? Or are you denying that this happened?

Also, do you dispute https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/technical-sessions/presentation/checkoway saying that Dual EC becomes thousands of times cheaper to attack whenever those randomness extensions are deployed?

Is Extended Random A Malicious NSA Plot? — Quarrelsome

2:10amWeb
Show threadChristian Huitema4h ago
@djb @paulehoffman @rsalz I don't know for 2012, but from 2013 on a large number of IETF participants were absolutely convinced of being under attack. It was fairly obvious that some IETF participants were either willing enablers of these attacks, or "useful idiots". But we don't know which ones, and we quickly realized that launching a witch-hunt would be very destructive, and that the safest path was to keep discussions strictly technical.
Show threadEliot Lear4h ago

@huitema

I would argue that what we had at the time was a frenzied mob, particularly in Vancouver.

Show threadDaniel J. Bernstein3h ago
@huitema @paulehoffman @rsalz Using ECC+PQ instead of non-hybrid PQ is a straightforward, low-cost, broadly recommended, broadly deployed technical step to limit the damage from PQ security failures (such as the SIKE break and KyberSlash). The problem at hand is non-technical, namely NSA pressuring various companies such as Cisco to support non-hybrid PQ. See https://blog.cr.yp.to/20251004-weakened.html#tls for quotes from employees of NSA and Cisco admitting this.