Thursday is a good day to delta with friends and family.
Switch a loved one to #DeltaChat – the decentralised secure open source messenger from Europe.
Thursday is a good day to delta with friends and family.
Switch a loved one to #DeltaChat – the decentralised secure open source messenger from Europe.
@leanderlindahl I'm slowly getting people on Signal, I doubt this here will happen.
But the screenshots imply desktop usage as a bigger thing? Could it be an alternative to small discord communities?
@b0rn_dead @leanderlindahl
as #signal user, i've often wanted to use a separate profile for work, for personal and for activism. whenever you're in that situation, #deltachat is helpful.
if you ever find yourself communicating in a context where it would be bad if you're phone numbers are leaked (despite being set to "hidden" because that setting is broken), then it's time to switch from #signal to #deltachat for that.
honestly signal's whole phone number thing is about as un-private as #facebook's real-name policy.
@pelle @b0rn_dead @leanderlindahl
the phone number requirement is actually worse because, unlike names, phone numbers are globally unique and you can't effortlessly just make one up.
edit: see reply. this is slightly wrong.
@maypop_neocities yes, you •think• you can hide your number, because that's what the settings say, yet #signal will still leak your number, so it's actually even worse, because they give false promises of security.
does their reply to my bug report look reassuring to you?
https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/13824
there are other such leaks.
@moehrenfeld @maypop_neocities
they're polite, but they're wrong. i'm using #OpenContacts, therefore the system contacts was empty, so when they blame the leak on system contacts they're mistaken.
phone number can be visible despite the privacy setting saying "your phone number will not be visible to anyone," which is fine if phone number leaks are not an issue to you, but otherwise serious as authorities can identify an entire network of activists from a single captuted device. it puts people at risk.
another leak issue that's probably not fixed:
https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/14222
@moehrenfeld @maypop_neocities
if your phone number may be visible to others, depending on compicated program logic (when you sign up; how contacts are stored on various phones; whether a setting has been enabled in the past; whether a server was available; etc) then it would be more accurate to write "your phone number may still be visible to others."
when #signal says that your number is hidden yet it may not be, then they are giving a false sense of security to users and preventing thrm from taking appropriate safety precautions. this is especially bad for an app that is advertised as safe for journalists and dissidents.
i think #deltachat does this the right way by simply not asking for your phone number.
their main issue i have is that its a black box. the app on google play and such is not auditable because it isnt verified against the source code. the authors of signal also reject packaging on f droid, which makes me doubly suspicious: why would they do that if not to make sure they remain the only people compiling the app?
other than that, the phone number requirement is absolutely archaic, and made much worse by the fact that they require me to use a phone to sync my messages to my desktop. i fundamentally distrust phones, so an app that forces me to use one despite relying on no phone-specific features is extremely annoying to me because i cannot in good conscience use it for private messaging.
the need to have one singular profile also goes against basically all advice you will find on opsec. there is no point in doing this other than some form of traceability (whether by others through easier discovery or otherwise).