Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 9
#realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 9
#realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 9
We can construct weird machines that work across processor classes, despite small changes in microarchitectures #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 9
END OF DAY 1 #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
DAY 2 Next up is 'Deploying Research: On Building and Shipping an Anonymous Whistleblowing System', presented by Daniel Hugenroth #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Implemented and deployed in the Guardian app on iOS and Android #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
#realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Really want boring simple cryptography with few assumptions; used Rust bc strong typing enabled misuse-resistant API design, and performance came for free #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
How do we bootstrap trust in the org key? It helps to be part of a long-trusted publication #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
'Words matter' #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
When sufficiently motivated, users do read the manual #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Awesome #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Secure elements are great tools...except they don't expose auth attempt counters, nor enforce timeouts (they are reserved for the operating system) #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
RainbowSloth key stretching scheme #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Q: Diff from SecureDrop? A: Focused on the first contact experience; using Tor is a red flag/signal; we don't support sending files, pivot elsewhere for that #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Work with actual UX researchers; in-person user testing; #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Speaking of SecureDrop, next up is 'SecureDrop Next Generation: Lessons from a Decade of Deployment', presented by Rowen Shane, Shannon Veitch #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Uses Tor, PGP encryption, #realworldcrypt
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Deployment/maintenance burden, physical security requirement, better encryption is available #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
What do we want from a next-gen SecureDrop? #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Don't want to leave extra evidence behind #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
'The real way to use deniability is in combination with other security properties of the system; there are tradeoffs against authentication' #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
#realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Client is the Tor browser; no persistent state; server is 'just' an encrypted message queue; one time keys #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Key bundles per-journalist #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Hints #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Specifics about the new SecureDrop protocol github.com/freedomofpre... #realworldcrypto

github.com/freedomofpress...
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
#realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Pros, and cons #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
#realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Different organizational profiles motivate different deployment types #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Next steps, attachments, formal verification! github.com/freedomofpre... github.com/freedomofpre... #realworldcrypto

GitHub - freedomofpress/secure...
GitHub - freedomofpress/securedrop-protocol: Research and proof of concept to develop the next SecureDrop with end to end encryption.

Research and proof of concept to develop the next SecureDrop with end to end encryption. - freedomofpress/securedrop-protocol

GitHub
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Q: Target a particular journalist, key exhaustion? A: Known, not seen in existing SecureDrop instances, so deferring doing anything for now, but there are approaches #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Next up, 'At-Compromise Security: The Case for Alert Blindness', presented by Simone Colombo #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
How much are our assumptions and models actually based on the real world? #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
"Cryptography is also a social science unaware of itself." #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
#realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
82 abductions related to these protests #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Vigorous application of ethnography to cryptography #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
'deep hanging out' (technical term) #realworldccrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²
#realworldcrypto
Mar 10 at 2:08amWeb
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Analyzed at social-foundations-of-cryptography.gitlab.io/school #realworldcrypto

Autumn School · So...
Autumn School · Social Foundations of Cryptography

Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Adverary goal: intelligence, via torture #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
'raising the alarm' saved victims #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
"The abductors eventually heard the message, which put pressure on them to release the abducted person." #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
At-compromise alert blindness: when they are taken, abducted people can alert their network without the adversary noticing #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
#realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
#realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Personal secrets capture the distinction of compromising people or their devices. Multiple personal secrets model that the abducted person knows they have been abducted: they can decide which secret to use. #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
#realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Alert #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Blindness: 'If I do anything now to upset these guys, I’m dead.' #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
We give up confidentiality for alert: a goal only ethnography could suggest. We give a provably secure construction and we implement it. #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
eprint.iacr.org/2026/252 #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Ethnography proposes 'exists' statements, not 'for all' statements #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Coffee time #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
'Defending the Open Internet: TLS, Passkeys, and the Privacy Stakes of Digital Identity', by Christopher Harrell #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Q: How do I resolve the dilemma that if i work on this, governments will use it to discriminate [against children, women, etc] A: Build primitives that work with trust lists, group of issuers we trust [um we trusted the US until we didn't, oops] #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Q: Device-bound means i lose my creds A: Cloud-based HSM [narrator: 🙄] #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Not all have PQ privacy #realworldcrypto
Show threadDeirdre Connolly¹ ²Mar 10
Q: The nice ZKs going to PQ change the computational/privacy properties A: Depending on the construction (BLS vs ML-DSA, relying on the symmetric guts of certain constructions) #realworldcrypto