Next up, 'Chypnosis: Undervolting-based Static Side-channel Attacks', presented by Shahin Tajik #realworldcrypto
Moar attacks on OpenTitan #realworldcrypto
AMD security advisories 😏 #realworldcrypto
Next up, 'Kerckhoff's Principle in Practice: Addressing Security by Obscurity in Secure Hardware', presented by Jan Jancar #realworldcrypto
JavaCards will never die #realworldcrypto
Certified devices...had plenty of vulns #realworldcrypto
'Who would do that? Just lie about elliptic curves?' #realworldcrypto
Just lie to the target 😈 #realworldcrypto
Next up, 'Encryption in the microarchitectural world', presented by Ping-Lun Wang #realworldcrypto
microarchitectural 'weird machines' #realworldcrypto
We can construct weird machines that work across processor classes, despite small changes in microarchitectures #realworldcrypto
END OF DAY 1 #realworldcrypto
DAY 2 Next up is 'Deploying Research: On Building and Shipping an Anonymous Whistleblowing System', presented by Daniel Hugenroth #realworldcrypto
Implemented and deployed in the Guardian app on iOS and Android #realworldcrypto
Really want boring simple cryptography with few assumptions; used Rust bc strong typing enabled misuse-resistant API design, and performance came for free #realworldcrypto
How do we bootstrap trust in the org key? It helps to be part of a long-trusted publication #realworldcrypto
'Words matter' #realworldcrypto
When sufficiently motivated, users do read the manual #realworldcrypto
Secure elements are great tools...except they don't expose auth attempt counters, nor enforce timeouts (they are reserved for the operating system) #realworldcrypto
RainbowSloth key stretching scheme #realworldcrypto
Q: Diff from SecureDrop? A: Focused on the first contact experience; using Tor is a red flag/signal; we don't support sending files, pivot elsewhere for that #realworldcrypto
Work with actual UX researchers; in-person user testing; #realworldcrypto
Speaking of SecureDrop, next up is 'SecureDrop Next Generation: Lessons from a Decade of Deployment', presented by Rowen Shane, Shannon Veitch #realworldcrypto
Uses Tor, PGP encryption, #realworldcrypt
Deployment/maintenance burden, physical security requirement, better encryption is available #realworldcrypto
What do we want from a next-gen SecureDrop? #realworldcrypto
Don't want to leave extra evidence behind #realworldcrypto
'The real way to use deniability is in combination with other security properties of the system; there are tradeoffs against authentication' #realworldcrypto
Client is the Tor browser; no persistent state; server is 'just' an encrypted message queue; one time keys #realworldcrypto
Key bundles per-journalist #realworldcrypto
Pros, and cons #realworldcrypto
Different organizational profiles motivate different deployment types #realworldcrypto
GitHub - freedomofpress/securedrop-protocol: Research and proof of concept to develop the next SecureDrop with end to end encryption.

Research and proof of concept to develop the next SecureDrop with end to end encryption. - freedomofpress/securedrop-protocol

GitHub
Q: Target a particular journalist, key exhaustion? A: Known, not seen in existing SecureDrop instances, so deferring doing anything for now, but there are approaches #realworldcrypto
Next up, 'At-Compromise Security: The Case for Alert Blindness', presented by Simone Colombo #realworldcrypto
How much are our assumptions and models actually based on the real world? #realworldcrypto