Mastodawn

Not that any of these victories, from the #genocide perpetrated in El Fasher to the mass atrocities in Wad Madani, have consolidated the reputation of either belligerent. The return of the #SAF led government to Khartoum has not hidden either the battle scars or widespread corruption and #war profiteering by the “liberators”. Looting and extortion have long since been shown not to be only the hallmark of #RSF warfare, but also of either side’s normal governance.

It does not mean either that any corner of the country is “safe”. The #SAF are rebuilding their airforce with #Pakistan s aid and are eliminating #RSF Chinese, #UAE provided air defence. Meanwhile drone warfare has generalized and intensified, a consequence of massive external supplies to both sides. Strikes commonly involve non-military targets.

Nevertheless, ground operations are largely concentrated in #Kordofan s “triangle of death”, meaning El Obeid (capital of North Kordofan), Dilling and Kadugli (capital of South Kordofan). #RSF s alliance with SPLM-N Al-Hilu and control of West Kordofan makes the #SAF positions there precarious, and any relief brough by the recent siege breaking of those last two towns temporary.

Mathieu Gotteland

#RSF and allies have meanwhile launched a diversionary offensive into Blue Nile state from #SouthSudan. A RSF training camp in Benishangul-Gumuz (Northwestern #Ethiopia) are also very close to that second front. The major risk this diversion poses is a wider regionalization of the conflict, with both RSF and #SAF more heavily involved in the civil #war currently unfolding in South Sudan, as well as in any renewed hostilities in #Tigray and in the looming war between Ethiopia and #Eritrea

#Sudan

Diplomatically, the #SAF is continuing and will very probably continue to enjoy the benefits of having captured the Sudanese state and of its recent alignment on #SaudiArabia. This is the context of Burhan’s recent visit to #Qatar, as well as post-war reconstruction talks with #India.

On paper, the #RSF s international support seems bound to deteriorate, as exemplified by recent weak signals from #Chad. Chadian internal unrest as to the extent of N’Djaména’s support to the RSF, acting as a #UAE proxy, has been fueled by spillover in Tiné and the deaths of Chadian soldiers. Hemedti has nevertheless managed to visit #Uganda, while on an apparent search for an African mediator, an occurrence swiftly and predictably condemned by the #SAF.

#Sudan #SouthSudan #war

Both the #RSF and the #SAF will have indeed to cater to heightened foreign interest in bringing an end to the #war, especially on the part of the #US. While the SAF are keen to criminalize not only the RSF but also Hamdok’s civilian bloc, to reject any #UAE involvement and to retaliate against any foreign involvement with the RSF, they claim to seek a truce within the US-Saudi Jeddah process, stillborn in 2023 and further delegitimized by Saudi support to the SAF.

#SaudiArabia #Sudan

Meanwhile, Hemedti’s #Uganda visit was meant to promote an #AU #IGAD mediation that the #SAF are all the while undermining. While the AU is currently resisting #Egypt s push for Sudanese reinstatement, #Sudan has reintegrated IGAD 10 days after the regional organization had condemned #RSF crimes.

Both the #RSF and the #SAF are weak, indisciplined, corrupt and structurally inclined to a spectrum of grave human rights violations. Neither has had any incentive whatever to seek either a truce, a ceasefire or peace.