Signal provides:

- Excellent protection against third party interception of communications (wiretapping).

- Limited protection against compromised (hacked) or lost devices

- No protection against certain common usage mistakes (accidentally including a reporter in your large group war planning chat).

If you look at the systems that are supposed to be used for classified communications, the underlying cryptography isn’t particularly different from Signal (the AES cipher can be used to protect classified material). That’s not what failed here.

The difference is that systems like Signal are designed to *facilitate* communication with anyone. Classified systems are designed to *limit* communication to authorized recipients.

Both are sensible for their respective - very different - purposes.

@mattblaze what app do I download that has “Man-in-the-Middle (because I invited him)” protection?
@KuJoe
Maybe with this you can at least see your mistake?
@mattblaze

@mattblaze

Most likely Signal was chosen because a) it helps bypassing documentation requirements, as has been the case with similar cases, and b) it protects against interception.

The more interesting question that nobody has asked so far, despite it's being hinted at in the article in The Atlantic: why is a) so acceptable that all of these folks routinely use Signal for that purpose? You don't "accidentally" tune in to such undocumented conversations.

@katzenberger @mattblaze a) is applying too much intelligence to these guys

@peteriskrisjanis @katzenberger @mattblaze Not necessarily - avoiding FOI requests has been a major focus for Project 2025.

Not sure why they're worried about their actions being scrutinized </sarcasm>

@peteriskrisjanis

On the contrary, it is deliberate obstruction. Look at the chat screenshots in the article:

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2025/03/trump-administration-accidentally-texted-me-its-war-plans/682151/

The messages have the timer icon, bottom right. This means that #DisappearingMessages was enabled for this #Signal chat.

@mattblaze

The Trump Administration Accidentally Texted Me Its War Plans

U.S. national-security leaders included me in a group chat about upcoming military strikes in Yemen. I didn’t think it could be real. Then the bombs started falling.

The Atlantic
@katzenberger
The reason why signal is used widely by government officials is to let recipients know they have send something over the secure line. The secure line is something they have at home or in their office so it cannot be lost. @mattblaze
@CodexNotFound @katzenberger And anyone at or near the cabinet level (as here) has access to secure communications wherever they are (including in transit).

@mattblaze

Infodump follows aimed at nobody in particular:

AES is the symmetric cipher, Signal uses ECC (on Curve25519 & derivatives: So X25519 and Ed25519) for the DR protocol, and ML-KEM as the KEM for the initial key exchange.

ECC is not quantum-safe: You can recover a private key from the public key and decrypt communication if you have a quantum computer. The protection from using a PQC (post-quantum) KEM for the initial key exchange is limited.

Additionally, Signal has a specific threat model, which can make using it insecure for a lot of usecases. For one, it is not anonymous. This means that it does not protect your identity, it only protects your messages. Aka it is fine for chatting with trusted parties, but dangerous for chatting with untrusted parties.

@ity thank you for the cryptography lesson. I am new to all this stuff.
@mattblaze thank you matt, this made me laugh out loud
@mattblaze “fediverse shitposter johnny still can’t PQ encrypt”
@glyph @mattblaze that part isn't even accurate, having PQC in the initial key exchange is sufficient in Signal's threat model at this point in time.
(Edit: Yes I googled the name after. I still think it's okay to infodump about cryptography even to someone that knows more cryptography than me.)
@ity you’re clearly the expert here. Probably too advanced for me to be able to follow.

@mattblaze I am starting to feel like I said something wrong here ?

If there's any mistakes in what I said feel free to correct me, I am always eager to learn ^^

@ity @mattblaze Hint: look at https://www.mattblaze.org/papers/ — and yes, it's his web page; I've known Matt for >30 years, and he's my modal co-author.
Technical Papers

@ity

Matt Blaze is a well know academic security expert, so he's poking fun at being lectured on systems he understands very well lol

@void_turtle If what I said came off as lecturing then apologies as that was not my intention, I was moreso infodumping to any interested readers (since this is public social media)

@ity Additional context you might be missing: He was commenting specifically on this breaking news story wherein top level US government people accidentally added a journalist to their signal loop planning military strikes, so the quantum safety (or lack thereof) of signal and the lack of anonymity is pretty irrelevant to this specific issue. Your post might have come off as lecture-y for this reason

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2025/03/trump-administration-accidentally-texted-me-its-war-plans/682151/

The Trump Administration Accidentally Texted Me Its War Plans

U.S. national-security leaders included me in a group chat about upcoming military strikes in Yemen. I didn’t think it could be real. Then the bombs started falling.

The Atlantic

@void_turtle Ah, yea I was missing that context completely :(

I don't keep up with US news anymore, it's too depressing

@ity @void_turtle
What an absolutely hilarious way of learning who @mattblaze is 🤣
@ity @mattblaze you’re explaining something kinda beside the point to an academic cryptographer who is almost certainly completely aware.
https://www.mattblaze.org/papers/
Technical Papers

@c0dec0dec0de @mattblaze To me it feels important enough to mention that Signal's cryptography is not impenetrable ? Whether whoever I am replying to is aware of it seems besides the point, since those reading his post might not be.
@ity @c0dec0dec0de I didn’t say it was impenetrable. I don’t know whether it’s impenetrable. I said it wasn’t what failed here, because it wasn’t.

@mattblaze @c0dec0dec0de

Ah, I misread your post then, I was missing the context it was in since I don't follow US news a lot. That's fair ^^

@c0dec0dec0de @ity @mattblaze

I thought it was for followers.

And nosy folks like me.

@ity @mattblaze oh no, now I feel bad for the chuckle.

Your first reply came across as correcting or explaining to him directly and @mattblaze is a well regarded cryptography expert and definitely knows all that.

I'm gunna take a swag at how your brain works and just say that I've been there. Even though this is a public forum, when you reply to someone it's generally taken as a direct reply to them unless otherwise specified. So next time just maybe preface with the info dump explanation you gave here.

Don't take it personally, you weren't trying to be rude, you were just excited and it came off in a wrong way.

@varx @mattblaze

Thanks >.< Yea, I was not trying to be rude, and rather just wanted to infodump about cool cryptography things. I can edit the post to make it clearer that an infodump follows ig

@mattblaze @ity Now I feel cheated. Are you saying that the internship I did with you... checks notes... 29 years ago was worth nothing at all?
@raph @ity sorry if you’re just figuring that out now.

@mattblaze Oh lol I just googled your name

Apologies, I like cryptography. Again, if there's something I said wrong in my post, please correct me.

@ity @mattblaze 'The clipper chip guy' might be a better alias tbh. Not many opportunities for a cryptographer to get more famous than that.
@jsbarretto @ity @mattblaze But only to people that have been doing cryptography for 20+ years, or that dive deep.
@ity @mattblaze Are there still no post-quantum ECC options?

@ity @mattblaze

I'm sorry people are giving you a hard time.

I'm sure I'm not the only one who valued your reply.

Please don't feel like you can't post ideas and information - someone will find them useful.

@mattblaze yeah, I suspect your regular Signal user might be a bit lower in ranking as intelligence interest.
I know these people aren't bright, but you would think they still follow best practices when running their fascist gig. Absolute zero self preservation.
@mattblaze I'm assuming Signal was chosen to circumvent FOIA... I don't know if that makes the situation better or worse. Funnier, maybe.
@floppergostic One way of archiving your messages is to include a reporter in all your chat groups.

@mattblaze
That's so crazy that it just might work!

@floppergostic

@mattblaze but Matt, Signal uses X25519, which is not part of FIPS! Isn't that a huge concern? I was told that would be a huge concern! /s

@sophieschmieg @mattblaze

The "I" in "FIPS" is for "impediment".

@sophieschmieg @mattblaze I heard that there‘s a concern Signal doesn’t use Military Grade hardware and operating systems.
@jb
Thank fuck, can you imagine having to lug that shit around?
@sophieschmieg @mattblaze

@dymaxion @sophieschmieg @mattblaze

In a past life and job, the phones were sound powered, with no electronics or external power.

So, yes…

@jb
I mean, I'm thinking about going out to the club at night with a 152 somehow improbably crammed into my purse
@sophieschmieg @mattblaze

@dymaxion

I gotta SCIF* in my pocket, baby.

@sophieschmieg @mattblaze

@mattblaze The whole story begs the question of usability vs. security. We can certainly blame the users, but would they go to off-the-shelf products if they were happy using the government-issued tools?
@huitema @mattblaze They don't trust the government, remember?
Let's blame the users for once.
@huitema @mattblaze The relevant government-controlled tools are highly secure, which is intrinsically cumbersome compared to mass-market tools that are made to be easy.
This case is absolutely end-user sabotage, intentional or by gross incompetence which is a big piece of what the proper secure channels make impossible.
@mattblaze Signal’s UI is pretty bad even for its intended purpose. I have never sent messages to the wrong person with any other IM system as frequently as I have with Signal. They make a big pile of rookie mistakes (breaking spatial memory, not providing visual clues about the recipient) that are easy to fix if they cared. I’d fix them myself and submit patches if there code were under a permissive license.
@david_chisnall @mattblaze hmm? Signal uses different colors for different people, that helps me distinguish chats fairly well.