@hejsna >yeah they do save phone numbers but *not* who’s talking to who. No contact lists, no messages, no metadata about them. Literally just phone number plus two dates. I think that’s just about as good as it gets.
Signal's infrastructure operates over the same TCP/IP network that the rest of the internet operates over. Without an anonymizing overlay network, such as #tor, adversaries can monitor the traffic going to and from Signal's infrastructure and build up a reliable social graph of who is likely talking to who.
Again, Signal has explicitly stated that it does not consider this as part of their threat model:
>Signal instantly dismissed my report, saying it wasn't their responsibility and it was up to users to hide their identity: "Signal has never attempted to fully replicate the set of network-layer anonymity features that projects like Wireguard, Tor, and other open-source VPN software can provide".
>
>https://gist.github.com/hackermondev/45a3cdfa52246f1d1201c1e8cdef6117
And has shown no interest in incorporating anonymizing overlay networks into its applications either:
https://community.signalusers.org/t/use-an-anonymizing-overlay-network/62670
I believe that Signal, as the dominant e2ee provider in the United States, has an ethical obligation to its users to take more steps to protect them, especially since it is now operating under a fascist government: (1) drop the phone number requirement, (2) bring network-layer anonymization into scope.
@Mer__edith @signalapp