Which one is real and which one is the honeypot?

"simulating" modern web applications is quite hard. Trying to clone or copy the source will always break due to the huge amount of javascripts and XHR requests, and not to mention the fact that some cough qnap systems consists of 7 different kinds of redirects from different web servers all serving different headers.

The way I have gone down is to leverage the ability of browsers to export HAR files and then serving them with a custom built Go tool. Allows me to build pixel perfect clones of websites with "relative" ease.

This could probably be used to "clone" more complex webapps also. But for now I'm happy with just being able to replicate login screens.

#honeypots #kilpi.tech

Now... this is kind of annoying. I have the honeypot dev instances running in my home network and now every time I open esxi I need to double check that I have not accidentally opened the honeypot and am about to enter the real password into that...

I reminds me about the conclusions of this research into honeypots and deception tech I read a while back

Results support a new finding that the combination of the presence of deception and the true information that deception is present has the greatest effect on cyber attackers, when compared to a control condition in which no deception was used

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2/1823/

#honeypots #honeypot #redteam #blueteam #infosec

An Empirical Assessment of the Effectiveness of Deception for Cyber Defense

The threat of cyber attacks is a growing concern across the world, leading to an increasing need for sophisticated cyber defense techniques. The Tularosa Study, was designed and conducted to understand how defensive deception, both cyber and psychological, affects cyber attackers Ferguson-Walter et al. [2019c]. More specifically, for this empirical study, cyber deception refers to a decoy system and psychological deception refers to false information of the presence of defensive deception techniques on the network. Over 130 red teamers participated in a network penetration test over two days in which we controlled both the presence of and explicit mention of deceptive defensive techniques. To our knowledge, this represents the largest study of its kind ever conducted on a skilled red team population. In addition to the abundant host and network data collected, we conducted a battery of questionnaires, e.g., experience, personality; and cognitive tasks, e.g., fluid intelligence, working memory; as well as physiological measures, e.g., galvanic skin response (GSR), heart rate, to be correlated with the cyber events at a later date. The design and execution of this study and the lessons learned are a major contribution of this thesis. I investigate the effectiveness of decoy systems for cyber defense by comparing performance across all experimental conditions. Results support a new finding that the combination of the presence of deception and the true information that deception is present has the greatest effect on cyber attackers, when compared to a control condition in which no deception was used. Evidence of cognitive biases in the red teamers’ behavior is then detailed and explained, to further support our theory of oppositional human factors (OHF). The final chapter discusses how elements of the experimental design contribute to the validity of assessing the effectiveness of cyber deception and reviews trade-offs and lessons learned.

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst

Adam on @riskybusiness explaining the same thing, how canaries screw with your mind and makes you second guess things

https://overcast.fm/+It0geLnZU/35:40

The original article they discuss is also good https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/08/tourists-give-themselves-away-by-looking-up-so-do-most-network-intruders/

The one thing I think is important with this, is that while red teams "hate" canaries and honeypods, I think criminals like ransomware crews are probably apathetic towards them for now, as long as there are more targets out there than they have time with they don't care much about getting detected.

But in both cases honeypots are useful, if they care they get more careful and move slower, which gives you more time, if they don't they just trigger them and let you know you have a problem.

#honeypot #redteam #blueteam #podcast #infosec

Risky Business #719 — FBI vapes 700,000 Qakbot infections — Risky Business

On this week’s show Patrick Gray and Adam Boileau discuss the week’s security news. They cover: The FBI takes down Qakbot, steals operators’ bitcoins ha ha Danish hosting provider completely destroyed in ransomware attack Sophisticated Russian cyber attack on Polish trains. Well. Not really. Microsoft revokes cert then revokes its revocation Much, much more! This week’s show is brought to you by Proofpoint. Ryan Kalember, Proofpoint’s EVP of cybersecurity strategy Ryan Kalember is this week’s sponsor guest. Links to everything that we discussed are below and you can follow Patrick or Adam on Mastodon if that’s your thing.

@gnyman this is very cool. i have long suspected that there was a meaningful psychological effect, and it is very interested that this was confirmed