I and my employers, #1Password, have never directly criticized a competitor before. But #LastPass's claim that it would take "millions of years" to crack the data made available from the breach needed to be addressed explicitly.

I also take the opportunity to explain why 1Password's distinct security architecture would keep users safe if we were to be breached.

https://blog.1password.com/not-in-a-million-years/

Not in a million years: It can take far less to crack a LastPass password | 1Password

How 1Password goes above and beyond to protect you in the event of a data breach.

1Password Blog

@jpgoldberg huge respect for what you've built and all the care you've taken to build a great product. I love 1password.

But this blog post is not a good look. Kicking a competitor when they're down for security reasons... Oof.

@ben, we would never do this for a breach or bug. But have you read their announcement?

Sure vendors understate the impact on users of security problems (and researchers overstates it). Human psychology leads to that, so it isn't even insincere.

But their statement goes well beyond that normal tendency.

@jpgoldberg I'll read it again to make sure ... But still, don't you think plenty of folks are legitimately beating up on them already? Opens the door to them hitting back the moment you misstep in your marketing or even during a breach. I don't think folks will see the subtle difference you lay out.

@ben That is a very real risk.

As you might imagine our marketing people, CEO, and others were very heavily involved in the decision. Yes, it might open the doors for mud slinging in ways that merely confuse the public, as they may not be able to differentiate.

We will see.

@jpgoldberg so you're saying a six-word diceware password is gonna be fine...

This is a really useful explainer.

How strong should your account password be? Here's what we learned | 1Password

How much effort would a hacker need to put in to crack a 1Password account password? Here’s what we learned after running some community challenges.

1Password Blog

@davidmschell @jpgoldberg I live completely in the Apple ecosystem, and the security of the passwords (and everything else) in my iCloud Keychain comes down to the security of my physical devices. Anyone who has physical possession of one of my devices and can unlock it has access to my Apple keychain. Among the things stored in my keychain is my 1Password secret key, so isn’t my 1Password data as secure as my keychain data even if I have a really weak master password? Could you make the argument that your master password really doesn’t have to be that strong at all?

It seems to me that in the past, before fully encrypted drives and secure enclaves and modern hardware security, it might have been more important to have a strong master password. Is it that important now?

@captainslim @davidmschell, if you live entirely within the Appleverse then iCloud Keychain can be a very fine choice. It doesn’t do everything 1Password does, but not everyone needs all of that.

A locked Apple device is very hard to break into even with full physical access.

@jpgoldberg I do use 1Password for all the extra stuff that it does. My point was that 1Password—even with no master password—seems to have the same security as iCloud Keychain, which itself is very secure. So is having a strong 1Password master password important, or is it just belt-and-suspenders in the Appleverse?
@captainslim, that is a tough one. We are able to store the Secret Key more security on Apple devices than we are on other platforms, but I don't want people to rely on that. So you don't need an unwieldy account password, but do have a unique and reasonable one.
@jpgoldberg It’s interesting to imagine a passwordless mode for 1Password on Apple devices, where the encryption key is stored in iCloud Keychain, protected by OS-enforced biometric or device passcode access. It’d have the same security as iCloud Keychain, requiring physical access to and the ability to unlock a trusted device, with all the extra features of 1Password.
@jpgoldberg I love #1password and appreciate the education from the team in light of everything going on with LastPass. When a competitor delivers messages that leave customers and the general public at security risk, you have a duty to step up and set the record straight. This is most definitely not kicking a competitor when they are down, is entirely ethical, and in the best interest of the user community.
@jpgoldberg love #1password but respectfully think this post is a bad move. Discussion here https://awscommunity.social/@Quinnypig/109593951007096454
Quinnypig (@[email protected])

Blunder by 1Password on this blog post. You stay above the fray when your competitor screws up like this and the entire rest of the internet is rightly piling onto them. If I worked there I’d be putting out content pieces for a month on how awesome their security was in all the ways LastPass’s is crap, but even the CIA couldn’t waterboard me into mentioning the LP breach by name as I’m doing it. https://blog.1password.com/not-in-a-million-years/

AWSCommunity.social
@dcreemer thank you.You may be right. And perhaps our anger at aspects of the LastPass announcement got the better of us. But at the moment it feels like we couldn't not say this.
@jpgoldberg Understood -- there's probably a lot of worry that their errors will reflect badly on 1Password. IMHO it's easy to think the rest of the world must be viewing you this way, but I think most folks will just look for other cloud-based alternatives (like 1Pass). Anyhow - please keep up the great work and don't listen to your VC's too much 🙂
Bcrypt is great, but is password cracking “infeasible”? | 1Password

There are a lot of technical terms that mean something very specific to cryptographers but often mean something else to everyone else, including security professionals.

1Password Blog
@jpgoldberg I understand that you and your employers believe with all your hearts that your servers can't be hacked and then user passwords obtained. But you used to give your paying customers the option to store their passwords on their own home systems only, and now you don't. The password that is never put in the cloud is the one that can't be hacked from the cloud. But for some reason your company has decided that your customers (again, PAYING customers, not freeloaders) should not be able to decide for themselves which method of storage they are most comfortable with. And that is why, if I am ever forced to stop using the older version of #1Password that still supports local password storage, I won't be using 1Password going forward. So, that's something else that will not happen in a million years - me and my family returning as your customers.

@Lunatech, we explicitly said that we have to plan for being hacked. That is why we designed the whole Secret Key thing. It is to protect users in the event that we get hacked.

If your synching mechanism provides better privacy and security than ours, that’s great. I do not believe that that would be the case for the overwhelming majority of 1Password users. Security choices must be made among viable alternatives.

@Lunatech, perhaps you have your own hardened rsync server or you only move your data around through purely local connections. And perhaps you never need to share some set of items with colleagues or family members. And that’s great. KeePass* may be a good choice for you. But my experience is that many people contrast our sync against an ideal instead of the reality of how they manage sync.

@jpgoldberg Also, please keep in mind that you are basing all your estimates on how long it would take to crack passwords based on currently available hardware and currently know algorithms. But already there is talk of quantum computers that will be far faster than today's computers. What may (or may not) may be a true estimate of the time it would take to crack a password vault today might look ridiculous in five, ten, or twenty years. But in any case, people should have the ability to store their passwords locally and not be forced to trust anyone's cloud storage.

There was a time padlocks were considered pretty secure, until criminals discovered how to make lock-picking tools! But they still couldn't pick the padlock they didn't know existed.

@jpgoldberg difficult call, but as a customer of both #1Password and #bitwarden I’ve been highly interested in an overview of how the security architecture contrasts if suffering a similar breach - so was a useful read.
@jpgoldberg so I have a question - when you say the device generates the secret key, how do other devices get access to the account if you don’t have a copy of the secret key to pass into the new device being added ti the account?
Or is it that each device has a secret key and joins the chain of trust for the account by using the account ID + master password? Perhaps the post could be updated to explain there are multiple secret keys?
@rscullen @jpgoldberg There’s a single secret key per 1Password account. If you want to add an additional device to your account, you must tell it the secret key. There are a number of ways to do this. The new device can scan a QR code displayed in 1Password on the first device (or on a piece of paper that you previously printed), or you can type it in manually. On Apple devices, the secret key is synced among your devices via iCloud Keychain, if you have it enabled.

@captainslim @jpgoldberg thanks for this.

For some reason I got it in my head that the secret key was an “account number”, and the real secret key was behind the scenes obfuscated from the user, but at no point in the UI does 1P say that so I don’t know where that thought came from lol. Makes sense now that I’ve looked at my account screen again. Cheers.

@rscullen @captainslim The A3-XXXXXX is not secret, and is an identifier, but the rest of it is, indeed, the secret of your Secret Key.

@rscullen, that is an excellent question and the blog post has been updated/corrected with the answer (in a footnote) that reads.

"In an earlier version I incorrectly said that the your Secret Key “never leaves your device.” There are a number ways your Secret Key can travel from an enrolled 1Password client to a new client, including end-to-end encrypted iCloud Keychain syncing, end-to-end encrypted Android backup, mechanisms under your control such as scanning a QR code from an enrolled 1Password client or you transmitting a setup code through mechanisms of your choosing. The over all point is that it is never transmitted to 1Password controlled systems, and so is never available to us or to someone who might breach us."