@aiden56 @leo
I guess we'll do round two of the hot takes on this stuff.
So, generally many, many websites use your email address to log you in. some use a username, but it's more the norm to use your email.
The same email that has been in countless leaks for years and years is on countless "consolidated" lists etc, and is likely run against all manner of websites as part of the standard billions-long email stuffing lists.
Given that so many websites have email enumeration issues, that is it is sort of hard to both allow a user to lookup if their email exists or not when registering and make it not able to tell the same thing to a massively distributed, slow attack coming from residential IP's .. then they are going to know quickly if you are on a site.
they actually likely just don't care. The list of URLs your email is associated with is unlikely to really give any of these big operations any kind of advantage. They already factor in that knowledge.
So then, I assume you're going to jump ship to some other password provider, of which there are many. Of which, just about all are or will be, under attack at some point. If you think you are going to jump to a provider who can protect your stuff 100%, then that's funny.
I know, I know, we can/should all host our passwords on our own self-hosted service or only locally in our systems, and sure, that likely does provide a certain measure of security, I guess? But I already do that. It's an encrypted block here locally that I just ask LastPass to store and backup.
The thing is, for this kind of thing, you have to factor in Shannon's maxim / Kerckhoffs's principle in that the enemy knows the system. Assume they can get to the encrypted blob, and assume they can know your username on a site. The controls still hold secure in this case.