Ser Guerrillera del ELN
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Continuando con nuestro “Marzo Antipatriarcal” hoy hablaremos sobre lo que es Ser Guerrillera del ELN. Para esto, escucharemos a continuación la historia de una de nuestras compañeras:
“Yo nací en un barrio popular, en una familia que fue desplazada de su tierra, la vida fue dura desde el inicio, tuve que trabajar desde niña porque no nos alcanzaba...
🚨 Informe revela: Colombia sigue siendo clave en el tráfico mundial de cocaína
Un informe reciente advierte que Colombia continúa siendo el mayor productor de cocaína a nivel mundial, con presencia de grupos armados ilegales como las FARC y el ELN.
Una de piratas
Editorial Revista Insurrección N° 1044
Comando Central (COCE)
Agoniza el sistema de salud pública, que hace 33 años fue entregado a empresarios, para que reemplazaran al Estado, en garantizar este derecho fundamental. Este invento por una complicación de males está en la sala de cuidados intensivos, en donde unos quieren desconectarlo y otros no.
Los empresarios fundaron unas...
📣 News Digest #RDM in #NaturalScience Week 12, 2026!
Today with @FAIRmat, @NFDI4Cat, @NFDI4Chem, @nfdi4earth, @PSDI and #RSpace. Enjoy reading:
https://thefairelephant.com/news_digest_archive/news-digest-rdm-in-natural-science-week-12-2026/
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The Paradissidents Against the Revolution
Today, paradissident groups have a presence in more than 22 departments of Colombia, expanding their dirty war tactics against the people, murdering, disappearing, and constantly harassing communities while deepening drug trafficking in the regions and forging alliances with other paramilitary factions. While these actions have had serious impacts on communities and grassroots organizations, one effect that has received little attention is the terrible damage they have done to the legitimacy of the revolutionary and insurgent tradition in the country.
The History of Struggle That Is Bleeding Out Today
In Colombia, the history of revolutionary and insurgent projects is long and rich in events, proposals, and methods, at least for study. The influences and motivations for change that fueled each project were varied, ultimately culminating in small “victories” or the annihilation of these visions for the country. With many of these groups, including liberal guerrillas, the State established agreements that often resulted in assassinations after promises of amnesty, as with Guadalupe Salcedo, or in persecution and extermination, as happened with the Patriotic Union, after negotiations and promises. There were also cases where insurgent projects fell into the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) trap, laying down their weapons and surrendering them under false pretenses and projects that the establishment promised but never fulfilled, or only partially fulfilled, without addressing the underlying causes of the conflict. The truth is that the FARC-EP was one such project, which, like all others, had its successes and failures, and which notably deepened the struggle against the oligarchy and imperialism. As the ELN, we understood very well that this was a force that was part of the country’s revolutionary projects, with whom we could engage in dialogue to jointly advance the revolution. An example of this was the formation of the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordinating Board, which, although it ultimately remained just another attempt at unity, helped us understand this force as legitimate, even though we had different methods and approaches. Within it, we recognized great leaders like Manuel Marulanda Vélez, Alfonso Cano, and Mono Jojoy, and we are certain that they felt the same way about our commanders.
Prior to the signing of the agreements in 2016, as part of a strategy to weaken and dismantle this guerrilla group, state forces focused on eliminating several leaders of this project, demoralizing its strength and undermining the effectiveness of its military strategy. Several years were dedicated to striking blows against the FARC-EP, which, coupled with misguided decisions (such as accepting drug trafficking as a source of funding, which led to the political and ideological disintegration of a large part of its ranks), resulted in a strategic defeat for its leadership. In other words, demoralization reached such a point that the certainty of victory was lost. Peace then emerged as a horizon that could offer an option to end the war with dignity. Thus, in 2016, after lengthy negotiations and significant concessions to overcome that historical impasse, the peace accords were signed between the FARC-EP and the government of Juan Manuel Santos. The peace accords constitute a turning point, marking the beginning of a new chapter in history—the story that brings us to the present moment.
The FARC-EP Dies and the Paradissidents Are Born
Prior to the peace agreement, and as a result of internal tensions and divisions stemming from various factors—including the number of concessions made during negotiations, which were not universally supported by the armed forces; the fragmentation of a faction whose primary interest lay in drug trafficking in the regions; and internal power struggles and disagreements that fueled divisions—some groups refused to accept the agreements and remained determined to continue their armed struggle. These groups formed a new structure, eventually commanded by Gentil Duarte and known as the “Central General Staff.” Furthermore, after the signing of the agreements and during the period designated for their implementation, some of the key leaders at the negotiating table surprised the Colombian people by taking up arms again, calling themselves the “Second Marquetalia,” citing the government’s failure to uphold the agreements. These two factions constituted the first phase of the reorganization of these “armed groups.” The main problem became evident after these groups, abandoning the legacy of the FARC-EP, became mere remnants with no real reason to wage war other than their drug trafficking businesses. Although there were some differences between them, both ended up acting in the same way, generating terror in communities and killing at any cost to maintain their economic interests and territorial control in the regions. Later, the Central General Staff subdivided, giving rise to the General Staff of Blocs and Fronts, which today is just another such force, lacking a political vision and instead focused on business interests that only harm the country.
In the countryside and cities against the revolution
Today, nothing remains of the FARC-EP’s revolutionary project, only an empty shell that has been used to establish a foothold in territories, but also to harass and intimidate those who stand in the way of their business. The strategy has not only been confined to the regions, their municipalities, and rural areas, but has also been evident in the country’s cities. Although the methods vary, a modus operandi of territorial control based on micro-trafficking in the cities is evident. However, the ways in which they have ultimately influenced the social and organizational fabric have been varied, and in this case, it is worth noting that perhaps the point of greatest consolidation of these groups occurred primarily during the social uprising, when, through the dissemination of a false revolutionary discourse, they attracted the attention of many young people who, not knowing where to channel their righteous anger, ended up joining the dissident groups, deceived by the narrative and legacy of the FARC-EP. Furthermore, they were exploited through underhanded tactics, taking advantage of the vulnerabilities of working-class youth by offering money to work for their groups. This was the case for many young people, including el de Coco, el de Bigotes, and many others throughout the country. For the rest of the country, they have implemented different methods, depending on the degree of territorial control and the capacity for co-optation through rhetoric and resources.
Thus, in southwestern cities like Cali, Popayán, and Nariño, the method has been the infiltration of social organizations through their funding, instrumentalizing them to carry out their plans. In places like Putumayo and Caquetá, among others, the modus operandi has been coercion, given the territorial control they have established since their formation in these areas. In other regions such as southern Bolívar, the Aburrá Valley in Antioquia, Chocó, and the Urabá region of Antioquia, the way to establish control has been through opening up to other paramilitary groups in direct alliance for strategic plans. Finally, in northeastern cities like Cúcuta and Bucaramanga, the method of funding organizations, making them functional to their territorial control plans, has also been implemented.
These logics not only complicate the interpretation of the various territorial actors, but in the long run, they delegitimize any revolutionary project, since ultimately, they represent a contradiction between discourse and deeds. These groups have not only damaged their own tradition and the legacy of the FARC-EP, but they also call into question any project that calls itself revolutionary. Today, as the ELN, we know that the actions of these groups contribute to the counterinsurgency war that has been waged against us throughout our years of struggle and resistance, but we also know that we have been transparent with the people, in every word, in every action, in every moment in which we have spoken to the people and they have listened to us. Today it is up to us to tell the people for whom we fight not to be fooled, that they must discern and not fall for tricks, that our tradition of struggle remains intact, and that today we are the ONLY revolutionary project in this country and that we will not take ONE STEP BACK.
By: Octavia Rebelde, Antorcha Correspondent
Source: https://insurgenciaurbana-eln.net/las-paradisidencias-contra-la-revolucion/
https://abolitionmedia.noblogs.org/?p=30329 #colombia #counterinsurgency #eln #farcEp #paradissidents #southAmerica
ELN – Battles in Southern Bolivar
Darío Ramírez Castro War Front
The Darío Ramírez Castro War Front of the ELN is fighting combined forces of the state army and the Gulf Clan cartel, who are attempting to seize the community mining titles of artisanal miners in gold-rich territories in Bolívar and Antioquia.
JANUARY 2026
– On the 13th at 9:00 a.m., a guerrilla offensive began against paramilitaries of the Gulf Clan in the trenches of Campo Café, in the La Caoba village of Mico Ahumado, in the municipality of Morales, southern Bolívar; The operation, which lasted until January 22, forced them to retreat from their fortifications in Metodio, San Agustín, Mina Rica, Santo Domingo, and Mina Cielo. During their escape, 12 sets of field equipment were recovered, along with 2 GPS devices, 2 Motorola radios, and 10 drone grenades. According to local residents, the narcoparamilitaries left several dead and wounded with them. The guerrilla units suffered 4 wounded.
– On the 22nd, a drone bombing was carried out on the Clan del Golfo base, located in the La Garita village, in the municipality of Río Viejo, southern Bolívar; the results are unknown.
– On the 22nd, a drone bombing was carried out on the paramilitary base, located on the Sombrerón ridge, in the San Agustín village, in the municipality of Arenal, southern Bolívar, where one paramilitary member was killed and two were wounded.
– On the 23rd, a drone attack was carried out on a paramilitary base located in the village of San Agustín, in the municipality of Arenal, southern Bolívar; the results are unknown.
– On the 24th, a drone attack was carried out on a paramilitary base located at the Mina Rica junction, in the village of San Agustín, in the municipality of Arenal, southern Bolívar; the results are unknown.
– On the 29th at 11:40 am, during an hour-long firefight with the Clan del Golfo in the village of Santa Cecilia, Villa Flor, in the municipality of Santa Rosa, southern Bolívar, we do not know of enemy casualties, but we had one comrade slightly wounded.
– On the 30th at 9 am, a drone attack was carried out on a paramilitary base located in the village of Santa Cecilia, in the municipality of Santa Rosa, southern Bolívar; the results are unknown.
FEBRUARY
– On Sunday, February 1st at 9:00 AM, a paramilitary base located in the Santa Cecilia village, in the municipality of Santa Rosa, southern Bolívar, was bombed with drones; the results are unknown.
– On February 4th at 10:40 AM, a paramilitary base located in the Santa Cecilia village, in the municipality of Santa Rosa, southern Bolívar, was bombed with drones; the results are unknown.
– On February 5th at 11:00 AM, a paramilitary base located in El Cafetal, in the municipality of Morales, southern Bolívar, was bombed with drones, resulting in the deaths of two paramilitaries and injuries to three others.
– On February 6th, a paramilitary base located in La Jungla, in the municipality of Arenal, southern Bolívar, was bombed with drones; the results are unknown.
– On the 6th at 2 pm, a paramilitary base located in El Cafetal, Morales municipality, southern Bolívar, was bombed with drones; the results are unknown.
– On the 7th at 4 am, after several skirmishes, guerrilla units seized the fortified positions of the Gulf Clan, located in Filo Alto de San Agustín, heading towards La Garita. The paramilitaries ultimately fled and abandoned their positions. Our force concluded without incident.
– On the 7th at 4 am, a paramilitary base located in El Cafetal, Morales municipality, southern Bolívar, was bombed with drones, resulting in one paramilitary member being wounded.
– On the 8th at 10 am, a paramilitary base located in El Cafetal, Morales municipality, southern Bolívar, was bombed with drones; the results are unknown.
– On the 10th, a paramilitary base located in the La Garita village of the Río Viejo municipality, southern Bolívar, was bombed with drones. Four paramilitaries were wounded, and to protect themselves, they used the civilian population as human shields, blending in with the people to avoid further bombings by our units.
– Also on the 10th, at 9:00 a.m., during an hour-long firefight between the guerrillas and the Clan del Golfo in Casa Verde, in the El Paraíso village of Santa Isabel, Santa Rosa municipality, southern Bolívar, the paramilitaries were forced to retreat. In their flight, they carried two dead and one paramilitary member seriously wounded by an anti-personnel mine (APM). The paramilitaries took refuge in La Antena, where at 4:00 p.m., faced with a new guerrilla attack, they were forced to flee again, carrying three dead and several wounded. Our comrade Vlacho, operations officer of the Compañía Simón Bolívar, was killed in action.
– On the 10th at 4:20 a.m., in the Mina Cielo village of the Arenales municipality, southern Bolívar, a paramilitary member was seriously injured after stepping on a landmine.
– On the 11th, a paramilitary base located in the La Garita village of Rio Viejo, southern Bolívar, was bombed with drones. The results are unknown.
– On the 12th at 1:10 pm, fighting broke out between the guerrillas and the Clan del Golfo in the La Guarapería village of the Montecristo municipality, southern Bolívar, which lasted throughout the afternoon. One paramilitary member was killed and three wounded. The operation ended without further incident.
– On the 20th at 5:30 pm, the military base of the 48th Jungle Battalion of the state army, located in Mina Vieja in the San Lucas mountain range, was bombed with drones. The results are unknown.
– On the 20th at 9:30 pm, guerrilla units engaged in combat with the Gulf Clan in Casa Verde, in the El Paraíso village of Santa Isabel, Santa Rosa municipality, southern Bolívar department. The guerrillas managed to seize the paramilitary positions, forcing them to flee towards the Palmeritas area. The results of the engagement are unknown.
– On the 28th at 9 am, the military base of the 48th Jungle Battalion of the state army, located in Mina Vieja in the San Lucas mountain range, was bombed with drones. Fourteen professional soldiers were wounded, and a Black Hawk helicopter from the Military Aviation was hit by the bombs and forced to make an emergency landing in the municipality of Santa Rosa, southern Bolívar department. The operation concluded without further incident.
Source: https://eln-voces.net/2026/03/16/combates-en-el-sur-de-bolivar/
https://abolitionmedia.noblogs.org/?p=30096 #colombia #eln #guerrilla #southAmerica
📣 News Digest #RDM in #NaturalScience Week 11, 2026!
Today with @DAPHNE4NFDI, @NFDI4Cat, @NFDI4Chem, @nfdi4earth & @PSDI. Enjoy reading:
https://thefairelephant.com/news_digest_archive/news-digest-rdm-in-natural-science-week-11-2026/
#FAIRElephantNews #ChemotionELN #Chemotion #RDM #ELN #FAIRdata #ResearchDataManagement
Marzo Antipatriarcal
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El ELN como organización insurgente reconoce el papel histórico y protagónico de las mujeres en la revolución y en las luchas por la liberación, así como en la construcción del proyecto de vida socialista contra toda forma de opresión y dominación. A partir del sexto congreso, nos reconocemos como una organización de carácter antipatriarcal, con la disposición de...
🚀 Great news for chemical research!
💻 Release of #Chemotion #ELN 3.0.0 out! 🎉 The latest update to our electronic laboratory notebook brings numerous improvements and new features that make managing your research data even more efficient and #FAIR.
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