Could the XZ backdoor have been detected with better Git and Debian packaging practices?

The discovery of a backdoor in XZ Utils earlier this year shocked the open source community, raising critical questions about software supply chain security. This post explores whether better Debian packaging practices could have detected this threat, offering a guide to auditing packages and suggesting future improvements.\n

Supply-Chain-Angriff: NPM-Pakete mit 2,6 Milliarden Downloads pro Woche infiziert

Angreifer haben durch einen Malware in NPM-Pakete eingeschleust, die wöchentlich über 2,6 Milliarden Mal heruntergeladen werden.

Enable sponsorship on your repo · Issue #105 · tukaani-project/xz

With the recent attention, I'm sure plenty of people will be willing to donate a few dollars to help support you. Please enable the "Sponsor" feature on your repo : https://docs.github.com/en/spons...

XZ Utils backdoor

The Philosophy of the Open Source Pledge

Today, we launched the Open Source Pledge. Virtually all companies use Open Source software, making the Open Source ecosystem crucial to virtually all of the technology we use. That Open Source software is created and supported by maintainers. But the companies that use Open Source software almost never pay the maintainers anything. This means that the maintainers end up doing a huge amount of work for free, often as a second shift after their dayjob so that they can pay the bills, leaving them burned out and overworked, and leaving the projects they maintain at risk of serious security issues.

XZ backdoor: Hook analysis

In this article, we analyze XZ backdoor behavior inside OpenSSH, after it has achieved RSA-related function hook.