"Given what we know about the limited net surplus actually squeezed from agriculture and the scale of human loss, a softer, more balanced socialist strategy looks economically plausible and morally preferable. A reformed NEP with hard investment targets could have delivered comparable industrial capacity by the early 1940s, with fewer long-term distortions and a very different distribution of gains.
But plausibility on paper isn’t the same as political feasibility in 1928–32. Information was thin; the leadership’s worldview was siege-minded, which was hardly irrational given the collapse of collective-security efforts after 1933 and, ultimately, the 1941 German invasion; and incentives inside the party-state pushed toward command solutions. From that vantage point, the crash path felt “inevitable,” even if it wasn’t in a strict economic sense. The late-1980s debates in the Soviet Union revived the counterfactuals, including the idea that Lenin might have kept a mixed economy longer. As Alec Nove cautioned in the last edition of An Economic History of the USSR, it’s far from obvious he would have chosen differently had he lived into the 1930s.
So, I land here: a more humane path was possible, but not likely under the beliefs, threats, and institutions of the time. The lesson isn’t that speed always justifies the means. It’s that the means shape the society you end up with, long after the steel is rolled and the machines are built."
https://deveconhub.com/was-stalin-necessary-three-ways-to-read-soviet-industrialization/
#Russia #USSR #Stalin #Industrialization #NEP #Lenin #StateCapitalism