@mhoye it’s always good to err on the side of stronger rather than weaker crypto where feasible as you’re not only defending comms / data against today’s capabilities but also against future capabilities that can be applied against any captured & stored comms / data by an adversary. it’s already common for nation-state intelligence orgs to position themselves in core comms backbones to collect & store as much as they can that goes across the wire, whether encrypted or not

the usual caveats about threat models still apply, but threat models can change over time & your #ThreatModel in 5-10 years may include people / orgs / countries that you’re not currently worried about – the adage is “the time for good #OpSec^ is before you know you need good OpSec” 🙃

Aus gov advice (from #ASD⚹) for agencies is to have quantum-resistant #crypto in place by 2030 & they’re updating the Aus Gov Information Security Manual (#ISM) to reflect developments in post-quantum cryptographic algorithms – see the chapter Guidelines for cryptography at https://www.cyber.gov.au/business-government/asds-cyber-security-frameworks/ism/cyber-security-guidelines/guidelines-for-cryptography

they also have a good overview for smaller orgs – Planning for post-quantum #cryptography at https://www.cyber.gov.au/business-government/secure-design/planning-for-post-quantum-cryptography

#PostQuantumCryptography
 
 
 
^ “operational security” – good security & privacy practices designed to keep you more secure

⚹ the Australian Signals Directorate