How to Create WordPress Custom Designed Login Logo
It seems the custom-designed logo of the login form gets cropped or truncated if you update your WordPress installation to 3.8 or later.
Background: It seems the custom-designed logo of the login form gets cropped or truncated if you update your WordPress installation to 3.8 or later. Just...
Email address invalidated #login
E-Mail Address Invalidated #login
Nope nope nope nopity nope
#enshittification #IMDB #reviews #RegistrationWall #login #web #privacy #e14n
GDM keeps asking for password multiple times on login after suspension #login #gdm #systemdlogind
That got onto Hacker News and in turn got me reminiscing about the rather different way that #login was planned to work on GNU Hurd, with one running login *after* starting a shell session, adding credentials to running shell processes. It was in early blurbs for Hurd.
I thought that they never implemented it. It turns out that for a brief time at the turn of the century the #Debian #Hurd people, at least, actually did.
https://groups.google.com/g/linux.debian.ports.hurd/c/2rCbPlXXzfQ/m/4Wmg_jf8FC0J
A Post-Quantum Future for Let's Encrypt
Let’s Encrypt is committed to a post-quantum-safe Web PKI. The path we’re planning to take is Merkle Tree Certificates (“MTCs”), a new approach that adds post-quantum authentication to the web without sacrificing the speed and reliability that have made TLS universal.
— by @letsencrypt
🔐 https://letsencrypt.org/2026/06/03/pq-certs
#letsencrypt #PQCryptography #pqc #web #it #authentication #postquantum #login #pwords #postquantumcryptography #websecurity #future #webpki
Let’s Encrypt is committed to a post-quantum-safe Web PKI. The path we’re planning to take is Merkle Tree Certificates (“MTCs”), a new approach that adds post-quantum authentication to the web without sacrificing the speed and reliability that have made TLS universal. This post is about these plans and why we believe MTCs are worth pursuing as a key to a post-quantum future. An increasingly urgent problem For much of the last several years, the conversation about post-quantum cryptography has been a conversation about encryption. The reasoning was straightforward: an attacker who records encrypted traffic today might be able to decrypt it years from now once quantum computers can break the underlying math. Authentication, the part of TLS that indicates a server is who it says it is, has been a less urgent problem. A quantum computer needs to forge a signature in real time, not retroactively, so threats to authentication hinge on the existence of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC).
Mandar Apte | UX Designer
AskUbuntu
C.
Tilda Moose, citizen
JdeBP
Uncle hadsn
𝕂𝚞𝚋𝚒𝚔ℙ𝚒𝚡𝚎𝚕
Dendrobatus Azureus