Paulo Fernando de BarrosDec 21

An Open Letter to Chancellor Merz: Indivisible Security and History Matters

Indivisible Security and History: Jeffrey Sachs’ Open Letter to Chancellor Merz

Jeffrey Sachs Calls for German Accountability in European Tensions

In a recent interview with Professor Glenn Diesen, renowned economist and foreign policy advisor Jeffrey Sachs delves into the motivations behind his open letter to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. The discussion underscores the principle of indivisible security, a foundational concept in European stability that has been repeatedly overlooked. Sachs argues that Germany’s actions over the decades have contributed to the current Ukraine crisis, and without acknowledging this history, Europe risks escalating into broader conflict. Indivisible security, as Sachs emphasizes, means that no nation’s safety can come at the expense of another’s, a truth rooted in post-World War II agreements but eroded by broken promises and geopolitical maneuvering.

The conversation begins with Sachs expressing alarm over Chancellor Merz’s rhetoric, which he describes as “beating the drums of war” without any attempt at diplomacy with Russian President Vladimir Putin. As the leader of Germany, Merz bears a special responsibility for European peace, yet Sachs sees a lack of self-reflection in European politics. Europe, he says, is on a dangerous course marked by misunderstanding and denial of its own role in the Ukraine war. The open letter aims to prompt Merz to confront Germany’s historical contributions to this instability, starting with the pivotal promises made during German reunification in 1990.

At the heart of Sachs’ argument is the assurance given to Soviet leaders that NATO would not expand eastward. In the context of reunifying Germany—the nation whose actions ignited World War II—Western leaders, including German officials, explicitly promised Mikhail Gorbachev and other Soviet figures that NATO’s jurisdiction would not move “one inch eastward.” This commitment was not casual; it was integral to the negotiations allowing reunification.

Sachs points out that Germany played a central role in these assurances, yet both Germany and the United States later reneged, leading to NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and aspirations toward Ukraine and Georgia. This betrayal, Sachs asserts, forms the casus belli for the current war, a fact acknowledged even by insiders in the Biden administration.

A recent prank call to Amanda Sloat, a former senior National Security Council official, revealed her admission that if NATO enlargement had been off the table, the Ukraine war might have been avoided. Sachs uses this to reinforce his call for honesty: indivisible security demands mutual trust, which has been shattered by such deceptions. He urges Merz to recognize this history and cease provocative statements, instead pursuing diplomacy based on indivisible security principles.

Expanding on Germany’s missteps, Sachs recounts several key events. In 1999, Germany participated in NATO’s 78-day bombing of Belgrade, an action taken without United Nations authorization. This intervention in the heart of Europe set a precedent for unilateral power plays, ignoring international norms. Then, in 2002, Germany remained silent as the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, destabilizing the nuclear arms control framework. This move, combined with NATO expansion, heightened tensions, as it removed safeguards that had maintained balance since the Cold War.

The 2008 recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Germany further exemplifies this pattern. After NATO’s bombing fragmented Serbia, Germany supported the creation of Kosovo, where the largest NATO base in southeastern Europe, Camp Bondsteel, was established. Sachs highlights the hypocrisy: Europe champions the inviolability of borders yet selectively breaks them when it suits strategic interests.

That same year, at the Bucharest NATO Summit, Germany acquiesced to U.S. pressure despite Chancellor Angela Merkel’s private reservations. The summit declared that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually join NATO, a decision Merkel later admitted in her memoirs could lead to war. Public opinion in Ukraine at the time opposed membership, recognizing the risks, but the commitment was made anyway, setting the stage for future conflict.

Sachs then turns to the 2014 Maidan events. On February 21, 2014, German, Polish, and French foreign ministers brokered an agreement with Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to restore calm, maintain his government, and hold elections later that year. However, within hours, U.S.-backed hard-right paramilitaries seized government buildings, installing an extra-constitutional regime. Yanukovych denied resigning, but Germany quickly endorsed the new government, abandoning its brokered deal. This silence enabled the coup, leading to unrest in the Donbas region, where ethnic Russians rejected the regime’s crackdown, including restrictions on the Russian language.

By early 2015, the Minsk II Agreement was negotiated, with Germany and France as guarantors. Endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council, it called for cessation of hostilities and political autonomy for Donetsk and Luhansk. Yet Ukraine refused to implement it, opting instead to build a massive army with U.S. support to retake the regions by force. Sachs criticizes Germany for doing nothing as guarantor, allowing the agreement to fail. Merkel later admitted it was used to buy time for Ukraine to strengthen militarily, though Sachs believes her initial intent may have been genuine, modeled on autonomy arrangements like South Tyrol in Italy. Regardless, the failure underscores Germany’s lack of commitment to indivisible security.

Throughout the interview, Sachs stresses that indivisible security is not a Russian invention but a core element of pan-European agreements. He draws parallels to earlier history, such as the 1952 Stalin Note, where the Soviet Union proposed German reunification on neutral terms, honoring the Potsdam Agreement’s call for demilitarization. Western powers, influenced by German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, rejected it deceitfully, prolonging the Cold War. Adenauer’s secret communications revealed distrust of his own people and a preference for division over neutrality. This pattern of deceit repeats, Sachs argues, eroding trust and indivisible security.

Diesen notes the irony: Moscow supported German unification despite French and British concerns about a “Fourth Reich,” yet Germany later excluded Russia from European integration, reviving bloc politics. Sachs agrees, pointing out Germany’s active role in pushing NATO expansion under President Bill Clinton, contrary to promises. He shares a personal anecdote from a 2021 call with Jake Sullivan, where the U.S. National Security Advisor privately assured no NATO enlargement for Ukraine but refused to say so publicly, citing an “open door policy.” Sachs warned this could lead to war, a prediction that materialized.

The interview highlights how leaders like Merz and Ursula von der Leyen, both German, fail to acknowledge their country’s responsibility. Sachs praises past German figures like Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, Helmut Kohl, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher for advocating indivisible security and unity with Russia. If current leaders followed suit, the war could end through diplomacy.

Ultimately, Sachs’ message is that truth can halt hostilities. Leaders know Russia’s concerns—NATO expansion chief among them—but propagate falsehoods publicly. Indivisible security requires honesty to rebuild trust. Without it, Europe heads toward disaster. The open letter calls on Merz to reflect, tell the truth, and lead toward peace.

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References

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