📢 Handala wipe Stryker Corporation via Microsoft Intune : 56 000 employés impactés dans 61 pays
📝 *Le groupe hacktiviste pro-palestinien Handala, lié à l'Iran, a compromis les credentials Global Admin de Stryk...
📖 cyberveille : https://cyberveille.ch/posts/2026-03-21-handala-wipe-stryker-corporation-via-microsoft-intune-56-000-employes-impactes-dans-61-pays/
🌐 source : https://www.threathunter.ai/blog/iran-handala-stryker-wiper-detection-pack/
#Entra_ID #Handala #Cyberveille
Handala wipe Stryker Corporation via Microsoft Intune : 56 000 employés impactés dans 61 pays

Le groupe hacktiviste pro-palestinien Handala, lié à l'Iran, a compromis les credentials Global Admin de Stryker Corporation pour déclencher un wipe massif via Microsoft Intune le 11 mars 2026.

CyberVeille

🛠️ Tool
===================

Opening:
TokenFlare is an open-source, serverless Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing framework focused on Entra ID and Microsoft 365 authentication flows. The project packages capabilities to capture post-authentication artifacts (session cookies, tokens) and to exchange them for API access via Microsoft Graph.

Key Features:
• Credential and session capture: captures credentials and session cookies at phishing interaction time.
• Serverless infrastructure: designed to run on serverless platforms (notably Cloudflare Workers) to provide TLS, scalability, and obfuscation of hosting.
• Post-auth exploitation path: uses captured session material to perform actions via Graph API for lateral access or demonstration purposes.
• Operational tooling: interactive campaign configuration, webhook delivery of captured artifacts, and built-in bot/anti-automation protections.

Technical Implementation:
• Architecture centers on a stateless serverless front end that handles the phishing interaction, stores minimal transient state, and forwards captured session material to a collector endpoint.
• Use of session cookies and tokens enables exchange into API access where permissions permit; the framework demonstrates how post-auth artifacts can be reused to query Microsoft Graph.
• Design choices prioritize low overhead for operators: SSL and bot protection are provided by the hosting platform, while credential delivery is webhook-driven.

Use Cases:
• Red team engagements that aim to test identity controls without deploying agents to endpoints.
• Purple-team exercises demonstrating the impact of exposed session tokens and inadequate session revocation.
• Security assessments focused on conditional access, token lifetimes, and Graph API permissions.

Limitations and Considerations:
• Effective operation depends on the hosting platform and on captured artifacts that retain validity; short token lifetimes or strong conditional access policies reduce efficacy.
• Detection requires correlating anomalous token use, session reuse, and unexpected Graph API calls originating from novel serverless hosts.
• Not novel in technique: commoditised AiTM kits exist on underground markets; TokenFlare provides an authorized testing equivalent.

References and Context:
• The framework was used in 15+ engagements and publicly demonstrated at a security conference; it is published as an open-source project for authorised testers.

🔹 tool #M365 #Cloudflare #Entra_ID #phishing

🔗 Source: https://labs.jumpsec.com/tokenflare-serverless-AiTM-phishing-in-under-60-seconds/

TokenFlare: Serverless AiTM Phishing in Under 60 Seconds

At Beac0n 2025, I counted the talks. Five were about payloads, C2 frameworks, and endpoint evasion. One covered physical security. One was AI. And one (mine) was about cloud-native identity attacks.

JUMPSEC Labs
📢 Prise de contrôle d’une hiérarchie SCCM via intégration Entra ID (CVE-2025-59501) corrigée par KB35360093
📝 Source: SpecterOps (billet de blog, 19 nov.
📖 cyberveille : https://cyberveille.ch/posts/2025-11-21-prise-de-controle-dune-hierarchie-sccm-via-integration-entra-id-cve-2025-59501-corrigee-par-kb35360093/
🌐 source : https://specterops.io/blog/2025/11/19/sccm-hierarchy-takeover-via-entra-integrationbecause-of-the-implication/
#CVE_2025_59501 #Entra_ID #Cyberveille
Prise de contrôle d’une hiérarchie SCCM via intégration Entra ID (CVE-2025-59501) corrigée par KB35360093

Source: SpecterOps (billet de blog, 19 nov. 2025). Contexte: Publication de recherche détaillant une vulnérabilité de SCCM intégrée à Entra ID, assignée CVE-2025-59501, avec un correctif publié le 27 oct. 2025 (KB35360093) et une chronologie de divulgation. Le billet explique que, sur des sites SCCM intégrés à Microsoft Entra ID (CMG/Co-management) et avant le correctif KB35360093, l’API AdminService valide un jeton Entra puis extrait l’UPN pour réaliser une impersonation Kerberos S4U d’un compte Active Directory correspondant, sans contrôle d’autorisation supplémentaire sur l’UPN. Cela permettait d’exécuter des opérations WMI côté SMS Provider « au nom » de n’importe quelle identité AD mappable via l’UPN.

CyberVeille
Using PostgreSQL with .NET and Entra ID - .NET Blog

Getting started with .NET and PostgreSQL, and using Entra ID to secure your app.

.NET Blog