Scott Arciszewski

678 Followers
129 Following
171 Posts
Residing at the intersection of PHP, security, cryptography, and open source software. He/him. Opinions are solely mine. RTs != endorsements, etc.
TitleSr. Security Engineer
Pronounshe, him
Bloghttps://scottarc.blog
If you have a favorite #MLDSA implementation, check if these new Wycheproof test cases are valid and please report back in the PR.
ml-dsa: additional test vectors by tob-scott-a · Pull Request #242 · C2SP/wycheproof

This PR adds new test cases to kill implementation bug classes identified in DJB's latest loquacious screed against ML-DSA. It's sad that Dr. Bernstein prioritizes trying to win cheap point...

GitHub

RE: https://infosec.exchange/@trailofbits/116419704979785055

Today in memory safety bugs in Rust code.

Google used a ZK proof to disclose a quantum breakthrough that cuts the cost of breaking cryptocurrency by 20x without handing attackers the circuit.

The Rust code behind the proof had memory safety bugs. We used this new attack surface to forge a proof that beats Google’s on every metric.

Google patched it within days. Their quantum claims are unaffected. https://blog.trailofbits.com/2026/04/17/we-beat-googles-zero-knowledge-proof-of-quantum-cryptanalysis/

We beat Google’s zero-knowledge proof of quantum cryptanalysis

Trail of Bits discovered and exploited memory safety and logic vulnerabilities in Google’s Rust zero-knowledge proof code to forge a proof claiming better quantum circuit performance metrics than Google’s original results, demonstrating unique security risks in zkVM systems.

The Trail of Bits Blog

Hot take:

Discord is not a documentation platform. It is a chat platform. If your project requires connecting to a discord to obtain necessary information, then your project is undocumented.

Release Version 2.5.0 · paragonie/sodium_compat

Security Fix Read: A vulnerability in libsodium This fixes a congruent issue in the main branch of the PHP implementation. For older PHP versions, see v1.24.0 instead.

GitHub
We're releasing pure Go implementations of ML-DSA (FIPS-204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS-205). These libraries are engineered to be constant time, preventing timing side-channel attacks like KyberSlash. https://blog.trailofbits.com/2025/11/14/how-we-avoided-side-channels-in-our-new-post-quantum-go-cryptography-libraries/
How we avoided side-channels in our new post-quantum Go cryptography libraries

We’ve released open-source Go implementations of ML-DSA and SLH-DSA.

The Trail of Bits Blog

@DefuseSec In case you wanted to refresh cryptofails.com sometime

https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1979

On Singh et. al.'s "Collatz Hash"

Singh et. al. recently uploaded a preprint describing a new hash function inspired by the Collatz Conjecture. After performing some cursory tests, the proposed function appears to be completely unsuitable for cryptographic purposes, and should not be used.

IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
A key should always be considered to consist of both raw key material and all metadata required to fully describe and execute the associated cryptographic function.
@abacabadabacaba @soatok yeah, I’d second the idea to explicitly not allow multiple recipients for this scheme. KCI seems a bit of an edge case for a two party system, but allowing any member in a multiparty group to spoof any other member seems like a bit of a cliff. Unfortunate that schemes like MLS have to pull in signatures for this and can’t just use something similar to Noise_K.