Swapneel Patnekar

150 Followers
258 Following
268 Posts
In my $dayjob, I am the Founder and CEO of https://infosec.exchange/@shreshta, a threat intelligence company. 
Aside from grokking DNS here, expect pictures of my cat.
Personal bloghttps://brainattic.in

Have you noticed that when the blame #DNS meme starts flying the root is perfectly operational, there is rarely a mention of the big registry operators, BIND, Unbound, Knot, and PowerDNS are absent the conversation, and many who can craft a reasonable dig query are getting responses from local and public resolvers to debug?

Even with all the misconfiguration, added complexity on top of it, and burden of being used by practically every service on the Internet, we should marvel at how amazingly good the vast majority of the DNS performs despite our best efforts to overwhelm it with all the Internet junk we've created.

Wishing everyone a Happy and prosperous Diwali! 🪔

I'm again running my free Rust training course for FOSS developers. It's split into two sessions of two hours. First session is on Wednesday, October 1 at 13-15 UTC. Second sessions is two days later, on Friday, October 3 at 13-15. See https://liw.fi/training/rust-foss-dev/ for more information.

Boosts welcome. Share widely amongst your friends who might be interested.

#Rust #RustLang #Training #Free

Free Rust training to FOSS programmers

Skimming through The Art of Mac Malware, Volume 2 (https://nostarch.com/art-mac-malware-v2) has an interesting chapter on setting up a DNS monitor to intercept and block DNS traffic from unrecognized processes. DNS monitor uses the network extension framework.

I am guessing(yet to get my hands dirty) it provides similar visibility to what kunai does in terms of process hunting.

DNSMonitor source - https://github.com/objective-see/DNSMonitor

#DNS #ThreatHunting

My Firefox extension DNSSEC/DANE Padlock was just accepted:
https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/dnssec-dane-padlock/
It displays a small padlock or key when the website supports DNSSEC or DANE, which is quite rare but a sign of specific attention to security.
I’ve done a small list of websites to test: https://codeberg.org/Seb35/DNSSEC-DANE_Padlock/wiki/Examples-of-websites
If you want to participate to development, code and tickets are on https://codeberg.org/Seb35/DNSSEC-DANE

#Firefox #DNSSEC #DANE

DNSSEC/DANE Padlock – Get this Extension for 🦊 Firefox (en-US)

Download DNSSEC/DANE Padlock for Firefox. Validate DNSSEC and DANE using DoH

While analyzing a scam server infrastructure, we discovered a folder containing a random name and profile generator - an open source tool designed to create identities on demand. The open source tool is hosted on Github and is pretty old with the latest commit around 7 years ago.

From a scammer’s perspective, tools like this are invaluable and are part of their toolkit. They’re used to craft believable personas for,

1. Pig-butchering and romance baiting
2. Crypto and investment scams
3. Social engineering campaigns at scale

Behind the scenes, the tool offers an API for automation and pulls profile images from unsplash[.]com

The next time you get a "Hi" or a "Hello" or something similar from a stranger, do recollect this post 😀

#pigbutchering #romancebaiting #investmentscams #cryptoscams

"Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Funnull Technology Inc., a Philippines-based company that provides computer infrastructure for hundreds of thousands of websites involved in virtual currency investment scams, commonly known as “pig butchering,” along with its administrator, Liu Lizhi." [1]

"Since January 2025, the FBI has identified 548 unique Funnull Canonical Names (CNAME) linked to over 332,000 unique domains. In April 2025, a sample of eight domains were analyzed to depict a CNAME analysis that resolved to four CNAMEs tied to Funnull infrastructure. Between February 2023 and April 2025, the eight domains showed three different patterns of CNAME activity." [2]

My observations,

1. As the report states "Cryptocurrency Investment Fraud Scams between October 2023 and April 2025", in our scam threat intelligence dataset, out of 24k+ domain names, a large number were registered before 2023, some of them going back to 2021. No wonder the pig-butchering/romance baiting and investment scams industry is exploding.

2. The FBI report falls short of clearly mentioning Protective DNS as a recommended solution to mitigate access to malicious domain names.

3. Preliminary analysis of random domain names (small sample size) from the FBI report in our historical DNS database shows many domain names pointing at IP addresses of a Autonomous System in HK.

[1]: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0149

[2]: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2025/250529.pdf

Treasury Takes Action Against Major Cyber Scam Facilitator

WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Funnull Technology Inc., a Philippines-based company that provides computer infrastructure for hundreds of thousands of websites involved in virtual currency investment scams, commonly known as “pig butchering,” along with its administrator, Liu Lizhi.  Americans lose billions of dollars annually to these cyber scams, with revenues generated from these crimes rising to record levels in 2024.  Funnull has directly facilitated several of these schemes, resulting in over $200 million in U.S. victim-reported losses. “Today’s action underscores our focus on disrupting the criminal enterprises, like Funnull, that enable these cyber scams and deprive Americans of their hard-earned savings,” said Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Michael Faulkender.  “The United States is strongly committed to ensuring the continued growth of a legitimate, safe, and secure digital asset ecosystem, including the use of virtual currencies and similar technologies.” This action was taken in close coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  To assist the private sector in identifying and taking down websites associated with Funnull, the FBI is also publishing a cybersecurity advisory with more information on Funnull’s operations, including technical details about the IP addresses and computer infrastructure that it uses.  The public is encouraged to report online scams and other illegal online activity to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3).SOPHISTICATED CYBER SCAMS TARGETING AMERICANSIn September 2023, the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) published an alert about pig butchering scams.  These scams are largely perpetrated by criminal organizations based in Southeast Asia who use victims of labor trafficking to conduct outreach to millions of unsuspecting individuals around the world.  The scammers leverage fictitious identities, the guise of potential relationships, and elaborate storylines to deceive victims into believing they are in trusted relationships.  The scammers then steal victims’ assets by convincing them to invest in virtual currency through a fake website designed to look like a legitimate investment platform that reflects significant, but fabricated, returns on the investment.   However, once a victim is unable or unwilling to pay more into the scam, the scammer will abruptly cease communication, taking the victim’s entire investment with them.FUNNULL’S SUPPORT TO THOUSANDS OF PIG BUTCHERING WEBSITESFunnull Technology Inc. (Funnull) enables virtual currency investment scams by purchasing IP addresses in bulk from major cloud services companies worldwide and selling them to cybercriminals to host scam platforms and other malicious web content.  Funnull is linked to the majority of virtual currency investment scam websites reported to the FBI.  U.S.-based victims of these scam websites have reported over $200 million in losses, with average losses of over $150,000 per individual.  These figures likely underestimate the total losses, as many victims of scams do not report the crime. Funnull generates domain names for websites on its purchased IP addresses using domain generation algorithms (DGAs)—programs that generate large numbers of similar but unique names for websites—and provides web design templates to cybercriminals.  These services not only make it easier for cybercriminals to impersonate trusted brands when creating scam websites, but also allow them to quickly change to different domain names and IP addresses when legitimate providers attempt to take the websites down.  In 2024, Funnull purchased a repository of code used by web developers and maliciously altered the code to redirect visitors of legitimate websites to scam websites and online gambling sites, some of which are linked to Chinese criminal money laundering operations.  Liu Lizhi (Liu), a Chinese national, is an administrator of Funnull.  Liu was involved in and possessed spreadsheets and other documents containing information about Funnull’s employees, their performance, and their progress on tasks.  These tasks included assigning domain names to cybercriminals, including domains associated with virtual currency investment fraud, phishing scams, and online gambling sites.OFAC is designating Funnull pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13694, as further amended by E.O. 14144, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of cyber-enabled activities originating from, or directed by persons located, in whole or substantial part, outside the United States that is reasonably likely to result in, or has materially contributed to, a threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States and that has the purpose of or involves causing a misappropriation of funds or economic resources, intellectual property, proprietary or business confidential information, personal identifiers, or financial information for commercial or competitive advantage or private financial gain.  OFAC is also designating Liu pursuant to E.O. 13694, as further amended by E.O. 14144, for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Funnull.SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONSAs a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.  Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons.  OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis.  OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions.  In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons.  The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law.  The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.  For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.Click here for more information on the persons designated today.  To report internet crime to the FBI, click here.###

U.S. Department of the Treasury

As folks in my network already know, we've ( @shreshta ) been actively detecting and tracking network infrastructure associated with industrial scale scams such as - pig-butchering/romance baiting, and crypto and investment fraud campaigns.

An interesting pattern in this data is the misuse of the Tesla brand in crypto and investment scam infrastructure.

From fake trading platforms to cloned website templates/kits and impersonation pages promising unrealistic returns, these scams are designed to deceive victims by capitalizing on the Tesla brand.

I am sharing our report which has some key findings, tactics used by threat actors, and indicators of compromise (IOCs).

Full report available here - https://shreshtait.com/blog/2025/05/crypto-investment-scams-exploiting-the-tesla-brand/

#pigbutchering #romancebaiting #scams #investment #Tesla #crypto

Crypto & Investment scams exploiting the Tesla brand

A surge in crypto and investment scams exploiting Tesla’s brand and Elon Musk’s image is targeting investors through fake websites.

Shreshta Blog

Sometimes it's fascinating to see how some domain names constantly rotate the IP addresses and the network infrastructure they point to.

Here's a quick look at one such domain over time 👇 FYI, this one is not fast flux.

#DNS #threatintelligence

An interesting discussion came up at a nerd dinner :-), where, the argument was that a recursive resolver already knows where the root servers are (root hints ), so then what is the purpose of running a local copy of the root zone in the recursive resolver aka RFC 8806?

My blog post unpacks the key differences and why recursive resolvers must embrace running a local copy of the root zone.

https://brainattic.in/2025/03/25/root-hints-vs-rfc-8806/

root hints vs RFC 8806

A deep dive into root hints vs RFC 8806. Learn how recursive resolvers use root servers and the benefits of serving the root zone locally.

Swapneel Patnekar