Ok, fellow hackers, I propose a pact: That new EU age verification app thingy ... do NOT help improve it.

Don't publish findings. Don't responsibly disclose insecurities. Don't facilitate them making it bulletproof.

If personal data is directly at risk, by all means, slam their asses into the ground. GDPR them into oblivion.

But on its core functionality this needs to be, to become, and to stay, the most insecure, the most easily circumventable piece of shit code on the planet.

In today's episode of "Can It Run Doom": DNS fucking TXT records.

Some absolute madlad (cough Adam Rice cough) compressed the entire shareware DOOM WAD, split it into around 1,964 chunks, shoved them into Cloudflare TXT records, and wrote a PowerShell script that reassembles and runs the whole goddamn game from DNS queries alone. Nothing touches disk. The DLLs are in DNS. THE FUCKING DLLS ARE IN DNS.

RFC 1035 was written in 1987. Those engineers are spinning in their graves fast enough to generate municipal power.

Bonus: this is a fully functional globally-distributed covert data exfil channel that your NGFW will never fucking see if you're not doing deep DNS inspection. Sleep well.

blog: https://blog.rice.is/post/doom-over-dns/

repo: https://github.com/resumex/doom-over-dns

Also lmao @ every blue team that has never once looked at their DNS query volume. How's that DLP policy working out for you.

It was always DNS.

#infosec #dns #doom #itisalwaysdns

I reported an insecure DKIM key to Deutsche Telekom / T-Systems. They first asked me to further explain things (not sure why 'Here's your DKIM private key' needs more explanation, but whatever...). Then they told me it's out of scope for their bugbounty.

I guess then there's really no reason not to tell you: They have a 384 bit RSA DKIM key configured at: dkim._domainkey.t-systems.nl

384 bit RSA is... how shall I put it? I think 512 bit is the lowest RSA key size that was ever really used. 384 bit RSA is crackable in a few hours on a modern PC (using cado-nfs). The private key is:
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIHxAgEAAjEAtTliQYV2Xvx1OGkDyOL799BTFEuobY2dn2AgtiKCQgrh78NVK1JK
j0yRXgNnPpGBAgMBAAECMF0t+TBZUCi8xATSMij7VLTxv5Xi5OIXesNiXOKtYIRP
LkpYfR5PggaMScfbmqSssQIZAMwOhm9d7Y7Qi7I2j1AlYbiqdtqO54T7FQIZAONa
9dJFkC6lM3EPXR+0SZ4dqwwpiM0nvQIYYgz8thi5JK264ohq9sTvnu9yKvUN9I09
AhgfgMYZKcxtujRjkSZtMzUUNLYzzDmJe90CGDKwqcBI0v9ChaR8WHht+/chMdxj
7ez94w==
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

The Alpine Linux project is pleased to announce the availability of new stable releases:

3.20.10
3.21.7
3.22.4
3.23.4

These releases include security fixes across core components.

musl (2 CVEs)
openssl (6 CVEs)
zlib (2 CVEs)

See https://alpinelinux.org/posts/Alpine-3.20.10-3.21.7-3.22.4-3.23.4-released.html for more details

#AlpineLinux